Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Indochina, Volume XIII, Part 1

110.11 AC/3–953

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Allison) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Matthews)¹

top secret

[Washington,] March 9, 1953.

Subject:

• US Objectives and Strategy for Talks with Prime Minister Mayer

Reference is made to Mr. Bonbright’s memorandum of March 3d to Mr. Matthews on the above subject.²

I fully agree as to the close interconnection between the questions which Mayer will wish to take up on his visit here namely, the French problem in Indochina, France’s defense effort in Europe and the relation of US assistance in fiscal years 1953 and 1954 to those two matters. I also have a full understanding of the importance attached by our Government in general to the ratification of EDC by France and the other countries concerned in order that a German contribution to the defense of Europe may begin to take shape by the end of this year.

I note that the reference memorandum recommends that the US be willing to consider immediately and sympathetically any requests for additional assistance related to additional French efforts in Indochina over and above the level of the present effort. I note, however, that any aid to France intended to relieve France of a part of her present Indochina burden would be offered only in the context of an over-all package agreement for the purpose of securing French ratification of the EDC. This package agreement includes, under the terms of the memorandum, $500 million worth of budget-support type of aid to France in fiscal year 1954. This aid would support both the European and the Indochinese part of the French defense effort.

Therefore, in the event that the French Government is either unwilling or unable to secure prompt ratification of EDC, we would be left in the position of having perhaps agreed to “moderate sums” for possible additional immediate assistance to France in connection with efforts in Indochina over and above the present level while at the same time having taken no decision at all regarding the aid which makes possible the French contribution to the defense of Europe and of Indochina at present levels.

Incidentally, the amount which we plan to offer to France as budget support in FY 1954 is $500 million which compares with $525 million in actual aid in FY 1953 and with a French expectation, about which we will be hearing, of $650 million also for FY 1953. It is noted, however, that the memorandum contemplates that the $500 million figure might be increased by an indeterminate amount if the French can convince us of their further need on the basis of their total effort in Europe and in Indochina.

EUR’s proposal places the Indochina egg firmly in the EDC basket. I believe that this should be avoided to the extent possible. I do not of course question the wisdom of the tactics being advocated by EUR in the sense of making a part of our aid to France contingent upon France’s ratification of EDC; this is beyond FE’s competence. I do urge however, that Indochina be kept as separate as possible from this exercise.

The hot war now being fought in Indochina is at a critical stage. It is my belief that unless effective military plans can be devised and implemented there in the relatively near future, we run the risk of serious adverse developments in both the political and the military fields with a possible threat to our whole position in Southeast Asia. We cannot afford to risk the loss of momentum in Indochina at this point by tying the intensification of the actual military effort there to the problem of a German contribution to the eventual defense of Western Europe—against a possible Soviet aggression—a problem which, as Mr. Bonbright’s memorandum points out, has remained pending for two and one-half years since it was first raised as a matter of prime urgency.

Rather it seems to me we should do everything possible to see that the period remaining until the German component of EDC presents an actual rather than a theoretical problem for French military planning on the continent of Europe is employed in the most effective manner possible to defeat and destroy, if at all possible, the Communist aggression in Indochina. It should be clear that, when German soldiers again make their appearance on the Rhine, those French leaders who desire energetically to continue the Indochina war will have a further adverse factor of considerable importance with which to contend.

Nor do I believe we should subject our Vietnamese, Laotian and Cambodian friends to the discouragement which they would undoubtedly experience if it were made clear to them that our support of the struggle in which their lives and fortunes are engaged is to be deprived of essential free world support pending the adoption by France of a particular defense formula in Western Europe.

I am doubtful as to the possibility of maintaining secrecy if we take the position suggested in Mr. Bonbright’s memorandum and suggest that the position in question should be adopted, if at all, with full acceptance of the consequences of publicity.

I am led by the above considerations to suggest a modification of the proposed position which would permit at least an artificial separation of the problem of the active prosecution of the hot war in Indochina from that of an eventual German contribution to the defense structure of Western Europe. My proposal embodies the following features:

1) As set forth in Mr. Bonbright’s memorandum we should be willing to consider immediately and sympathetically any requests for additional assistance related to additional French or native efforts in Indochina over and above the level of the present effort.

2) We should be willing to estimate an amount of budget-support aid to France in fiscal year 1954 related to the present level of French expenditures in Indochina. Such an allocation can, of course, be nothing more than an artificial one but for the purposes of this exercise it should be made. A figure of perhaps $300 million is suggested for discussion. In addition, of course, there would be the MDAP and MSA programs specifically earmarked for Indochina.

3) We should indicate a willingness to consider French proposals for the shift to us of a part of the load presently borne by the French in Indochina, regardless of the EDC factor.

4) We should indicate to the French that our assistance to France specifically related to France’s contribution to the defense of Western Europe can only be determined after EDC has been ratified, although, on the assumption of such ratification, we are proposing a program of $__million for budget support plus the related MDAP program.

It would presumably be made clear that this aid would only be made available to France upon ratification of the EDC by her Parliament.

1. Drafted by Philip W. Bonsal, Director of PSA.
2. The memorandum, titled “U.S. Objectives and Strategy for Talks with Prime Minister Mayer,” was transmitted to Matthews by James C. H. Bonbright, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs. Copies were sent to PSA and other interested areas of the Department. For text of the Bonbright memorandum and other documentation on the visit of Mayer to the United States in March 1953, see volume vi.