Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Indochina, Volume XIII, Part 1

751G.00/3–1653: Telegram

The Ambassador at Saigon (Heath) to the Department of State¹

secret

Saigon, March 16, 1953—9 a.m.

1797. Repeated information Hanoi, Paris unnumbered. I went to Ban Me Thuot yesterday to take leave of Bao Dai and to present new Counselor, Robert McClintock.

1. Bao Dai discussed expansion of Vietnamese Army. Financing of 54 commando battalions for 1953 was assured by French help and anticipated increase in Vietnamese general revenues which would allow expansion of Vietnamese contribution to defense budget from 1.7 billion piastres for 1952 to 2.9 billion piastres this calendar year. For 1954 he recommended an increase as Alessandri had advised of 98 battalions. Cost of this increase which could not be borne by Vietnam would have to come from French possibly with American aid, but Bao Dai said that French should be able manage this alone since extra cost should not exceed 30 to 40 billion francs (roughly $85 to $117 million).

He indicated that Vietnamese could not again increase its contribution in 1954. I suggested to him as I had to President Tam (see Embtel 1796, March 15) that Vietnam could increase taxes or impose new ones although this would probably involve opposition from French and Vietnamese interests. I suggested specifically that temporary tax on financial transfers abroad could be levied. The idea of this tax was evidently not very interesting or pleasing to Bao Dai. (His transfers abroad are large and regular.) He did not discuss this suggestion. Instead, he said that with expansion of Vietnamese Army they should in fairly short time clean Viet-Minh out of South Vietnam, which would permit resumption of large rice exports with consequent increased revenues to government.

2. Bao Dai brought up his desire to send special mission headed by General Hinh to States, probably in late April, and inquired whether I would be in Washington at that time. I repeated (see Embtel 1721, March 4)² that Washington was agreeable to General Hinh’s visit but pointed out that it would be with Pentagon, although we would, of course, be glad to see and talk with him in Department. Bao Dai made no mention of possibility President Tam visiting Washington at same time, although according to Cheysson, Tam had informed Bao Dai of his desire to make trip.

3. In an over-all survey of military position Bao Dai said that enemy still had the initiative. He referred to recent fighting in or near Hue during which the Vietnamese forces had lost 30 killed and 150 missing as illustrative of recent raids from Communist territory in north into Vietnamese-held areas. He thought one strategic objective of Viet-Minh command was to penetrate to Mekong River.

4. When I inquired as to his notions as to who might replace General Salan, Bao Dai said that he had no idea. He felt, however, that French high command in Vietnam usually had been selected more with view to satisfy requirements of French domestic politics than for their special qualifications in field. He said that most French generals sent out here seemed to regard the assignment as means to winning more ribbons preparatory to their return to metropolis. He personally did not know the top echelon of the French Army, but could only hope that if Salan were replaced his successor would not be man of same stripe of Carpentier. He remarked that General Alessandri would be the ideal man to exercise high command but supposed there were no possibilities of his getting it because of his lack of political backing in France.

Comment: I personally agree Alessandri would be highly competent commander-in-chief. He certainly achieved success in 1949, and military disasters in fall of 1950, which began during his absence in France where he had gone on leave because of his disagreement with the French military plans and Carpentier’s High Command, were not his fault. I also agree that there is no practical chance of Alessandri getting command since he was made scapegoat for defects of French military plans and Carpentier’s command.

5. On political situation Bao Dai said that he expected difficulties in north. He seemed to anticipate that recently-elected municipal councillors would resign in protest to the intent of administration to govern without their advice. He likewise thought there was very imminent threat of student strike in Tonkin.

However, Emperor as usual was philosophic and said that “when I arrived here in 1945, I started with nothing. Things are somewhat better but we need much patience. It takes time”. I inquired what he proposed to do to avert these resignations of councillors in north and he replied that this was not his problem but Tam’s. Tam was responsible for this development by his insistence on going ahead with elections.

6. Bao Dai said that his health was better but that he was rather looking forward to short trip to France in May and on two occasions during our talk asked me to visit him in Cannes on my way back to Saigon.³ He said that his trips to France were generally useful since they gave him chance to talk with French political personalities. Thus he said that in 1950 [1949] while the accords were being negotiated, he had argued, he thought with success, with several RPF deputies not to overthrow the Queuille⁴ government at that time.

Following my audience with Emperor, I had lengthy talk with Nguyen De. He confirmed Bao Dai’s estimate (or possibly it was he who had furnished Bao Dai with the information) of impending difficulties in Tonkin and said that at all costs the forthcoming student strike and the threatening resignation of the municipal councillors should be quashed. As for the ability of the Prime Minister, Tam, to counter this political trouble in north, Minister expressed considerable doubt, although he said he had always upheld Tam in his conversations with Bao Dai. He said that Tam was man of authority and action, but his posture was brittle because of his too great confidence in and reliance on the French.

He then launched long criticism of Tam of seeking political popularity by premature idea of local elections and National Assembly. He was merely playing game of ambitious politicians who think only of their own interests and not of danger to country of Communist China. To hold elections or form National Assembly at this time would be merely to play into Viet Minh hands. Nevertheless, he said for time being there is nobody in sight to lead government except Tam.

Heath

1. This telegram was transmitted in two parts.
2. Telegram 1721 from Saigon, Mar. 4, concerning possible trips abroad by Vietnamese leaders, is not printed. (751G.11/3–453)
3. On Mar. 17, Ambassador Heath departed from Saigon for Washington for consultation and leave, and in order to participate in the U.S.-French conversations which occurred during the visit of Premier Mayer to the United States, Mar. 26–28. Heath did not return to his post until June.
4. Henri Queuille was Premier of France from September 1948 to October 1949.