Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Indochina, Volume XIII, Part 1

751G.00/4–953

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Matthews)¹

top secret

[Washington,] April 9, 1953.

Subject:

• Description of French Plan for military operations in Indochina as recently presented by M. Letourneau, Minister for Associated States, and recommendations regarding U.S. Government consideration of that plan.

The Background

During his recent stay in Washington, M. Jean Letourneau, Minister for Associated States in the French Government, and General Allard, Chief of Staff of the French Expeditionary Corps in Indochina, outlined for the benefit of the Departments of Defense and State and of DMS a broad strategic plan or concept designed to accomplish the substantial military defeat of organized enemy forces in Indochina by the first half of 1955. M. Letourneau gave military and operational data and furnished an estimate of the added cost over present levels of expenditures in calendar 1953, 1954 and 1955 if the plan is to be implemented. The plan is currently being evaluated in Defense from a military point of view. The Joint Chiefs are scheduled to give their opinion on April 15.² This memorandum sets forth the essential elements of the plan and makes recommendations as to further handling in the Department of State, including coordination with Defense and DMS and integration with the consideration of the French aid problem as a whole.

(a) The Military Concept

The Letourneau plan involves a program for military operations predicated upon the creation of substantial additional native forces. The assumptions upon which the plan is drawn up are the following:

(1) That the enemy will remain at about his present strength and equipment levels.

(2) That there will be no overt Chinese Communist aggression.

(3) That the Vietnamese Government will in fact have the resources and the drive needed to carry out successfully its share of heavy recruiting, training and operational responsibilities in accordance with timetable of plan.

(4) That forces from the French Union outside of Indochina (i.e., Metropolitan French, North Africans, Senegalese and Foreign Legion) will remain in 1954 and 1955 at 1953 levels, i.e., there will be no significant increase or decrease in these forces.

The plan recognizes that the weakness of the present situation from the Franco-Vietnamese point of view is the lack of mobile combat-worthy reserves in the Tonkin area which would permit the French High Command to assume and hold the initiative against the organized enemy divisions in that main area of enemy strength. In order to provide, directly and indirectly, the needed additional offensive power for our side, it is planned not only to continue the current project to create a Vietnamese National Army of eight divisions (there are six divisions, more or less, currently available), but also to raise large numbers of additional national forces organized generally into light “commando” battalions.

It is hoped to raise 54 of these light battalions or 40,000 men in 1953, 45,000 men in 1954 and 20,000 in 1955. In addition, there would be raised in 1954 supporting units numbering perhaps 12,000 (heavier units and communications units) plus in 1955 an additional 3,000. (Small increases in the forces of Laos and Cambodia are also contemplated.)

According to the Manning table included under Tab A attached,³ the effect of the plan including the existing program for the expansion of the regular army, would be to increase the forces available for the Franco-Vietnamese war effort from 422,230 men on January 1, 1953 to 581,700 when 1955 increments have been activated. This is an increase of 159,470 men (variations in figures from different sources are often encountered).

The new Vietnamese light battalions and supporting forces would, it is contemplated, be completely officered by Vietnamese. They would be raised and used on a strictly regional basis. Concurrently, the Vietnamese General Staff would assume increasing responsibilities for territorial military security by taking over such responsibilities from the French High Command.

In broad terms, the operational plan contemplates the successive cleanup from south to center to north of the Viet Minh forces by French Union troops including the Vietnamese regular units and the new lighter levies described above, with the latter playing an important role in the military operations and then assuming responsibility for territorial security in the liberated territories.

These cleanup operations (to be carried out in Cochin China between May 1953 and early 1954, and in Annam during the first half of 1954) would enable French expeditionary corps and Vietnamese regular units now pinned down in static defense tasks and in the protection of roads, bridges, communications and utilities to be progressively released for the build-up of forces and for operations in the north against the major Viet Minh regular units. It is believed that for the anticipated “final battle”, to begin in late 1954 or early 1955, the mobile striking force at the disposition of the French High Command could be increased from its present level of the equivalent of seven or eight regimental combat teams to some twenty regimental combat teams.

The French High Command hopes to bring the enemy to accept this final battle (or to accept being driven to barren hill regions where he could not survive as an effective force) by attacking him with great strength in the rich Than Hoa–Vinh area just south of the Tonkin Delta. It is particularly upon this area that the enemy relies for food and for recruits and as a secure base for his forays into the southern delta. Its loss would be of great importance to him and it is the firm belief of the French High Command that he could be brought to a destructive and final battle if his control there were threatened.

The plan, so far as the raising of additional manpower is concerned, is not a purely French product. It represents agreement with Bao Dai and General Hinh, the Vietnamese Chief of Staff, at a meeting of the Franco-Vietnamese Defense Commission on February 24. We are advised, however, that General Alessandri, a French general who is Bao Dai’s military adviser, considers the plan to be inadequate and has recommended that the number of new troops to be raised in 1954 be at least 100 instead of 54 battalions.

(b) The Price Tag

The attached table (Tab B)⁴ gives for calendar 1953, 1954 and 1955 the French estimates of budgetary requirements for the Associated States national military forces (excluding the value of U.S. end-item aid programs present and future). The total expenditures expressed in billions of francs with dollar equivalents are as follows:

Calendar Tear	Billions of Francs	Millions of Dollars
1953	144.9	414
1954	226.1	647
1955	250.1	714.7

These figures cover pay and allowances, food and maintenance, medical supplies, clothing and bedding, matériel and infrastructure. They are additional to the roughly one billion dollars per year budgeted for the French expeditionary corps.

For calendar year 1953, French and Vietnamese resources are apparently in sight (on the basis of current U.S. budget support aid) to cover all but 10 billion francs or $28.7 million which is included in the French budget as counterpart of a part of the $125 million in additional aid anticipated from the U.S. during FY 1953 but not yet received. (This item of 10 billion francs or $28.7 million which is included in the level of resources estimated by the French for calendar year 1954 and 1955; if this amount is not made available by the U.S. in the form of budget support aid in 1953, 1954 and 1955, requirements of aid from sources not now calculated by the French will have to be increased correspondingly.)

For calendar year 1954, the French compute U.S. FY 1954 aid at present levels plus the $28.7 million referred to immediately above and they anticipate no possible increase in French resources available. They thus arrive at a “deficit” of 81.2 billion francs or $233 million which they expect us to supply.

Similarly, a deficit below resources presently in sight of some 105.2 billion francs or $300.7 million is indicated for calendar 1955 but nothing is said as to the added burden which French and Vietnamese sources might reasonably be expected to assume.

It is to be noted that the additional budget support aid which the French are requesting is for items which we have not heretofore financed and also that most of these items consist of piastre expenditures.

So far as end-items are concerned, additional requirements from the U.S. above the FY 1953 level of some $290 million (including $30 million in common use items) are computed for calendar 1953 at $19.3 million from MDAP. The French have already been told by Defense that end-items covered by this sum will be made available and the requirements are being urgently processed by MAAG Saigon.

For calendar 1954, additional end-items needed from the U.S. MDAP for the French plan are valued at $81 million (in excess of MDAP estimates of about $465 million) and for 1955 at some $10 million.

In summary, therefore, the additional aid (entirely from U.S. sources in 1953 and 1954 at least) estimated by the French for the execution of the Letourneau plan may be tabulated as follows (all amounts in millions of dollars):

	Calendar 1953	Calendar 1954	Calendar 1955	Total
Additional U.S. Aid “Promised”	$28.7	$28.7	$28.7	$86.1
New Budget-support Aid	—	233.0	300.7	533.7
Additional End-item(MDAP)	19.3	81.0	10.0	110.3
Total Additional	$48.0	$342.7	$339.4	$730.1

(Note—U.S. Budget support aid to the French budget as a whole for FY 1953 is $525 million.)

The above plan or concept was at first considered by Defense to be (1) too slow and (2) to be defective in that it deferred any major military effort to reach conclusions in the north, which is the most critical and important theater of operations, until the conclusion of cleanup operations in the south and center. The President expressed to the French Ministers the hope that they might find it possible to accelerate the carrying out of the plan. Nevertheless the French Ministers and General Allard insisted strongly that their timetable was realistic and not susceptible of improvement except on the basis of unpredictable favorable circumstances. Mayer and Letourneau suggested to the President, who agreed, the sending of two U.S. officers to Indochina for the purpose of discussing the plan with the French Command and seeking some acceleration. The question of whether to send such a mission was not further mentioned in the Letourneau or later talks.

The plan has been submitted for evaluation by the Secretary of Defense to the Joint Chiefs of Staff whose opinion is expected to be expressed on April 15th. General Trapnell, Chief of MAAG Saigon, has prepared a memorandum of comments, a copy of which is attached as Tab C⁵ General Trapnell reaches the conclusion that the plan, while “slow and expensive” offers the only solution currently available to us.

At the request of Mr. Frank Nash, Assistant Secretary of Defense, Ambassador Heath submitted a memorandum to be forwarded by Mr. Nash to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the political effects and feasibility of the plan. A copy of this memorandum is attached as Tab D.⁶ Ambassador Heath’s conclusion is favorable as to the political feasibility and desirability of the program for the expansion of the Vietnamese national army. He also expresses a favorable opinion of the other features of the plan.

Discussion

While the military features of the plan must be evaluated in the Pentagon, it seems clear that there is very little likelihood that the French will develop or accept any accelerated strategic concept for the defeat of the Viet Minh. Indeed the carrying out of the present plan will depend very much on the character, energy and aggressiveness of the Franco-Vietnamese military leadership. Nor does it appear that the French would concur that a strategy or concept providing for a lesser build-up of Vietnamese forces than that included in the present plan would produce the results desired. On the basis of present indications, an increase over present plans may well be submitted to us.

So far as the cost of the plan is concerned, particularly for calendar 1954, the French themselves do not contemplate any additional contribution from their own resources above the level of such contributions in calendar 1953. They count upon a maintenance of our contribution at present levels (including $28.7 million from the “promised” $125 million) and upon an increment from us of $233 million in budget-supporting assistance and $81 million in end-items. Therefore, any reduction in the price tag upon which the French have based the Franco-Vietnamese effort in calendar 1954 would necessarily be derived from (a) a possible reduction in the total cost as a result of Franco-American screening of proposed expenditures, (b) a greater Vietnamese contribution to the war effort, or (c) possible economies resulting from a modification of the piastre-franc rate.

Since most of the items for which U.S. budget-support aid is required represent piastre expenditures, special attention will have to be given to the methods and procedures for transforming U.S. dollar assistance into piastre availabilities in Viet-Nam. Also, since the expenditures in question consist of items handled through the Vietnamese budget, some study should be given to the problem of whether U.S. aid should be administered through the French as at present or whether direct bilateral arrangements should be entered into with the Vietnamese Government. The solution adopted will probably depend upon the ways and means devised for going from dollar appropriations to piastre budget support. (If, as seems likely, this will involve finding additional items to finance in the French military budget, thus releasing francs with which to swell the French contribution to the Vietnamese budget, no direct U.S. Vietnamese arrangements would be necessary even though there might be a favorable balance of political advantages over disadvantages in any such arrangements.)

From the point of view of maximum political desirability the plan possesses obvious drawbacks. For one thing, it contemplates that large organized enemy forces with all their political prestige both in Indochina and in the Communist world will remain more or less intact until early in 1955. For another, since the plan depends for its success upon a great increase in the number of Vietnamese under arms, it involves a transfer to the Vietnamese Government of an increasing share in decisions as to how and whether hostilities are to be pursued or terminated; this is dangerous to the extent that divergencies as to the significance of the struggle and the conditions for its termination may develop between the French and the Vietnamese. Recent developments in Soviet and in Chinese Communist policy accentuate the risks inherent in this aspect of the situation. The plan also, as indicated above, places great reliance on the comparatively untried capacity of the Vietnamese Government to raise, train and handle comparatively large levies of men on a fairly tight schedule.

Nevertheless, if it is taken as a firm decision that no more than the approximately 130,000 men now in Viet-Nam from outside the area are to be made available from the French Union or from other free world sources, there seems no possibility of curing the above stated potential political disadvantages by making an earlier attempt to liquidate the main enemy forces. Our side simply does not have the necessary forces to move now.

Recommendations

In view of the above discussion, the following recommendations as to general lines of procedure are submitted:

1) That if Defense finds the French concept militarily acceptable, the Department support it from the political point of view.

2) That early arrangements be made for a thorough screening of stated French requirements for both budget-support and end-item aid. (Responsibility of State and Embassies, MAAG/Saigon, DMS, Defense (OMA))

3) That recommendations be formulated as to methods and procedures for rendering budget-support aid in the amounts probably required. (Responsibility of S/MSA, FE, DMS)

4) That an early top level decision be secured, in the light of the screened requirements and of the methods devised for making aid available, to the effect that the necessary authorizations, appropriations and, if necessary, legislative authority, will be requested from Congress.

5) That we be prepared for further discussions with the French in Paris prior to the NATO Annual Review meetings with the particular aim of further clarifying the cost of French military programs in both Europe and Indochina.

6) That an early meeting be called by Mr. Matthews with representatives of Defense (Mr. Nash, General Stewart), DMS (Mr. Ohly⁷ and Mr. Paul), and State (Mr. Matthews, Ambassador Heath, Mr. MacArthur, Mr. Robertson, Mr. Merchant, Mr. Martin, Mr. Knight, Mr. Parelman,⁸ Mr. Bonsal among others) for the purpose of canvassing the situation, achieving an understanding as to agency responsibilities and establishing a timetable.

Note—The Department has already asked Embassy Saigon to initiate a study of added revenues which might accrue to the Vietnamese Government if defense expenditures on the scale contemplated by Letourneau plan take place in calendar 1954.

Draft copies of this memorandum were circulated on April 3 to: Ambassador Heath, Messrs. MacArthur, Nolting,⁹ Nitze, Allison, Knight, Beigel and Parelman. Such comments as have been received have been taken into account in this final draft.

1. Drafted by Philip W. Bonsal, Director of the Office of Philippine and Southeast Asian Affairs.
2. See the enclosure to the memorandum by Halaby, Apr. 24, p. 493.
3. Not printed.
4. Not printed.
5. For the memorandum by General Trapnell, Mar. 31, see p. 451.
6. For the memorandum by Ambassador Heath, Mar. 31, see p. 449.
7. John H. Only, Deputy to the Director for Program and Coordination, Mutual Security Agency.
8. Samuel Τ. Parelman, Special Assistant for Regional Programs, Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs, Department of State.
9. Frederick E. Nolting, Jr., Special Assistant to the Deputy Under Secretary of State.