Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Indochina, Volume XIII, Part 1

751G.5/7–253: Telegram

The Ambassador at Saigon (Heath) to the Department of State¹

top secret

Saigon, July 2, 1953—2 p.m.

7. Repeated information Paris. For Johnson (FE) from Bonsal. General O’Daniel yesterday sent telegram to JCS via CINCPAC transmitting General Navarre’s “principles for the conduct of the war in Indochina” and O’Daniel’s comments thereon.² He requested copy sent Department. When received, please repeat Paris.

Navarre’s “principles” reflect in my judgment O’Daniel’s impact here. Navarre has clearly moved forward from position he described to O’Daniel mission at June 21 briefing (see Saigon telegram 2552, repeated to Paris 474).³ Navarre’s own attitude toward situation has been sharpened and his plans accelerated by his talks with O’Daniel and presence of mission here.

Navarre left today for Paris where he will attempt sell his concept of offensive operation to new French Government. Vital part that concept is need for equivalent from one to two divisions fresh troops from French Union to be made available as soon as possible. Such additional troops added to battle corps already at disposal French High Command appear offer only practical means to give command adequate capabilities coping with enemy and reversing current military trend this fall. O’Daniel had hoped troops could be drawn from other parts Vietnam and that mission of new commando levies might be changed to permit their use in offensive operations but he now concedes that early implementation these possibilities would be unattainable in view conditions here. Therefore, additional French Union troops essential.

I recommend Embassy Paris receive instructions from Secretary to give discreet yet effective support to Navarre concept. Points which occur to me in drafting of Department instructions are following:

1. Navarre concept must not be thought of as creating conflict with NATO requirements. It should be clearly apparent that France cannot play full role in European defense (1) as long as Indochina drain continues at present level or (2) if France were confronted with inevitable consequences of a disastrous or dishonorable retreat in Indochina. Victory in Indochina is key to France’s playing full part in Europe. French (Navarre) and US (O’Daniel) military thinking indicates such victory is possible. For reasons with which Department abundantly familiar, delay in reversing military trends here could well have serious repercussion in political plane in France and in Vietnam. Furthermore, now, rather than after effective German contribution to European defense begins to threaten new problems for French, is time when maximum French effort here is possible.

2. We should support forward looking political thinking which would reverse adverse political trends here at same time that evidence is being given of determination and ability to reverse military trends. In phrase of General Navarre, period of rug merchant tactics should be considered ended. A final French position as to the independence of the Associated States and as to what France expects within framework of French Union in return for her continued participation in the development and defense of these states is essential. The timing of any specific renegotiation of existing agreements should perhaps be dependent on favorable military developments. This would not, however, preclude an immediate statement of general intention to be made by the new French Government perhaps at time of French Union meeting this month.

3. O’Daniel mission has under study number of specific ways in which Franco-Vietnamese military effort can be made more effective. I would hope that these important recommendations when formulated and thoroughly examined at working level would have needed high level support for prompt implementation.

4. It may be that we can help in transport of additional French Union troops to Indochina above those presently contemplated. I mentioned this matter to Admiral Radford on June 17; he made no commitment but seemed believe there were possibilities.

5. Now that Pleven is reaffirmed as Defense Minister, we should follow up approach already initiated regarding Air Force personnel ceiling here. (Impression given by O’Daniel mission is that though conditions in French Air Force here have improved since Secretary Defense wrote Department this subject,⁴ lifting personnel ceiling is vital if Air Force is to meet expected demands).

Concurrently, it would be my hope Congress action on MSA appropriations would enable us advise French and Associated States of exact nature aid to be anticipated from US. Also, I am increasingly impressed with desirability giving French such indications as may be possible concerning actual support US could render in event Chinese Communist aggression against Indochina as result vigorous Franco-Vietnamese offensive against Viet Minh.

Offroy, diplomatic advisor to High Commissioner here, has spoken to me several times regarding political necessity from point of view French Government of giving French public impression every avenue exhausted to secure consideration Indochina problem at time of Korean political conference or in event Four-Power discussions. Offroy has mentioned as example possibility refusing lift current UN embargo on China trade until supplies to Viet Minh from Communist China are cut off. I have given him no encouragement on this score.

Ambassador Heath concurs.

If Department believes desirable, Bonsal could return Washington in time for Foreign Ministers’ meeting which press here reports scheduled for July 10.⁵

Heath

1. This telegram was transmitted in two parts.
2. Dated June 30, p. 624.
3. Dated June 24, p. 616.
4. For the text of the letter from Secretary of Defense Wilson to Secretary of State Dulles, May 16, see telegram 5693 to Paris, May 21, p. 576.
5. Telegram 24 to Saigon, July 3, read as follows: “For Bonsal. Embtel 7 very helpful. O’Daniel telegram not yet received by JCS. Believe desirable that if possible Bonsal return Washington for Foreign Ministers meeting arriving about July 10. Bilateral talks with French on Indochina scheduled begin July 12. If desirable Bonsal could return Honolulu after Foreign Minister meeting to work with O’Daniel on report in light results meeting.” (751G.5/7–253)