Office of the Historian

PPS files, lot 64 D 563, “State-JCS Meetings”

Substance of Discussions of State–DMS–JOS Meeting at the Pentagon Building, January 28, 1953, 10:30 a.m.1

top secret
Washington, January 28, 1953, 10:30 a.m.

[Extract]

Present

  • Mr. Dulles
  • General Smith2
  • Mr. Matthews
  • Mr. MacArthur3
  • Mr. Nitze
  • Mr. Stassen4
  • General Bradley
  • General Hull5
  • Admiral Fechteler
  • General Twining
  • General Lemnitzer6
  • Admiral Duncan7
  • General White8
  • Admiral Lalor9
  • Colonel Carns10
  • Admiral Davis11
  • General Gerhardt [Gerhart]12
  • General Rogers13
  • General Fox14
  • Admiral Boone15
  • Mr. Frank Nash

Mr. Stassen: …16 Suppose they [the French] were to drop Indochina?

. . . . . . .

[Page 362]

General Bradley: This would be very bad.

Mr. Stassen: If Japan got stronger, how bad would it be if Indochina were lost?

General Bradley: It would still be bad. It would lead to the loss of all Southeast Asia.

Mr. Dulles: If Southeast Asia were lost, this would lead to the loss of Japan. The situation of the Japanese is hard enough with China being commie. You would not lose Japan immediately, but from there on out the Japs would be thinking on how to get on the other side.

Mr. Stassen: How anxious are the French to hold Indochina?

Mr. Dulles: They have no desire to hold Indochina except for the effect that the loss of Indochina would have in North Africa.

Mr. Matthews: They feel North Africa is vital; otherwise they would become a country like Belgium.

Mr. Stassen: Is it possible to hold a beachhead in Indochina?

General Bradley: Our present capabilities are not enough.

Mr. Stassen: If you were to hold a nubbin, wouldn’t that be of psychological importance?

Mr. Dulles: What should our answer be if the French put it up to us that they are going to withdraw from Indochina?

General Bradley: We studied the Indochinese situation in five-power discussions with the French, British, Australians and New Zealanders. We were considering the question of what we could do if the Chinese moved overtly into Indochina. We did not consider French withdrawal in these discussions because the French were participating in them. We are quite clear that we would have to react against China itself. The French and British are leery about blockades, etc.

Mr. Stassen: Unless the Chinese were prepared to accept retaliation by our air, etc., it is doubtful whether they would move into Indochina. But if one were to assume that the French weakened their position in Indochina, might not the Chinese move in some way unless they thought we were prepared to hold at least a beachhead?

General Bradley: We think the Vietnamese could hold the Vietminh if they knew what their future status would be and if the necessary forces could be trained.

Mr. Stassen: Have we no training mission in Indochina?

General Bradley: The French are touchy about training missions for non-commissioned officers. They never took advantage of our offer to have them inspect our Korean training operation.

Mr. Stassen: Should we tie their acceptance of a training mission to any additional help for Indochina?

[Page 363]

General Bradley: That might lead them to say that we should take the whole thing. If they would adopt a training system similar to that we use in Korea that might be enough and might obviate a U.S. training mission.

. . . . . . .

  1. The portion of the discussion recorded here occurred in the context of consideration of general U.S. relations with France.↩
  2. Gen. Walter Bedell Smith, Director of Central Intelligence. General Smith succeeded David K. E. Bruce as Under Secretary of State on Feb. 9, 1953.↩
  3. Douglas MacArthur II, formerly Counselor of Embassy at Paris, succeeded Charles E. Bohlen as Counselor of the Department of State on Mar. 30, 1953.↩
  4. Harold E. Stassen succeeded W. Averell Harriman as Director for Mutual Security in January 1953.↩
  5. Gen. John E. Hull, Vice Chief of Staff, U.S. Army.↩
  6. Lt. Gen. Lyman L. Lemnitzer, Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Research, U.S. Army.↩
  7. Adm. Donald B. Duncan, Vice Chief of Naval Operations.↩
  8. Lt. Gen. T. D. White, Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations, U.S. Air Force.↩
  9. Rear Adm. William G. Lalor, USN (ret.), Secretary, Joint Chiefs of Staff.↩
  10. Col. Edwin H. J. Carns, USA, Deputy Secretary, Joint Chiefs of Staff.↩
  11. Vice Adm. Arthur C. Davis, U.S. Deputy Representative on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Standing Group.↩
  12. Maj. Gen. John K. Gerhart, USAF, Representative of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the Senior Staff, National Security Council; from Apr. 1, Special Assistant to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for National Security Council Affairs.↩
  13. Maj. Gen. Elmer J. Rogers, Jr., U.S. Air Force Member, Joint Strategic Survey Committee, Joint Chiefs of Staff.↩
  14. Maj. Gen. Alonzo P. Fox, U.S. Army Member, JSSC.↩
  15. Rear Adm. Walter F. Boone, U.S. Navy Member, JSSC.↩
  16. Ellipsis in the source text.↩