790.5/8–652: Telegram
The Secretary of State to the Department of State1
Secto 13. Rptd info Canberra 6, Wellington 6, London 6, Tokyo 4, Taipei 4, Manila 4, Djakarta 4, Paris 1, Saigon 4. Secretary opened Wednesday morning session2 with full treatment SEA area. He assured Council US regards this area of great strategic importance from every point of view. Vital part of area is Indochina. To strengthen it we have urged French to move more quickly on transfer of administrative power to three Associated States. Progress has been slow but at present French have probably gone as far as possible.
Secondly, we encouraged development Vietnam Army, supplying equipment therefor in belief this most hopeful way in which to encourage stiffness of opposition to communism. We have been concerned by decline in offensive spirit of French since death of De Lattre and some indications their efforts have become holding operation which we consider mistake.
Secretary described Vietnam Forces and also Viet Minh Army indicating that if this latter force augmented by substantial numbers Chinese troops it could probably not be successfully opposed.
Secretary then read paragraphs 27 to 32 of Ad Hoc Committee report on SEA. He also read British modifications which US believes made report useless. In our opinion military consultation re SEA could not produce desired results if officers were compelled to confine discussions to a consideration of resistance in Indochina only.3
We are convinced that SEA should not be allowed to fall. One thing we can do to prevent this is issue clear warning to Chinese Commies that attack would have grave consequences. However, we cannot issue such warning which has preventative quality without deciding what to do to back it up. This leads to dilemma that we can do nothing unless politicians will permit unrestricted military talks. Secretary then [Page 238] read from guidance paper worked out in London to reach agreement between govts so that such military talks might take place. He added that France and UK had approved guidance paper but US not yet convinced in present form it will permit recommendations on necessary possible courses of military action.
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Secretary replying to above queries said there was no categorical answer re attitude of French but evidence indicated that with our help they would continue fight. He felt French Govt was solid in staying in IC although strong elements outside present Govt wanted to get out. Two factors worked in favor present Govt attitude: (1) It was easy to say French should get out but difficult to do; (2) There is close connection between French withdrawal in IC and attitude of people in North Africa toward French.
The great problem is heavy drain on French economy and manpower which prevents French from taking steps it would like to take in defense of Europe. Now, however, French have Some hope as they can say they are building Army in IC which will enable eventual withdrawal French forces. Moreover, it is help if we continuously assure French that what it is doing in IC is in common interest in fight against Commie aggression.
Re SEA defense talks Secretary said we hope to obtain clear recommendations on a series of alternative plans. He then turned to Admiral Radford4 for opinion as to whether Commies could be stopped in SEA.
Radford analyzed situation in SEA in following manner: United States, France and Britain think alike re importance SEA but are not working together politically. British and French political thought influenced by their businessmen is that they can hold on by sitting tight and accepting no risks such as those inherent in series of recommended military actions. In Radford‘s opinion this attitude is wrong. Despite risks to Hong Kong and IC we should sit down and talk frankly. We should not forget that Chinese too have serious problems: That they have large forces on paper but not so many trained divisions; that they do not have our mobility; that they are vulnerable logistically.
The Commies are making greatest advances in shortest time in Asia, but we can stop them if we make up our minds to do so. Even static stage of creating strength in Formosa will make Commies think before attacking Hong Kong. IC can be held but not by landing [Page 239] ground forces there which would be great mistake. To prevent Commie successes in IC we might have to do all sorts of things running risk for example of attack on Hong Kong. In reply to further questions concerning possibility our military action might lead to all-out war with China, Radford said term “all-out war” was incomprehensible. We are already engaged in such a war with Commie China but one limited to single theatre.
In reply to questions concerning caliber Vietnam officials, Secretary and Allison stated that well-trained Vietnam authorities were scarce and Govt therefore had difficulty in taking over reconquered areas. Problem of training administrators and military leaders, however, was proceeding and with US assistance there was improvement and it was hoped this would continue.
In response to Australian request, Secretary discussed briefly situation as he saw it in Burma, Siam, Malaya and Indonesia in all of which he found disturbing signs of weakness although it was pointed out that situation in Burma brighter than year ago.
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Meeting adjourned.
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This telegram was transmitted in two parts.
The Secretary of State was in Hawaii for the First Meeting of the ANZUS Council, Aug. 4–6. For documentation on that conference, see volume xii.
↩ - For the text of the United States minutes of the Fifth Session of the ANZUS Council meeting, Wednesday, Aug. 6, see ibid.↩
- For the text of the report of the Five-Power Ad Hoc Committee of military representatives Feb. 5, and documentation on subsequent political-military discussions regarding the defense of Southeast Asia, see ibid.↩
- Adm. Arthur W. Radford, Commander in Chief, Pacific, and U.S. Pacific Fleet. For Radford‘s account of U.S. policy with respect to Indochina, 1950–1954, see From Pearl Harbor to Vietnam: The Memoirs of Admiral Arthur W. Radford, edited by Stephen Jurika, Jr. (Stanford, Calif., Hoover Institution Press, 1980), pp. 339–449.↩