Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Indochina, Volume XIII, Part 1

Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 138

United States Verbatim Minutes of a Meeting of United States and French Representatives at the Pentagon, March 30, 1953, 9:30 a.m.¹

top secret

Washington, March 30, 1953, 9:30 a.m.

[Extracts]

M. Letourneau, Minister for Associated States, met with Mr. Frank Nash for the purpose of discussing pertinent aspects in the Indochina situation with emphasis on further clarification concerning French long-range strategic plans for continuing operations in Indochina. Present were French and U.S. staff officers, representatives of the Department of State, and Office of Director of Mutual Security.²

. . . . . . .

Nash: At the White House meeting on Saturday morning,³ you may remember President Eisenhower’s comment to M. Mayer that the impression we had conveyed to the President of the discussions that we had with you and General Allard on Friday left us with some concern that the plan of operation was moving rather gradually. M. Mayer responded that it might be possible, if certain difficulties could be overcome, to accelerate the operation. Would you have any further comment on that this morning, sir?

Letourneau: In answer to Mr. Nash’s question and the comments by the President, as the plan develops, opportunities and circumstances may arise which may render acceleration of the implementation possible.

After talking with the Commander-in-Chief, there are difficulties of course, but it may be possible to present a plan which would satisfy the exigencies of public opinion—a plan which might say we will do it in 6, 10, or 18 months. In that case, the end object of this plan would be only to please public opinion, but it would, in fact, be dishonest to say that it can be done in that manner. There are operational elements which the Chief of Staff, General Lecheres, is more capable of exposing to the United States staff which are conditioned in the one direction by climactic elements which limit operations to a certain number of months in the year, and more important, there are political considerations and plans. I would like to repeat what I have already said. Some people might prefer to hear plain strategic answers to the questions. I would like to repeat that the main characteristic of this Indochinese war is its mixture of the political and military aspects. It may be possible that the United States staff contemplates operations in Korea which might contemplate the termination of that operation in 6 months, but the problem is quite different in Indochina, so I would like to repeat this very important element. In Indochina you are dealing with a government which is in a period of consolidating itself—therefore, you cannot require everything immediately from such a government, as the United States and France. We are both playing a loyal game of independence to the countries concerned. We cannot substitute ourselves for that government because if we did we would never obtain the quantity of manpower that local government can obtain by its own means. Also, and more important, if you did not care to conduct political operations in parallel and at the same time as the military ones, the end result would be that you would leave Vietnam at the end of military operations in a weakened condition, so that at the moment when the last French trooper got on board, or even before that, the winner would be, in fact, the Communists, because you would have left a weakened state behind you. So you would have your people killed, your French boys, or other Vietnamese, for 5, 6, 7, or 8 years, for what particular reason? The state would be in a weakened condition and would not be able to defend itself, and they would, in fact, take over.

With respect to the slowness of the plan, I would like to say that as the plan develops there will undoubtedly be circumstances which will be more favorable and which will allow some acceleration, but the object of the thing is to be able to get these Viet Minh units destroyed and leave them in such a condition that they cannot resupply themselves, so this is political as well as military and does not depend on large quantities of dollars or large quantities of ammunition. It depends on an effort which we must all make to get it to work. I would not be honest even if I obtained a larger contribution in dollars, I would not be honest if I said I can do it in 12 months, I would prefer to say I can do it in 24 months and be able to do it in 18 months. In general, and this pertains to the political comments, I hope that with the military increments, intelligent military comments will be made. Lastly, I would like to get rid of two considerations which I think appear in the minds of some of my U.S. colleagues and one of these bears on this plan. Some people say that the French have prepared a plan which takes long enough in implementation in order that they may, in fact, assure their stay in Indochina—in fact, they want to get entrenched in Indochina. Ambassador Heath may bear witness that the French have only one desire and that is to give up that country as soon as possible. I, myself, have to make vast efforts with my government and in parliamentary circles in order to bring home to them the necessity of continuing the battle, because many people say, what are we doing out there? We are not defending any French interests and if the free world is interested, let them come and get their people killed in its defense. Another consideration expressed, or which I feel may exist in the minds of some is that the French staff and military people are unfavorable to the development of a Vietnamese Army in order that the French may keep everything in hand themselves. Well, to admit this would be to admit that the French General Staff and high ranking officers are more stupid than they are. In general, regardless of what his nationality may be, he does not want to be put in a losing position and he wants to have the most number of cards in his hands. The French Staff know in this case that in view of the fact they cannot send reinforcements to Indochina, in view of their commitments elsewhere, the only card they do have is the creation of Vietnamese forces. So, those people who say the French staff is against it do not know what they are talking about. The French Command knows also that prudence and caution are necessary in view of the fact that they have the responsibility, and if they tried to go too fast it would tend to destroy their own work. This caution, which appears after discussion with the military and the politicians, is a political necessity and I, for my own part, would never reproach the French General Staff with any caution they exert and exhibit. I realize that full well and want to stress that it is in the creation of the Vietnam forces that there is the big chance. I apologize for having been somewhat violent in my expression.

Nash: Mr. Minister, we would not take that as any violent expression and would say rather that is a very articulate statement. You will appreciate I am sure, that the only motive we have in asking these questions, that may seem to be too pressing, is that we are going to have to be salesmen in behalf of our joint interests, salesmen to our Congress in trying to convince them that there is a plan or a course of action that is being implemented in Indochina that holds promise of an ultimate solution. Not necessarily, as President Eisenhower said on Friday, the concept of total victory, because that concept today is something very difficult indeed to achieve. I am sure that your military understand that when our military seem to ask very pointed questions we are trying to get as clear a picture as we can of what you have in mind so that we, in turn, can lay that picture before them when we have to ask for additional aid.

. . . . . . .

1. A note accompanying these minutes, which were drafted in the Department of Defense, indicates that they were circulated with only superficial editing and without verification by the participants. The source text is date-stamped Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs, Department of State, Apr. 8, 1953.

   Letourneau and Nash also met at the Pentagon on the morning of Mar. 31. Similar minutes of that session are in Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 138.

2. The minutes indicate that Ambassador Heath was among the American officials present.
3. The White House meeting of Saturday morning, Mar. 28, is described in telegram 5040 to Paris, Mar. 30; for pertinent extracts, see p. 435.