Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Indochina, Volume XIII, Part 1

751G.00/9–1952: Telegram

The Consul at Hanoi (Sturm) to the Department of State¹

secret

Hanoi, September 19, 1952—noon.

163. Dept pass Saigon; rptd info Saigon 121. Ref Deptel 205, Sept. 1 [15].² It is not only difficult to generalize about VM zones, treating them as single bloc, but probably misleading also. It is even more hazardous to make the leap from conclusions re state of VM morale and physical conditions to hypothesis covering effect of these on military action. Ordinary rules may well be considered suspect in any discussion of this rebellion which appears have lost substantially none of its moral force through six years of varied military fortunes.

… morale in upper Annam and Tonkin, working from south to north, in general about as follows: In interzone 4, widespread discontent among various civilian groups, owing principally heavy agricultural tax collections; some covert and overt resistance to VM authorities on part of Catholics, Buddhists and Muongs. In delta, … peasants continue cast lot with VM to extent of keeping troop movements quiet and hiding arms; … that attributable to better troop behavior among VM than among French Union. Believe explanation must include inability French Union troops guarantee peasants against VM reprisals once they have moved on; this is so at least in areas subject frequent military action. In south delta bishoprics of Phatdiem and Buichu, where nationalist fire long burnt more brightly than anti-VM spirit, there is evidence of significant revulsion of feeling following overt VM attacks on Catholic Church and bishops. On this subject see Contels 811, June 5 and 159, Sept 17.³

Document dated Aug 20 recently obtained by Consulate now being processed for transmittal purporting be training materials for political agents compiled by authorities interzone 3 (delta) to enable former prepare troops for fall and winter operations indicates VM concern with new weapons and materials French Union forces have reed “from other countries,” food and clothing shortages, “terrorism” “fallacious propaganda” which may have effect of developing “pro-American trends or fear of America or defeatism. On credit side, document points to relative thinness French Union forces, concentration of which any one plan creates weak spots elsewhere favoring VM attack; tenuous morale on French Union side which shld make it easy “shatter puppet army and govt”; improved techniques, training, weapons and experience on VM side following “last victorious spring and summer”; the “Chinese liberation army coming to the border” will bring VM “real help” and “our people and army will thus be encouraged to fight until victory.” Document goes on to characterize last fall and winter as defensive period; indicates forthcoming season will also be defensive, but directed to preparation of “general counter-offensive.” For nation as whole coming fall and winter will be devoted to striking at weak points “to relieve pressure on Bac Vietu,” to defeating all clean-up operations and to training armed forces and agents “for mobile war.” In interzone 3 plan is “open continuous fronts to attack enemy” continuously attack RC 5 and 6, hamper clean-up operations and frustrate “enemy plan for occupation of Ninhbinh which is to be used as recruiting base for puppet army.” Propaganda must be stepped up “to attract soldiers from puppet army as well as African and European soldiers.” Population must be clear-sighted, neither “pessimistic nor over-confident and be prepared to attack the enemy.”

In conclusion, “we must never lose courage, no matter how great hardships we suffer. Discouragement is not right attitude, although we must not be over-confident when some successes obtained. Overconfidence certainly leads to failure.”

In summary, this document reflects concern but not desperation.

In Hanoi clandestine VM organization said be trying recuperate from heavy blows dealt it by Franco-Viet security services. There is evidence Hanoi front members seeking authorization undertake terrorist activities in order restore morale and unity and demonstrate VM still powerful here. Morale in Viet Bac believed higher than elsewhere, owing proximity Chinese Commie aid supplies, ease in propagandizing and remoteness from French-controlled zones.

French have given some emphasis to reports of low morale in reg VM divisions.… VM takes great pains train troops to deceive interrogators if captured, and … such reports shld be treated with reserve. While morale of regional guerrilla units fighting in delta may be low owing shortage equipment and other local factors, it is probably dangerous apply conclusion reached concerning these forces to reg divisions. No evidence at hand to indicate serious resentment in VM zones against Chinese Commie advisers, cadres or other symbols of Chinese Commie control, despite historical precedent to justify such resentment and render it probable. In general VM army appears adequately fed. Food shortages suffered mainly by civilians, and although undernourishment widespread, there is no evidence of famine. Chinese Commie military assistance to VM appears be continuing at high level and may be increasing. Chinese Commie technicians are aiding VM develop arms plants, roads and mineral exploitation works. VM army believed be larger, better armed, trained and equipped than at any previous time, hence capable of considerable impact when and if it launches another large-scale offensive.

On other side of coin, VM economy appears in sorry plight. Ho Chi Minh piastre depreciating rapidly as supplies become tighter and French Union aerial and land attacks interrupt production and trade. Taxes are collected in paddy. Central govt has little idea of receipts or expenditures in remote areas. VM suffering serious shortage of medical personnel as many doctors have rallied to this side, but there appears be increase in VM stocks medical supplies; no epidemics reported. There is evidence also certain high VM officials, including Commies believe Sino-Soviet aid will never increase to point of permitting decisive VM victory over French until and unless World War III comes to resolve the problem.

In summary, failing massive intervention from outside IC there seems be little reason anticipate early major shift in present balance in the north. VM material weaknesses for time being are probably offset by greater political effectiveness in fields propaganda, elimination of corruption, competence and morale of officials and in general appeal to masses. If national govt proved able make real advances these respects and thus tend estrange from VM its important nationalist but non-Commie elements, it wld have dealt VM graver blow than any of which present military forces are capable. Linares has shown no sign whatever of easy optimism, and although he has often mentioned individual instances of VM weaknesses, he has never hinted to me that he was up against other than a tenacious foe the end of whose capacity for battle was nowhere in sight.

Sturm

1. This telegram was transmitted in two parts.

2. Telegram 569 to Saigon (repeated to Hanoi as telegram 205), Sept. 15, read as follows:

   “Dept attempting evaluate numerous recent reports of deteriorating conditions within VM zones. Statements allege rapid currency depreciation, food and equipment shortages, declining civilian and mil morale, and difficulties replacing battle losses particularly trained cadres. Realize combat operations after rainy season will provide best test these assertions but request urgently any additional data now available these and related subjs. Dept wld welcome your views re general trend within VM zones recent months.” (751G.00/9–1652)

3. Neither printed.