Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, East Asia and the Pacific, Volume XII, Part 2

690B.9321/11–1852

No. 28
Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Allison) to the Under Secretary of State (Bruce)¹

top secret

[Washington,] November 18, 1952.

Subject:

• KMT Troops in Burma

Problem

To remove or at least alleviate the threat to Burmese stability resulting from the presence on Burmese territory of KMT troops driven from China by the Chinese Communists.

Discussion

The KMT troops have been in the Burmese Province of Kengtung since early 1949, and are now reported to be extending their area of operations to the north and south of that region. A portion of them was engaged in a highly unsuccessful operation into Yunnan in 1951. Their potential usefulness for anti-Communist activities has been demonstrated to be very slight, and is becoming less and less as time goes on. At the same time they are in constant communication with the Chinese Nationalist Government and with certain elements in Thailand. This communication, involving the violation of the Burmese frontier, results in the furnishing of arms, supplies and leaders and consequently in strengthening the KMT forces and in augmenting their power to injure the Burmese Government and flout its authority. Moreover, the troops are becoming more and more of a burden on the population of the localities in question, where they live largely off the countryside.

Their presence thus constitutes a source of deep concern to the Burmese and their Government, which finds them a real and pressing danger to the political stability of the country and a constant invitation to Red Chinese intervention. Frequent emphatic reports from Burma underscore the political dynamite in the situation, and it is feared that public pressure may force the Burmese army to undertake full-scale operations against the KMT. Aside from the unfortunate repercussions which such operations would bring about, the Burmese armed forces have their hands full with their own native insurgents and are in no position to move against the KMT troops. It will be recalled that in the UN General Assembly in Paris in 1951, Vishinsky accused the United States of aiding the KMT troops in Burma.

For two years, at least, the conviction has been growing in Burma that the United States could and should contribute to the solution of the problem, and the Burmese authorities have repeatedly approached our Embassy in Rangoon with requests that pressure be brought upon the Taipei Government to cease supplying the troops and to order them to leave Burma. There has been a good deal of talk in the Burmese press and elsewhere concerning alleged support of the KMT activities by U.S. citizens, unofficial and otherwise. As Ambassador Sebald in Rangoon has pointed out, the Burmese press continues to cloud every expression of U.S.-Burmese friendship with references to the KMT problem and questions as to why the U.S. does not help to solve it. The pressure of Burmese opinion, official and public, is becoming almost unbearable in this respect.

When Deputy Secretary of Defense Foster recently called on the Burmese Defense Minister Ba Swe,² the latter advanced the presence of the KMT troops as one of Burma’s principal problems which, he said, resulted in a constant invitation to Chinese Communist troops to invade Burma. Ba Swe estimated the hardcore strength of KMT troops at only about 2,000 who could be repatriated, if not through Thailand, then through Burma internally by air and thence by ship. He suggested that the KMT might “surrender” to neutral officers—for example, to Americans—and lay down their arms for the duration of the repatriation only, the arms to be returned to them on shipboard after leaving Burma. In commenting on Ba Swe’s proposal, our Embassy in Rangoon remarked that the figure of 2,000 appeared on the low side, although the Minister may have been speaking only of officers and NCO’s. Our Embassy added that such a surrender to “neutral officers” might offer a possible solution to the dilemma—assuming Taipei would agree to give the necessary orders and the KMT would obey; and that if they should refuse to carry out such orders, the only alternative would appear to be a complete disavowal by the Taipei Government of its troops in Burma.

The Defense Minister has been active, more or less on his own account, in seeking a solution to the problem through repatriation, and he has made use of … as liaison with General Li Mi. (To date … has had no success; it has been reported that he met with Li Mi at Chiengmai in Thailand but that Li Mi flatly refused to consider repatriation through Rangoon.) Moreover, the Supreme Commander of Burma’s armed forces indicated some time ago that he would be glad to see the KMT repatriated through Rangoon, and their arms returned on shipboard. On the other hand Burma’s Prime Minister, U Nu, has announced publicly that repatriation is not in question and that the Burmese military will shortly move against the KMT.

Whether or not United States representations and/or action would at this juncture be successful in actually removing the troops, it is imperative in the interests of preserving our good relations with Burma that we convince the Burmese Government, once and for all, that we are not responsible for the presence of the KMT on their territory and that we have done everything in our power to help eliminate them. Even though action along the lines suggested in enclosure no. 1³ might be unacceptable to either Taipei or the Burmese, our interests will have been served if such positive action is taken.

Recommendations

I am sending official-informal letters to the Ambassador in Rangoon, and the Chargé in Taipei⁴ asking them to report as soon as possible, preferably by telegram, their comments and reactions to (1) the proposed plan for transporting the KMT troops in Burma to Formosa attached hereto as enclosure no. 1; (2) the draft of a proposed telegram from the Department to the Embassy in Taipei attached as enclosure no. 2.⁵

It is recommended that

1. The Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs be authorized to approach the Central Intelligence Agency to determine its reactions to the proposed plan and seek the full concurrence and cooperation of that agency … provided there is general agreement that such a plan should be put into effect.⁶

It would be anticipated that after the reactions of the Chargé at Taipei, the Ambassador at Rangoon … have been obtained, the Department of State would discuss the matter with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and seek their concurrence in the execution of the proposed plan outlined in enclosure no. 1 as modified in the light of the comments received. Further recommendations in this regard would be submitted at that time.

1. The source text, sent to Bruce via Deputy Under Secretary H. Freeman Matthews, bears Bruce’s notation, “OK DB.”
2. Deputy Secretary of Defense William C. Foster visited Rangoon in the course of a trip through various countries in the Far East; his conversation with U Ba Swe was reported in telegram 732 from Rangoon, Nov. 3. (102.202/11–352)
3. Enclosure 1, “Outline of Steps To Be Taken to Transport to Formosa Chinese Nationalist Troops in Kengtung,” not printed, sets forth a plan under which the United States would act as an intermediary between the Chinese Nationalist Government and the Burmese Government to secure their agreement and to organize the evacuation of the Nationalist troops from Burma to Formosa via Rangoon.
4. Allison’s letters to Sebald, Nov. 24, and to Rankin, Nov. 25, are not printed.
5. Not sent; not printed.
6. A memorandum of Nov. 13 by Bruce states that, at a meeting of the Psychological Strategy Board that day, the Director of Central Intelligence, Walter Bedell Smith, indicated that he “wished to have the State Department agree to the evacuation of the Li Mi contingents from Burma.” The memorandum notes that Bruce discussed the subject later that day with U. Alexis Johnson, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs, who informed him that arrangements had been under way for some time. (100.4 PSB/11–1352)