690B.9321/4–2954
No. 164
The Deputy Director of the Office of
Philippine and Southeast Asian Affairs (Day) to the Ambassador in Burma (Sebald)
official–informal
Dear Bill: In the absence of Phil Bonsal, who is still in Geneva, I opened your letter of April 29 concerning Taipei’s despatch No. 573. I had not seen this despatch before receiving your letter and am not certain that I would have seen it had you not written. It paints a sorry picture. I am sure that you realize that anyone who served in Rangoon from 1950 on is fully aware of how the KMT troop business poisoned our relations with Burma.
In the course of efforts to make an evacuation plan work this office and the Office of Chinese Affairs found it necessary to send a stream of instructions, some of which must have been extremely difficult to carry out involving as they did approaches to the authorities on subjects about which they were extremely sensitive.
[Page 224]Without knowing precisely who was responsible or why it was so, we became aware that all elements in Taipei were by no means cooperating, despite Chiang Kai-shek’s commitment, and that there was a strong element among influential political leaders which definitely opposed the plan at the time. Phase I should have produced better results. So many instructions were sent to Taipei that the traffic would hardly bear any more with any chance of success. In sending instructions to you as well as to Bangkok it was not intended that you should assume responsibility for the good faith of the Chinese. The theory was that we were exercising good offices for the mutual advantage of all concerned. We realized, however, that the Burmese expected the Chinese to fulfill their share of the bargain to the extent that we made representations on their behalf. In asking the Burmese Government to cooperate in the scheme the Department believed that despite obstacles and delays on the Chinese side positive action by all three governments in addition to our own would have to be secured.
There was one time when a current of opinion against Burma developed in the Department and that was when Burma resorted to military action at a time when it seemed here as if it would wreck the whole plan. Later the general opinion turned in favor of Burma as the obstacles and delays on the part of the Chinese became ever more apparent.
We now have the impression here that your efforts have done enormous good in bringing our relations with Burma around to where they would be if there had not been this KMT trouble. It is certainly true that there is a danger that some of the information reported in Taipei’s 573 will ultimately come to the knowledge of the Burmese and that we should be prepared.
Sincerely,