Office of the Historian

751G.00/3–3153

Memorandum by the Chief of the Military Assistance Advisory Group in Indochina (Trapnell)

top secret
[Washington,] 31 March 1953.

Subject:

  • French Plan for Ending the War in Indo-China.

To:

  • Major General G. C. Stewart
  • Director, Office of Military Assistance
  • Office Secretary of Defense
1.
As requested by you, the following are my comments on the French Plan for Indo-China.
2.
In broad terms, the plan contemplates the successive clean-up from south to north of the Viet Minh forces by the regular French and Vietnamese units. These areas will be garrisoned by newly organized [Page 452] Vietnamese commando battalions thereby releasing French and Vietnamese regular units for operations in the north. The plan contemplates the assembly of sufficient regular forces in the Delta area during the winter of 1954 and 1955 to initiate a conclusive campaign against the Viet Minh Battle Corps.
3.
The plan indicates a force build-up as follows:
  • FY 1953—An increase of 40,000 personnel in the Vietnamese ground forces, 650 in the Laos forces and 2,000 in the Cambodian forces.
  • FY 1954—A force increase in Vietnamese of 45,000, initiation of an air force program, an augmentation of Vietnamese navy, and an increase of 7,500 ground forces for Laos and Cambodia. An additional increase of 12,000 under the Hinh Plan.
  • FY 1955—Increase of 20,000 personnel for the Vietnamese army.
4.
French representatives indicated that they expect the United States to bear the entire costs of the equipment for the above listed forces. They further indicated that over and above the cost of equipment there would be a deficit of 81 billion francs for the support of these forces in FY 1954 and again in FY 1955.
5.
My reaction to the above plan is one of disappointment at the time required to reach a decisive stage in the operations. I am convinced the French are too conservative and overly cautious in their concept of operations. It would appear that more effort could be concentrated earlier in the north where the main Viet Minh threat exists. Cutting the Chinese supply lines should receive a high priority. However, after many discussions with the French High Command in Indo-China, I believe that they will resist any outside pressure to force them to modify their proposed plans. The plan otherwise appears to be sound and barring unforeseen developments, such as the implementation of Chinese forces, will probably succeed.
6.
It would not appear that the oft repeated French fear of a Viet Minh push through Laos to Thailand and Burma is based on a sound appreciation of the situation such a move would develop. The Viet Minh flank and long supply lines would be completely exposed to attack by the Franco-Vietnamese forces from the Tonkin area. The country is rugged and transportation extremely difficult. Meager food supplies exist throughout that area. Such a move might achieve a political advantage but militarily would be of little value.
7.
While this plan is slow and expensive, the other course of action is to accept a stalemate which is also not only expensive but in the long run favors the Viet Minh and offers no solution.
T. J. H. Trapnell

Brig General, USA