Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Indochina, Volume XIII, Part 1

Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers, Whitman file

Memorandum of Discussion at the 141st Meeting of the National Security Council, Tuesday, April 28, 1953¹

top secret
eyes only

April 28, 1953

[Extracts]

Present at the 141st meeting of the National Security Council were the President of the United States, Presiding; the Vice President of the United States; the Secretary of State; the Acting Secretary of Defense; and the Director for Mutual Security. Also present were the Secretary of the Treasury; the Director of Defense Mobilization;² General Vandenberg for the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Director of Central Intelligence; Mr. Robert Cutler, Special Assistant to the President; Mr. C. D. Jackson, Special Assistant to the President; Major General Wilton B. Persons, USA (Ret.), Special Assistant to the President; Colonel Paul T. Carroll, Military Liaison Officer; the Executive Secretary, NSC; and the Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC.

There follows a general account of the main positions taken and the chief points made at this meeting.

. . . . . . .

2. The Situation in Indochina

The Director of Central Intelligence then briefed the Council on the grave developments of the Vietminh invasion of Laos. The Vietminh forces had advanced so rapidly toward the south that if the French in the delta could be persuaded to take the initiative they might capitalize on the vulnerabilities of an overextended enemy and cut his supply lines. However, the French did not seem inclined to shift from their purely defensive tactics, and there were, therefore, no encouraging developments in the situation. It was also pointed out that there were plenty of supplies from the United States piling up in Saigon, but no Vietnamese troops to make effective use of these supplies, and an absence of will by the native population to fight. Finally, Mr. Dulles pointed out the great anxiety of Thailand over developments of recent days.

General Vandenberg stated that reports from Admiral Radford completely confirmed Mr. Dulles’ pessimistic views. According to Admiral Radford there were no indications that the French were doing anything to enlist the support of the population of Vietnam, either to take a hand in the fighting or to improve their political prospects for independence. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, said General Vandenberg, were loath to press the French to adopt a really effective plan, military and political, to meet the crisis in Indochina, but they were convinced that if such a realistic plan were not adopted, further U.S. assistance amounted to pouring money down a rathole. The French commanders in Indochina appeared completely defensiveminded, and General Vandenberg believed that the United States should somehow make clear to the French that unless they formed larger units of native forces and took the offensive against the enemy, further U.S. aid could not be forthcoming.

General Vandenberg also informed the Council that the French had requested the loan of six C–119 (Flying Boxcars) aircraft, together with pilots to operate them.

. . . . . . .

The President inquired why the French could not provide pilots.

Secretary Dulles said he had discussed the Indochinese problem with the French in Paris only last Sunday. He and his colleagues had attempted to make clear to the French that United States assistance to France in the next fiscal year would be closely related to Indochina, and would have to be conditioned on acceptance by the French of a practical program there and one from which we could see something hopeful. Secretary Dulles thought the French disposed to agree with this position and were on the point of sending out a new crop of generals. They did not wish, however, to interrupt the normal sequence of rotation in this matter.

Secretary Dulles inquired where the C–119 planes were.

General Vandenberg answered that they were in Japan, but that the French thought it would take several weeks to train their own pilots to fly these planes, and accordingly wanted American civilian pilots to operate them.

General Vandenberg then reiterated his fear that no hopeful results would be achieved in Indochina until the French changed their whole attitude.

Secretary Dulles agreed with this conclusion, and the President said that talk as you would, there was really only one military man in France who could really get the Vietnamese to fight with enthusiasm. This was the Governor General of Morocco, General Guillaume. He was the only available first-class fighter, since the French would obviously not send General Juin.

The Council then discussed the President’s question as to whether we were in a position to force the French to send General Guillaume to Indochina. At the end of the discussion Secretary Dulles volunteered to raise the question in his forthcoming conversation with Ambassador Bonnet. The President told Secretary Dulles to tell the French Ambassador that such an appointment would go far to revive U.S. confidence in France’s determination to achieve results in Indochina.

The Director of Central Intelligence pointed out the desirability of “sanitizing” the C–119 planes before their delivery to the French, and General Vandenberg stated that there would be no difficulty in painting over U.S. insignia.

The President expressed great disappointment over the developments in Laos. Until this invasion he and most other people had imagined that in due course, however slowly, the French would succeed in overcoming their enemies. This confidence had now been shattered. Neither the United States nor the French, said the President, could possibly hold this region by themselves. They must instill a desire to hold in the Vietnamese population.

Expressing agreement with the President, General Vandenberg added that the Vietnamese simply did not think the French honest in their promises for future autonomy for the region.

To this, Secretary Dulles replied that if the French were completely honest they would get out of Indochina, and we certainly didn’t want that.

The real point, said the President, was if Laos were lost we were likely to lose the rest of Southeast Asia and Indonesia. The gateway to India, Burma and Thailand would be open. What we had hitherto regarded as a civil war had now come to look like nothing more than France engaged in fighting a traditional colonial war.

The National Security Council:³

a. Noted an oral report by the Director of Central Intelligence on the situation in Laos and Thailand.

b. Noted an oral report by General Vandenberg for the Chairman, JCS, of the views of Admiral Radford regarding the situation in Indochina,⁴ and the reactions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as to the need for a change in the French conduct of the Indochina campaign.

c. Agreed that six sanitized C–119 aircraft should be loaned to the French for urgent use in Indochina.

d. Agreed that the Secretary of State should discuss with the French Ambassador the necessity, from the U.S. point of view, of improving French political and military leadership in Indochina.

Note: The action in c above subsequently transmitted to the Secretary of Defense for implementation. The action in d above subsequently transmitted to the Secretary of State for implementation.

. . . . . . .

1. Prepared by S. Everett Gleason, Deputy Executive Secretary of the National Security Council, on Apr. 29.
2. Arthur S. Flemming.
3. Points a-d and the note below constituted NSC Action No. 773, Apr. 28, 1953. (S/S–NSC files, lot 66 D 95, “NSC Actions”)
4. See telegram from Radford to Fechteler, Apr. 27, supra.