Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Indochina, Volume XIII, Part 1

751G.00/7–653: Telegram

The Chargé in France (Achilles) to the Department of State

secret

Paris, July 6, 1953—6 p.m.

69. Repeated information Saigon 9, info Phnom Penh 6, Vientiane 4, London unn; pouched Frankfort for Satterthwaite. All information available to us indicates that recent French policy decisions re IC reflect compromise between divergent views in Cabinet. It is believed that Reynaud was moving force behind position taken and that final text was adjustment between his and Bidault’s views. This is revealed in part in press conference Reynaud held with small group American correspondents shortly before release of text on evening July 3. Foreign Office officials had told United States correspondent during day that new talks with Associated States would take place within framework of March 1949 accords with implication discussions would represent evolution and freer interpretation these accords. Reynaud in press conference made clear to correspondents that this was not correct and that entire basis Franco–Associated States relations would be discussed if latter so wished, as was expected to be case. Commentary handed to press at time text of declaration released goes somewhat farther than text in saying “bonds which will unite Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos to France will carry with them no limitations on their independence other than those which will be freely agreed to” and “nature of these bonds will be defined between contracting parties dealing on equal basis and without restraint”.

Margerie’s interpretation to us of new policy decision is for example, less liberal than that given us by Tezenas du Montcel. Former speaks of need for increased Associated States participation in conduct of their affairs and need for increased participation in war effort but does not give impression of as far-reaching new look as does Reynaud in his press conference, Tezenas in his statements to us or informal commentary released with text. Figaro of July 4–5 strikes what is perhaps proper note in this regard when it concludes its article re IC decisions with statement “nations are judged more, and better, as are men, by acts rather than by texts” and “acts of French Government must be tomorrow the exact reflection of promises loyally made and commitments freely given”. Implementation new decisions vis-à-vis Associated States will be test.

One of most promising notes struck is appointment Dejean, career Foreign Office official, ex-Commissioner General. Margerie tells us his appointment made for several reasons: (1) he was one of two private secretaries to Reynaud in late thirties and thus well-known and trusted by Reynaud, who wished have person at Saigon in whom he had confidence; (2) Dejean had been well-received by Vietnamese on trips there since he had been chief of mission in Tokyo and he had been particularly helpful to Associated States in their relations with Japan; (3) Dejean was fully familiar with Far Eastern problems, including IC; and (4) his relations with United States military and civil officials in Japan had been excellent. With his background Dejean should be able bring new and fresh approach to IC situation and inspire confidence in new French Look.

An important point which has not been made clear publicly in light of recent developments is that of right of Associated States to have choice of remaining in or withdrawing from French Union. Reynaud told me in presence Laniel July 2, each state would have right to decide whether or not remain in union. Associated Press Bureau Chief who was present at Reynaud’s press conference tells us, however, Reynaud straddled this one by saying that this was unrealistic question in that they would not consider withdrawals since without French aid as par to French Union they would fall to Communists sovereignty. In reply to our query in this regard, Margerie tells us this was debated at some length in Cabinet meeting. He said some Cabinet members wished to make clear in public statement that Associated States were free to make their choice re continued membership in French Union but that other members were strongly opposed to public statement of this nature with result that question was not met head on. Text of communication does, however, make clear French desire and expectation that Associated States will remain in French Union.

We are reliably told that Reynaud has said he would not himself conduct talks or negotiations with Associated States in implementation new decisions since he did not wish to restrict his field of activities solely to IC problems but desired be free to act in much broader fields. However, Reynaud’s personal interest in IC and forward-looking approach to problem augurs well for French attitude in future discussions with Associated States and he would be expected to give guiding hand to such negotiations. Next move is now up to Associated States and it is somewhat disquieting to note that first press reports here of Associated States attitudes speak of “reserve at Saigon”.¹

While United States attitude toward French policy IC must be fairly clear to French Government, we believe that it has been helpful here in terms of French reactions to recent policy decisions that latter have been initiated by French themselves. Initial French reaction appears to have been generally favorable, which might not have been case had critics been in position to picture decisions as having been made under American pressure.

Achilles

1. Telegram 33 from Saigon, July 5, read as follows: “Initial reaction Vietnamese here to declaration handed by Laniel to three high commissioners Associated States July 3 one of reserve approaching skepticism. General attitude is France has made many promises in past; judgment to be withheld until French spell out intentions and give evidence good faith by concrete actions. Even French here admit legalistic wording declaration such that it could not expect capture imagination peoples Associated States. Manifesting some disappointment over declarations, Offroy observed to me too bad statement drafted in Paris without consultation any qualified French officials in Indochina who could have contributed probably worth-while suggestions.” (751G.00/7–553)