751G.5/7–3052: Telegram
The Ambassador in France (Dunn) to the Department of State
649. Rptd info Saigon 22, London unn. Saigon tel 220 July 27 (rptd Paris 54). While we generally agree with thesis in reftel re importance maintaining milt initiative vis-à-vis Viet Minh, recommendations in reftel seem in a sense to revert to portion of Letourneau talks at Washn and consideration of them must be given in light of recent developments here in connection with off-shore procurement problems.
Deptel to Saigon 2014 June 28 [20], para (1), reports Letourneau raised question need increased transport planes for additional parachute operations and that decision reached this question wld be further studied by US–Fr technicians. It is Saigon’s view that US Govt take steps urge additional airlift and maintenance be made available for Gen Salan, Fr may repeat request made at Washn for increased transport aircraft. Emb is not aware of final outcome this Fr request.
When during recent discussions with top ranking Fr officials here re OSP questions latter were informed that US Govt cld not meet Fr request in this connection and that of $623 mil requested by Fr US Govt cld at present give commitment on only $185 mill in OSP (Mystere aircraft and ammo), Fr officials described serious difficulties Fr Govt wld face as result this decision. In asking for reconsideration US Govt decision, Fr officials referred to IC problem as one which in [Page 231] a sense prevented solution problems here in metropole with implication that perhaps only by cutting losses in IC cld Fr Govt carry out its task here. One of items for OSP was cargo aircraft, three squadrons of which were for IC and two squadrons for liaison and transport missions between metro France and Fr union territories. If we were now to pressure Fr to make available airlift needed by Salan, Fr wld likely point immed to our rejection transport aircraft as included in Pleven May 6 OSP request,1 although proposed delivery schedules called for initial deliveries last half 1953 continuing through 1955.
In brief, we are of opinion that Fr shld keep US reps IC informed re milit plans in IC, which shld be matter between Salan and Trapnell, who is now in Paris awaiting arrival Salan. We do not believe, however, that we shld, at this juncture and in light Fr reactions to OSP problem, put any pressure on Fr to meet Salan‘s airlift required needs. It wld seem more logical to look into possibilities of what US Govt might be able to do by way of supplying additional transport aircraft, although Letourneau talks at Washn wld presumably have already given opportunity to explore this fully.2
We are forwarding to Saigon by airpouch memo summarizing recent OSP developments.
Gen Trapnell has seen this msg.
- For documentation on this request, see volume vi↩
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In telegram 270 from Saigon, Aug. 1, Ambassador Heath stated the following:
“Paris tel no. 22, July 30 seems to miss the point. Salan is not insisting on permanent assignment additional planes, pilots, crews but would be satisfied to have temporary loan of planes and personnel from Fr metropolitan forces to enable him to engage in more massive air drops from late September through part of November.
“Such a loan or temporary assignment of material and men would not involve US in further discussions of $623 million requested by Fr Govt. Our intervention with Fr authorities would be merely to express hope this temporary loan of material and men could be effected because of Salan‘s conviction it could be used to weaken enemy and thus shorten war in Tonkin.” (751G.5/8–152)
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