Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Indochina, Volume XIII, Part 1

751G:5/2–753: Telegram

The Ambassador at Saigon (Heath) to the Department of State

top secret
priority

Saigon, February 7, 1953—noon.

1568. Eyes only Allison. No distribution outside Department. Regarding Embassy telegram 1566, February 6. General Lecheres, Chief Staff French Air Force, has arrived Saigon and called on me yesterday evening. He said his Ministry must withdraw the 29 planes lent last fall, since part were definitely committed under NATO and rest absolutely necessary for pilot training. They would be gradually phased back to France, the last to be there by mid-April. He said not only were these planes needed in France, but he needed pilots for NATO or for instruction purposes. French did not have enough transport pilots to keep 100 crews, as at present, in Indochina.

Air Ministry, however, would be willing leave 20 or 25 flight crews provided United States would leave at least for several months the 21 planes we loaned last fall. He said that MAAG and Embassy would shortly receive request from Letourneau to this effect.¹

Lecheres not only insisted that French requirements under NATO and for training could not legally be sacrificed in favor of expanded operations here, but he insisted on the at least equal importance of reconstruction of metropolitan army as against expanded operations Indochina. He said time had passed when France or any other European country could hope build up sufficient separate military force or military industry. Western Europe military union was an absolute necessity.

Only solution to increase and accelerate operations in Indochina, Lecheres declared, was expand Vietnamese national army, including national air force. He thought that by 1954 there could be Vietnamese air force which could make a certain contribution.

I remarked that I assumed that the policy of France as well as that of United States, continued [to be] to bring hostilities in Indochina to successful conclusion at earliest possible moment. To that statement he raised question whether it was desirable to arrive at destruction of Viet-Minh forces at too early date since it might involve Chinese invasion.

I find this very disquieting and, if Rene Mayer visits Washington,² we must certainly ascertain whether there is definite policy or tacit understanding within French Government not to prosecute war too aggressively in Indochina. Nearly 18 months ago De Lattre thought he could break back of Viet-Minh resistance within year and half or two years. Since his death, there has been no one either in French high command or in French Government making any definite or determined predictions regarding duration of war here. General Trapnell has idea that by increasing Vietnamese regulars and auxiliary troops this year the French, under command willing to take more risks and losses, could “break the back” of Viet-Minh resistance during the 1953–54 fighting season. Salan will only go so far as to say that nothing like that could happen before 1954–55.

Heath

1. In telegram 1643 to Saigon, Feb. 10, Assistant Secretary of State Allison informed Ambassador Heath that he shared his concern regarding transport plane availability and that the Department of Defense had been asked to examine the question. (7510.5/2–753) In telegram 4454 to Paris, Feb. 17, the Department indicated that it tended to the view that nothing should be done to decrease transport availability in Indochina during the dry season ending in May. The Embassy was asked to supply information regarding French Government consideration of the problem. (751G.5/2–1753)

   In telegram 4695 to Paris, Mar. 3 (also sent to Saigon as telegram 1765), the Department reported that the U.S. Air Force had extended by 1 month the loan period of 21 C–47s still in Indochina which were to have been returned on Mar. 1. The Embassies were asked to approach French authorities in support of the request being made by the Military Assistance Advisory Groups in Paris and Saigon that 15 aircraft on loan from NATO also be allowed to remain in Indochina. (751G.5/3–353) The Embassy in Paris reported raising the matter with the Foreign Ministry in telegram 4917 from Paris, Mar. 4. (751G.5/3–453) In telegram 5169 from Paris, Mar. 21, the Embassy further reported that according to an official of the Foreign Ministry, French Ambassador Henri Bonnet had been instructed to take up the question of planes in Washington and to indicate that French NATO requirements prevented the retention of NATO-loaned aircraft in Indochina. Bonnet was also to request the extension of the loan of U.S. planes. (751.G.5/3–2153)

   None of the documents cited is printed.

2. During the Paris phase of his European trip, Feb. 1–3, Secretary of State Dulles, on behalf of President Eisenhower, extended an invitation to Premier Mayer to visit the United States. The dates for Mayer’s trip to Washington were later set for Mar. 26, 27, and 28.