Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Indochina, Volume XIII, Part 1

PSA files, lot 58 D 207, “French Military Operations in Indochina”

Memorandum by Ambassador Donald R. Heath to the Secretary of State¹

secret

[Washington,] April 28, 1953.

Subject:

• Current Situation in Indochina

As of possible interest I am setting down very briefly my views as to the present and prospective situation in Indochina and action which we can and should take towards redressing it.

Military Situation and Prospects

The overrunning of Laos by the Viet Minh is due to the fact that the French High Command, influenced by Letourneau, (1) acted on political rather than on purely military considerations (2) underestimating the ground-covering ability and agility of the Viet Minh. The idea of General Salan and Letourneau was to hold the Thai country in northwestern Viet-Nam and protect Laos against Viet Minh incursions. To that end he immobilized a large proportion of his shock troops in the improvised strong point of Na San and in Lai Chau. Had he not done so, he would have had sufficient striking forces to be in a position to menace the main Viet Minh forces around the Tonkin Delta and would have deterred them from mounting an incursion on the present large scale into Laos. From a purely military standpoint, it would have been better to let the Viet Minh indulge in limited occupation of these areas, tragic as that would have been for Laos, while the French concentrated their troops and operations in Tonkin against the Viet Minh main forces.

The Viet Minh cannot, however, win this war by dispersing their forces and overrunning economically unrewarding Thai country and north Laos—unless the Chinese Communists send troops to help them. As of today, it seems likely that the Viet Minh can capture the hereditary capital of Luang Prabang although there is as yet no certainty that they can take Vientiane, the more important administrative capital of Laos. It seems unlikely both because of supply difficulties and the necessity of keeping the bulk of their forces against the Tonkin Delta that the Viet Minh, unless reinforced by the Chinese, can indefinitely maintain their occupation of northern Laos in their present military strength let alone proceed against Cambodia or Thailand. The problem of the French High Command is then, as soon as feasible to (1) disengage as many troops as it can from Laos and return them to the Tonkin Delta, (2) meanwhile to build up as fast as possible, according to the Letourneau Plan, the Vietnamese National Army and, now, the Laotian National Army, in order to break the present equilibrum of forces to complete the clean-up of the Tonkin Delta and to attack and occupy as soon as possible such strategic areas as the Thanh Hoa Province whose loss would definitely weaken the Viet Minh.

French Military Plans

The Joint Chiefs of Staff have reluctantly accepted the Letourneau Plan for expansion of the Associated States National Armies and after cleaning up south and central Viet-Nam to attack, in 1954–1955 the main forces in the north reducing, according to Letourneau, Viet Minh resistance to “negligible proportions”. The Joint Chiefs of Staff would like a faster schedule and larger scale and earlier attacks on the main Viet Minh forces. I suggest that this human impatience for quick results reveals unfamiliarity with the French and Vietnamese forces, as they are and with the actual battle and climatic difficulties they face in Indochina. The plan might indeed be accelerated if the French could find for the High Command someone of the late Marshal deLattre’s calibre. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have no candidate to suggest beyond the possibility of General Guillaume who would be tarred as a colonialist because of his administration of Morocco. Even if we had a candidate, we could not force the French to accept him. General Valluy² has been mentioned as Salan’s successor. If Valluy or whoever takes command fails to exhibit in action the energy, ability and resolution which this military situation requires, then we might some months hence make some discreet suggestions to the French. While we had our doubts as to Salan’s ability to handle the military problem, we hardly felt justified in passing on these doubts to the French Government before the present defeat. Salan had previously made a good record in Indochina and had enjoyed the confidence of the late Marshal deLattre.

I see no alternative to approving the “Letourneau Plan” and giving the apparently $800 million for arms and budgetary support which France will need in 1954 to implement it plus an as yet undetermined slice, probably at least half, of the Associated States budget deficit in excess of $230 million which will result from the contemplated expansion of their national armies. But it is far from certain the contemplated expansion of the National Armies will in itself reduce Viet Minh resistance to negligible proportions within two years. We should vigorously support Admiral Radford’s recommendation that France send an additional 10–20 thousand troops to Indochina. We are, I understand, supporting his additional recommendation that we lend six C–119s with American civilian pilots to airlift troops and tanks for use in Laos.

The Political Situation

Slowing up and indeed gravely imperiling military progress is the lack of a dynamic Vietnamese Government, commanding general popular confidence. Bao Dai, although intelligent and useful as a symbol in bridging the strong north-south friction in Viet-Nam, is not by education or personality, the stuff of which Churchills are made. Tam, the Prime Minister, is dynamic and efficient and a great improvement over his predecessors, but it is doubtful he will be able thoroughly to unite the country because of his personality and candidly pro-French record. Our course is to support Tam and his reform measures morally and through our MSA Programs for the moment, but not, under present circumstances, to follow any of his courses of action which would greatly undermine the prestige or authority of Bao Dai or cause the latter’s abdication. Somebody better than Tam must eventually be found, but the successor is not clearly apparent as yet. There are only two Vietnamese now with something approaching national prestige; Ngo Dinh Diem, the Catholic lay leader, self-exiled at present in the United States, and Tri, Governor of North Viet-Nam. Diem seems at present disqualified due to his intransigence, his anti-French stand and his cordially reciprocated dislike of Bao Dai. Tri is a definite possibility. At present we are properly supporting his project for cleaning the Viet Minh out of the Delta through joining scattered hamlets into fortified defensible towns, by the allocation of MSA funds. If he succeeds in his governorship of the north he might then succeed Tam with advantage. At some future date the Embassy might discreetly support him vis-à-vis Bao Dai and the French (to the extent of not incurring the reproach of intervening in internal politics).

Apart from the lack of qualified leadership there is the problem of the profound distrust and dislike of the French. There are certain concessions in their basic accords with the Associated States which the French might well make which might allay although not remove the residual Francophobia in Viet-Nam and Cambodia (there is relatively little feeling among ruling groups of Laos who realize their need of French help). We have been stopped in the past by Letourneau’s contention that the French Assembly, voting $¼ billions a year and seeing French and French Union lives lost in Indochina, was in no mood for any further concessions at this time and that to insist on them would dangerously strengthen the opposition to the continuance of the French effort in Indochina. There are certain gestures and concessions which now, however, I feel the French must and can shortly make without particularly worsening the situation in the French Assembly. At some early date the French should announce that the system of mixed courts for French Union nationals will be reexamined and also the abrogation of the present requirement that legislation affecting French interests as defined in the basic accords with the Associated States shall not apply to French Union nationals until promulgated by the French High Commissioner. I think that in Washington, Paris and Saigon we must persistently and discreetly urge the French to some concession or promise on these points. There are other concessions or gestures which the French can make such as the surrender of Norodom Palace in Saigon to Bao Dai.

Presentation of Aggression Against Laos to Security Council

The advantages of attempting to obtain a Security Council resolution of condemnation of the clear aggression against Laos are well stated in the memorandum for the Secretary prepared by UNA.³ An immediate effort should be made to persuade France to let a Laotian representative make this presentation in the Security Council. A 7, 8 or 9–2 vote of the Security Council condemning the aggression would have an excellent effect in Laos, of course, and in Viet-Nam. The prestige and hope in the UN among the Vietnamese is very strong and a majority condemnation of the Viet Minh, even if vetoed by the Security Council, should have a great effect in rallying standout nationalists to Bao Dai’s side. Whether France can be persuaded to raise the general question of Viet Minh hostilities and Chinese Communist support at this time in the Security Council is doubtful. It should be explored.

I believe, however, if France would make the two concessions mentioned above, that at the next meeting of the General Assembly, she might strongly defend herself against any attack on her record and actions in Indochina which might be made by India, the Arab bloc and any other “anti-colonialist” states.

Cambodia

The situation of Cambodia is distinct from that of Viet-Nam and Laos. In contrast with them it is an ethnically homogeneous nation. In contrast it is, economically and financially, not far from self-sufficiency. Cambodians dislike, because they fear and hate the Vietnamese, the federative monetary and customs union which French influence has placed on the Associated States for their own good. While there have been Viet Minh operations and regional infestation, Cambodia has largely escaped the rigors of war which Viet-Nam, and now Laos, have experienced. The Chinese and Communist menace seems remote and little appreciated. French military defense of Cambodian internal security has not been too successful since the bulk of French Union forces in Indochina have been concentrated in Viet-Nam. To these factors must be added the recent release last year by the French of the 1949 rebel Son Ngoc Thanh and his almost immediate taking to the brush and rebellion again. Thanh’s propaganda has been increasingly effective and has diminished the national support, almost veneration enjoyed by the King. This is probably the principal cause—plus inept French handling—of the anti-French outburst of the King in the interview he gave the New York Times April 19th. Hitherto the King had been reasonable and appreciative of the necessity of French defense of Indochina.

The King is at present waiting it out in Japan until he is assured that the French will make some concessions to his demands. It is almost certain they will do so and our influence must be exerted to that end.

There is a hot-blooded group which would like to see him come into conflict with the French and are ready to launch a rebellion. (Saigon telegram 2029 April 28th).⁴ I believe, however, the Secretary’s telegram to the King⁵ emphasizing the necessity of harmonious cooperation with the French will have some effect and with some concession forthcoming from the French, the King will follow a reasonable course.

My Personal Plans

I had planned to take some leave before returning to my post since aside from two weeks in 1949 and an occasional day or so off, I have had no leave since 1947.

At FE/PSA’s request I have remained on busy consultation since my arrival here March 22nd.

In view of the invasion of Laos I now plan to forego my leave and unless the Department desires me to stay on here a time longer, I will leave Washington around May 10th. I believe it advisable to undergo a medical check-up, which had been arranged for me at Georgetown Hospital, for the period May 2–8 or 9, before returning to a post classified as unhealthful where I have served for nearly three years.

1. Transmitted through the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs.
2. Gen. Jean Valluy, Deputy Chief of Staff, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers in Europe; a French military commander in Indochina, 1946–1947.
3. The memorandum, “Possible United Nations Action with Respect to Invasion of Laos by Vietminh,” was transmitted to the Secretary of State by John D. Hickerson, Assistant Secretary for United Nations Affairs, on Apr. 28. It read in part as follows: “I believe that, on balance, it would be desirable to urge the French to agree to the introduction of the problem in the United Nations. Action there would give the problem an international character, and thus provide a better basis for increased United States aid and the inclusion of Indochina among the list of items subject to international negotiation. United Nations action would also maintain the principle of Free World opposition to aggression.” (751G.00/4–2853)
4. In telegram 2029 from Saigon, Apr. 28, not printed, Chargé McClintock reported on discussions he conducted with French officials at Phnom Penh that day. The French had expressed the belief that there was an immediate danger of armed revolt against them if King Norodom Sihanouk gave the word. (751H.00/4–2853)
5. The reference is to telegram 2539 to Tokyo, Apr. 28, p. 520.