751J.5/3–1953: Telegram
The Chargé at Vientiane (Thomson) to the Department of State
17. Repeated information Saigon 155, Paris unn. Ambassador Heath called on Crown Prince Savang at Luang Prabang March 16 accompanied by McClintock and myself.
In course conversation regarding problems Lao national defense, Ambassador suggested that Lao Government, to ensure full consideration its point of view during Letourneau visit Washington and subsequent studies, submit statement its projects for strengthening national forces including some detail regarding needs external aid. After reflection, Savang said he would descend Vientiane March 18 and that statement might be produced within week.
Comment: Despite Savang’s reply, and although I informed both Foreign Minister and Prime Minister of foregoing conversation same evening in Vientiane, I doubt whether Lao Government can quickly produce any statement detailed enough to be of great use. Total lack qualified military planners leaves Lao Government hardly capable drawing up military projects other than those developed by French; and this degree dependence would render Laos cautious about submitting anything this nature to US without prior French clearance. To my knowledge no projects yet considered for Laos parallel recent Dalat decisions for Vietnam. Effort continuing along established lines gradually improving and enlarging existing National Army (now about 12,000 men) and lightly-armed National Guard (about 6,000 men). Savang might use above statement to plug his pet project convert most of existing Lao infantry into paratroops. Legation will of course follow matter and assure speediest transmittal any results to Department.
Other points of interest conversation with Savang:
- (1)
- National defense: Savang much concerned over Chinese intentions, but did not even mention Vietminh threat from Thai country North Vietnam. While not prepared deny that fate of Laos linked to outcome struggle in Vietnam, he continued reflect Lao Government’s hope steer clear any unnecessary involvement in what they call “Vietnamese civil war” (re Saigon tel 1061 November 22), and specifically to avoid use Lao troops outside borders of Laos. He conceded nevertheless that such refusal based “present conditions” of conflict, and that Lao troops might fight beyond frontiers if conflict should become “more generalized”. He was vague about changes in conditions he had in mind.
- (2)
- French conception of Indochina war effort: Savang expressed mild irritation at changeability Letourneau’s declarations, varying from emphasis struggle as common problem free world to most recent shift toward playing up French Union interests. Added, however, [Page 416] realization that Letourneau less than free agent, subjected many different pressures.
- (3)
- Reorganization of French administration in Indochina: Stated that, like rest of Laotians, he would be impressed only by results, not by promises or assignment new titles to same old faces.
- (4)
- Minister to Washington: Savang said that while Lao Government ready establish mission immediately, he did not consider Minister designate fully prepared yet. (Foreign Minister now anticipates Ourot’s arrival Washington perhaps month of May.)1
- (5)
- Personal plans: Savang to travel to France early May, thence to Coronation London. King whose gout still bad may try cure in France during summer.
- Ourot Souvannavong presented his credentials on July 13, 1953.↩