Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 152
United States Minutes of United States-United Kingdom-French Meeting, Paris, April 25, 19531
[Extracts]
Present:
- U.S.—Messrs. Dulles, Wilson, Humphrey, Stassen, Aldrich,2 Dillon, Draper.
- U.K.—Messrs. Butler,3 Lloyd, Alexander,4 Harvey.
- French—MM. Bidault, Pleven, Letourneau, Parodi.
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Secretary Dulles: … The President in his speech5 next mentioned the end of direct and indirect attacks on Indochina, so that the armies released in Korea will not strike elsewhere. We must recognize that here we are dealing with a more complicated situation, because the conflict in Indochina has not yet fully received the status of an international war or an international act of aggression. In this connection, the Secretary thought it wise if at some appropriate time the French government were to give consideration to the possibility of a complaint being made by Laos or by France, or jointly by both, in the Security Council, about the invasion of Laos. This would give the conflict more international standing and would make it more readily a subject for international negotiation and settlement, which it is not today.
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Mr. Lloyd: … With respect to a complaint to the Security Council by Laos or by France or by both, the British government would follow the wishes of the French government.…
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M. Bidault: … As regards Indochina, M. Bidault thought the signal to stop the war would not be given there but elsewhere. In order to make peace, one must first stop fighting. He thought the French position here in line with President Eisenhower’s first two points. He could see the advantage of resorting to the UN if all non-Communist countries would vote their condemnation of the invasion of Laos. But recent experience in the UN—in which the French government could only express its thanks to the other two governments—had led it to [Page 506] feel that those fully independent countries (their independence being well illustrated by the unhelpful remarks that have just been made by a sovereign who would have done better to stay with his people in their hour of need) would not be regarded as such by a number of countries represented in the UN. Those countries have up to now followed a policy of working with us on some things while letting themselves be guided by expediency and demagoguery in others. Besides, the consequence may be to encourage material demands, requests and exigencies that involve additional difficulties without adding a single soldier to the forces. Without preventing Laos from taking its own action, therefore, the French government is not encouraging it along those lines.
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- For a summary of this meeting as a whole, see telegram 5669 from Paris, Apr. 26, printed in volume V. The extracts from the U.S. minutes printed here constitute the record of discussion on Indochina at this session.↩
- Winthrop W. Aldrich, U.S. Ambassador in the United Kingdom.↩
- R. A. Butler, British Chancellor of the Exchequer.↩
- Field Marshal Earl Alexander, British Minister of Defence.↩
- Reference is to President Eisenhower’s “Chance for Peace” speech of Apr. 16; see editorial note, p. 472.↩