Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Indochina, Volume XIII, Part 1

751G.00/1–2553: Telegram

The Ambassador at Saigon (Heath) to the Department of State¹

secret

Saigon, January 25, 1953—9 p.m.

1469. Re Deptel 1381 January 6.²Embtels 2218, May 10 and 2224 May 12 were drafted a few weeks prior to replacement Huu by Tam and reflect relatively stagnant political situation existing then. Like ourselves, French recognized this unhappy state affairs and Letourneau’s efforts at that time directed largely toward getting in government with more dynamism. About same time, Huu lost confidence of Bao Dai.

Although there were rumors current at time Bao Dai dismissed Huu and directed Tam form government that Letourneau had engineered change, Letourneau assured me he had no advance information appointment Tam. French, however, were pleased have Tam as President and his pro-French orientation has made for easier relations between French and Vietnamese Governments. On other hand, Tam’s Francophile sympathies and his sûreté background initially caused concern among Vietnamese nationalists. This concern has been dissipated to some extent as result of Tam’s performance to date. Tam has not, however, won support of any significant number of nationalists.

Salient characteristic Tam in contrast to Huu is his energy, but he is handicapped by:

(a) Lack of capable team. Recent cabinet reshuffle³ eliminated some dead wood but failed to bring to Tam’s side any outstanding figure and important Defense Minister post remains unfilled. New cabinet is undoubtedly more loyal and probably slightly more capable than preceding one. But it is not a group to inspire Vietnamese and it contains an unduly large proportion of Cochin Chinese.

(b) Magnitude and complexity of problems he faces. On analysis Tam’s much-vaunted action program remains more shadow than substance. But he must be given credit for activity, hard work and enthusiasm in much larger degree than his predecessors. He has produced budget and carried out elections.⁴ Point is not so much what Tam has failed to accomplish as what he has achieved considering that he must fight a war, institute social reforms, and get along with French and Bao Dai while at same time pushing for more self-determination for Vietnamese.

(c) Lack of widespread popular support. This is a hard nut to crack. Letourneau and French officials argue, with considerable justification that because of French domestic political considerations and security factors in prosecution war in Indochina granting of additional concessions to AS and turning over of more responsibility to them can go no faster. On other hand, large proportion of politically conscious Vietnamese and Cambodians resent degree to which French continue to exert influence and enjoy privileges in Indochina, and therefore remain distrustful of French and refuse to participate actively and constructively in government. Some headway has been made, however, most heartening sign of more reasonableness on part of both French and Vietnamese being arrangement which brought Tri to governorship north Vietnam. Tam-Tri understanding is still in experimental stage however and is not to be regarded as definite solution.

(d) Obstruction is due largely to vested interests, rivalries of political cliques and individuals. Blocking reforms are powerful French business interests with influence in French Assembly, government and High Commissariat and wealthy Vietnamese intent on maintaining control of large land holdings. Hampering development of strong, responsible government are personal ambitions of self-seeking politicians and their chronically negative attitudes.

(e) Bao Dai’s character. Greatest single contribution to improving political situation could be made by Bao Dai if he had will [garbled group] undoubted intelligence to provide real leadership and example. Bao Dai has frequently spoken to me of his willingness, when circumstances are appropriate, to provide such leadership. Both French and Embassy have exhorted him to fulfill his role as Chief of State at war. It is to be doubted that exhortations will ever move him to real activity which situation requires. Small prestige which he enjoyed is declining as his self-indulgence and fact that he is piling up fortune abroad become known. Intrigue such as led to resignation Defense Minister Tri undercuts Tam.

Military situation has not changed significantly in favor of Franco-Viet Forces. Because of US military aid Franco-Viets are in stronger position than ever before. However, despite severe economic hardships besetting Viet Minh, they were able launch Thai country offensive which caught French off balance and forced them into series defensive moves rather than permitting them take initiative as had been hoped. While strategically Thai country is not of great importance, psychological advantage derived by Viet Minh has been impressive and unfortunate. Although French troop morale is good and army ably commanded, High Command handicapped by limitations on manpower available from France, particularly officers and technicians. High Command is apparently only too well aware of uproar which would arise in France if manpower losses were heavy and this probably has some inhibiting effect on aggressive pursuit of offensive operations.

With respect specific policies and measures recommended Embtel 2218 and 2224 some progress has been made. Unfortunately, however, it has been too piecemeal and often ambiguous with result that it has not produced psychological impact so badly needed in this situation. Summary of progress under various headings follows:

1. French bona-fides: Letourneau has made strong statements against negotiation with Viet Minh. Less credence seems now to be given by Vietnamese to rumors of “deals” with Viet Minh. But Vietnamese are acutely aware of weariness French with Indochinese war. This has double effect. On one hand, Vietnamese are afraid French will attempt merely hold what they have, waiting for something to turn up. On other hand, they derive certain encouragement from fact France’s weakness and concern with her position in Europe lessen chances France withstanding nationalist movement AS. Moreover, there is growing, but as yet inadequate awareness that real enemy Vietnamese independence is Communist China.

France should continue stress its determination to fight communism to finish in Indochinese [Indochina], If during budget debates French determination is clearly set forth, this should have favorable influence on public opinion here.

2. Evolutionary statement: Nearest thing to evolutionary statement was Letourneau’s comment at press association luncheon in Washington last June to effect French Union not a prison. This statement created some stir in Paris and has not been publicized by French. Incident illustrates French attitude on statement of this nature, which so far as we are aware has not changed.

Lack of unequivocal declaration regarding French intentions is often mentioned by Vietnamese and foreigners as stumbling block to winning confidence Vietnamese and other Asians. Embassy questions whether any statement made unilaterally by France would be accepted at face value and given full credence by Vietnamese. It certainly would not dissipate overnight mistrust and hatred of French accumulated over years and founded on racial and nationalistic prejudices. Nevertheless, Embassy believes that evolutionary statement of nature discussed Embtel 2224 would be move in right direction and, while not decisive in itself in assuring Vietnamese cooperation, could be pointed to as another milestone in French affirmation of AS independence.

3. Reorganization of French representation in Indochina: Plans for transformation French representation in Indochina have been worked out and are scheduled to be put into effect soon after passage French budget. French have shown imaginative thinking in this matter and it is to be hoped that character of new representation and personality French representatives will clearly indicate that reorganization is not merely new facade for old regime. A good move for French in putting project into effect would be to give up Norodom Palace.

Roles of French functionaries in Indochina will reportedly be further reduced by reorganization, but definite information on this score will probably not be available until activation new organizations.

4. French aid to AS: French clearly thinking in terms of establishing cultural and sociological aid programs. It is understood that provisions for modest start included in French budget now under discussion. Details not known to Embassy.

5. French Union and AS diplomatic representation: Internal French Union relationships have been moving toward Commonwealth model. Three AS now have High Commissioners in Paris and establishment of French High Commissioners in three AS with attributes of diplomatic mission envisaged in project for amending character French representation Indochina. High Council meeting November recommended mutual representation among AS by means delegation but according information from High Commissariat source, diplomatic type representation appears to be on ice for moment, largely because of difficulties defining attributions representatives.

Establishing of diplomatic relations with Japan is agreed and Japanese representative is expected to arrive in Saigon in April.

Desirability of establishment of diplomatic relations with Philippines, India, Ceylon, Indonesia and other states is agreed to by both French and AS but in this matter hyper-nationalistic attitudes of these Asian states is stumbling block. Efforts to influence neighboring states to recognize AS have been made, notably as regard Philippines, but so far without tangible results.

6. March 8 and Pau accords: Stipulation which provides all Vietnamese laws must be promulgated by High Commissariat in order apply to French nationals residing Vietnam has perhaps been most unpopular of various privileges accorded French. According Cheysson, political counselor President Tam, repeal promulgation provision was definitely decided at recent meeting High Council Paris. Press account High Council transactions indicates French jurist to be sent Saigon to study question. Appears that abrogation provision agreed to in principle but mechanics implementation still to be worked out.

Question of revision judicial conventions between French and AS also raised at High Council meeting and this question understood to be currently under discussion. Mixed courts are probably least defensible of special privileges enjoyed by French but surprise (approx 15 character garbled) not been source much objection by Vietnamese.

Except for above two, none of special rights accorded French under accords appears to be subject of abrogation discussions.

7. Organs of French Union: Embassy knows of no interpretations of French constitution or other significant rulings in direction of doing more honor to principle of independence of AS.

8. Vietnamese Army: French and Vietnamese are agreed on need to expand Vietnamese Army by 41,000 men but there remain to be worked out certain details notably as regards proportionate share financing and great French military authority and responsibility for Vietnamese Army. Decision to expand army important step forward in prosecution of war and undoubtedly a significant decision as regards giving real substance to Vietnamese independence. Coupled with this, measures should be taken immediately to form some sort joint chiefs of staff arrangement between Viets and French.

No measures have been taken to increase intake of officers from Dalat school or of schools training reserve officers, but government in [Jan] 19 promulgated measure to increase length service reserve officers and technicians from 18 months to 3 years.

It is evident that French reservation regarding reliability of Vietnamese officers continues to be limiting factor to more rapid expansion Vietnamese officer corps. French have reason to be concerned regarding both political reliability and professional ability officers but it is possible they may be taking too cautious an approach to problem. French also remain cool to idea of training in US.

9. Vietnamese foreign trade: So far French planning seems to have been directed solely in direction preserving French economic position Indochina. While some Frenchmen may accept principle that geography and circumstances favor Vietnamese trade with nearby Asian areas, notably Japan, no responsible French official has yet given indication that France is prepared to foster trade relations outside French Union.

10. Vietnamese capital: There has been no evidence of planning to foster Viet capital for nation or to force reinvestment in Vietnam of large profits made by foreign firms.

Conclusion: We believe that measures and lines of action recommended last May, which have not yet been put into effect are still desirable. We recognize that there are formidable obstacles to some of our proposals and that there are reasonable explanations why French or Viets have not acted along lines suggested. We can be heartened by fact that some progress has been made and that over-all situation has shown some improvement. But we must make more rapid progress.

I am convinced that at this precise time there is no single, novel project which French, Vietnamese, or ourselves can undertake which would decisively contribute to accomplishment early defeat of Viet Minh. I do not believe any conference or study group can “pull such a rabbit out of the hat” at this time. Proposal which promises most decisive military result is that of increasing Vietnamese National Army by 41,000 men. This is agreed to in principle by both Vietnamese and French but, even if recruitment is undertaken immediately this increase force will not be available until November next.

General Trapnell, who will be in Washington in a few days, will tell you, I believe, that with this increase Franco-Viet Forces have chance of “break in the back” of Viet Minh organized military resistance in 1953–54 campaign season, although guerrilla resistance may continue thereafter for a time, perhaps for a long time. We will undoubtedly be called up to provide armament for new battalions but amount should not be great. French may be able to prove to us that France and Vietnamese Treasuries cannot afford to pay full cost and maintenance of these extra battalions, and we may be called upon to assist. If such [proof] is forthcoming, we should in our own interest make a contribution, which need not be large. Figures on costing of increase will be available, I believe within a short time.

In the past I had thought that were Bao Dai himself to take over actual reins of government, he might be able to form an effective government of national unity. I am not convinced now that he has energy to provide necessary direct leadership and example and that his becoming his own Prime Minister would greatly influence public opinion or governmental action. For the moment, we should support Tam, who whatever his deficiencies, is giving this country best government it has had since independence was regained. Perhaps if Governor Tri makes a success of his administration and pacification of north Vietnam, he might succeed Tam and form a more dynamic government. We are, through MSA giving financial and moral support to Tri in his pacification effort in the north. We will continue to urge on Bao Dai, Tam, and Ministers and Governors necessity of reforms and improvements in administrations. Our MSA credits are generally adequate and sufficiently elastic to permit us to extend some support to new reform measures. Of course some unforeseen turn of events may provide us with opportunity or indeed the necessity of attempting something radically new in this situation.

A subsequent telegram will discuss recommendations made in Embassy Telegram No. 2224 which are largely of economic and sociological character and in considerable degree concern MSA.⁵ These recommendations are largely for action by Viet Government. In a sense they are even more urgent for now is the time for Viets to “grab the ball” and take initiative in guiding destiny of their country. Demonstration of capability of Viets for strong, responsible government would be uncontestable argument and best guarantee of securing freedom of action Viets so persistently demand.

Heath

1. This telegram was transmitted in four parts.

2. In telegram 1381 to Saigon, Jan. 6, 1953, the Department of State requested an analysis of the situation in the Associated States with reference to the account and recommendations which Saigon had transmitted to Washington in telegrams 2218 of May 10, 1952 (see p. 131), and 2224 of May 12, 1952 (see p. 134). (751G.00/5–1052)

   An additional detailed exposition of the views of Ambassador Heath on the situation in Indochina at this time is contained in a letter he transmitted to Philip W. Bonsal, Director of the Office of Philippine and Southeast Asian Affairs, on Jan. 24, not printed. (751G.00/1–2452)

3. Premier Nguyen Van Tam announced major changes in his cabinet on Jan. 9. Included in the reorganization was the appointment of Le Van Hoach as Vice Premier and Minister of Information, and of Le Quang Huy as Minister of Defense ad interim.
4. Elections for village and municipal councils were held in the government-controlled areas of Vietnam on Jan. 25. In telegram 1479 from Saigon, Jan. 26, Ambassador Heath stated the following: “Too early judge worth and capabilities elected candidates, and degree corruption or ‘rigging’ unknown, but interesting note that among successful Saigon candidates were number Nationalists. Enormous response voters in democratic process testimony to Tam’s political acumen. … Action is clear slap in face Viet Minh, who now no longer can point to January 1946 elections as only consultation popular will, and to extreme Nationalist Attentistes who predicted failure owing public apathy.” (751G.00/1–2653)
5. See telegram 1534 from Saigon, Feb. 4, p. 378.