751G.00/3–1253: Telegram
The Ambassador at Saigon (Heath) to the Department of State
1789. Repeated information Paris unnumbered, Hanoi unnumbered. In general discussion of problems and prospects in coming weeks. Cheysson informed Embassy officer that President Tam feels confident that slow but steady progress has recently been made, particularly in south Vietnam, with respect to elections, pacification, development of National Army and general psychological climate. He believes this has been borne out by display of popular enthusiasm on occasion of March 8 national holiday celebrations, which were highlighted not only by impressive aerial and military parade but also by [Page 407] spectacle of Tam mingling with crowd in Streets at a ceremony marking beginning of demolition of central prison of Saigon, described by entire vernacular press as Vietnamese bastille and hated vestige of vanished regime. Tam’s Independence Day speech included deliberately worded and highly flattering references to Bao Dai as “father of Vietnamese independence”, which produced prompt expression of imperial gratitude, thus bearing out Cheysson’s impression that, at least momentarily, favoring wind is blowing from Banmethout in Tam’s direction. He thinks that Tam has approximately seven or eight month period of grace before Bao Dai may decide that pacification of south Vietnam will have been practically accomplished and autonomy of National Army sufficiently crystallized to enable him to take over direct charge of government. Meanwhile he added it is to be anticipated that imperial entourage will lose no useful opportunity to throw sand in works.
With reference to projected reform of French representation in Indochina, which might in principle buttress Tam’s position by taking additional wind out of extreme nationalists’ sails, Cheysson commented bitterly on what he described as systematic “dragging of feet” of influential circles around Letourneau. When asked to amplify this, he did not specifically attack Minister Resident, whose position as one of senior MRP politicians he believes must inevitably involve a certain amount of jockeying for position within French Government as well as in Parliamentary and electoral competition. He was, however, scathing in his condemnation of (1) surviving elements of old colonial administration, with their Bourbon approach to the complex psychological problem of winning confidence and cooperation of Vietnamese, and (2) French business community in Indochina, which he feels will never hesitate to turn a dishonest piaster into an even more dishonest franc and while engaged in these lucrative pursuits, will continue to operate with serene disregard for major permanent interests of France, as well as those of her soldiers and taxpayers.
In this connection, Cheysson referred sarcastically to rumored appointment of Gautier as first High Commissioner to Vietnam as only latest in series of “half measures” which had dogged implementation of French policy in Indochina since 1945 and often cost France some or all of benefits which might have been harvested from initiatives in themselves both practical and praiseworthy. He contrasted this with forthcoming departure of Janot, Letourneau’s Cabinet director, who has completed two years assignment here and is shortly returning to Paris to resume his duties with Conseil d’Etat. Cheysson believes that Janot’s willingness to work with Vietnamese towards acceptable solution of their relationship with France within framework of March 8 accords has earned him lasting enmity of groups referred to above, [Page 408] who in his opinion will not hesitate ruthlessly to use their undoubted political power to eliminate those whom they consider insufficiently supple in their response to pressure. He thinks they have neither learned anything nor forgotten anything and therefore that they and their attitude are more to blame than any other single factor for doubts and qualms still felt by many Vietnamese in coming out openly and wholeheartedly in favor of National Government. He does not expect Letourneau, who as a politician is obliged to deal with and is subject to myriad pressures surrounding both Palais Bourbon and Palais Norodom, to put a stop to this state of affairs, but he is convinced that absence of decisive directive in this whole field will in long run gravely compromise France’s future relationships with Associated States and undermine principal pillars of much discussed présence Française in Indochina.
Comment: Cheysson’s surprisingly frank comments, although perhaps partly to be attributed to passing burst of pessimism, are noteworthy as coming from official in position to know what goes on behind French governmental scene, both here and in Paris. His views are representative of those occasionally encountered among younger French civil officials responsible for working-level implementation of Franco-Vietnamese relations.