S/S–NSC files, Iot 63 D 353,1
NSC 124 Series
Report to the National Security Council by the Executive
Secretary (Lay)2
top secret
NSC 124
Washington, February 13, 1952.
United States Objectives and Courses of
Action With Respect to Communist Aggression in Southeast Asia
References:
- A. NSC Action No. 597–b3
- B. NSC 48/54
- C. NSC 645
The enclosed draft statement of policy on the subject, prepared by the NSC Staff in accordance with NSC Action No. 597–b, is submitted herewith for
consideration by the National Security Council at an early meeting. An
NSC Staff study will be circulated
separately as an annex6 to NSC 124 for
Council information in this connection.
The enclosure, if adopted, is intended to supersede NSC 64 and paragraph 14 of NSC
48/5, and to supplement the statement of the current U.S. objective with
respect to Southeast Asia contained in paragraph 6–g of NSC 48/5. It is recommended that, if the
enclosed
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statement of policy is
adopted, it be submitted to the President for consideration with the
recommendation that he approve it and direct its implementation by all
appropriate executive departments and agencies of the U.S. Government under
the coordination of the Secretaries of State and Defense.
It is requested that special security precautions be
observed in the handling of the enclosure and that access to it be
restricted on a need-to-know basis.
[Enclosure]
Draft
Statement of Policy Proposed by the
National Security Council on United States Objectives and Courses of
Action With Respect to Communist Aggression in Southeast
Asia*
objective
1. To prevent the countries of Southeast Asia from passing into the
communist orbit, and to assist them to develop the will and ability to
resist communism from within and without and to contribute to the
strengthening of the free world.
general considerations
2. Communist domination of all Southeast Asia would seriously endanger in
the short term, and critically endanger in the longer term, United
States security interests.
- a.
- The communist take-over of Indochina or Thailand or Burma as a
consequence of identifiable Chinese Communist aggression, especially
if encountered by no more than token resistance on the part of the
United States or the UN, would have
critical psychological and political consequences. These
consequences would probably include relatively swift submission to
or alignment with communism by the remaining countries of this
group. Furthermore, in the absence of effective and timely
counteraction, an alignment with communism of the rest of Southeast
Asia and India, and in the longer term, of the Middle East (with the
probable exceptions of at least Pakistan and Turkey) would
progressively follow. Such widespread alignment would endanger the
stability and security of Europe and would nullify the psychological
advantages accruing to the free world by reason of its response to
the aggression in Korea.
- b.
- Equally serious consequences could also flow from successful
communist subversion of mainland Southeast Asia without identifiable
aggression.
- c.
- Communist control of all of Southeast Asia would render the U.S.
position in the Pacific offshore island chain precarious and would
seriously jeopardize fundamental U.S. security interests in the Far
East.
- d.
- The loss of Southeast Asia, especially of Malaya and Indonesia,
could result in such economic and political pressures in Japan as to
make it extremely difficult to prevent Japan’s eventual
accommodation to communism.
- e.
- Southeast Asia, especially Malaya and Indonesia, is the principal
world source of natural rubber and tin, and a producer of petroleum
and other strategically important commodities. The rice exports of
Burma and Thailand are critically important to Malaya, Ceylon and
Hong Kong and are of considerable significance to Japan and India,
all important areas of free Asia.
3. Actions designed to strengthen the political and territorial integrity
of the countries of Southeast Asia require sensitive selection and
application, on the one hand to assure the optimum efficiency through
coordination of measures for the general area, and on the other, to
accommodate or to do minimum violence to the individual sensibilities of
the several governments, social classes and minorities of the area.
4. The successful defense of Tonkin is important to the retention in
non-communist hands of mainland Southeast Asia. However, should Burma
come under communist domination, a communist military advance through
Thailand might make Indochina, including Tonkin, militarily
indefensible. Thus, the route of communist advance into Southeast Asia
will influence the execution of the following U.S. courses of action
with respect to individual countries of the area.
courses of action
Southeast Asia
5. With respect to Southeast Asia, the United States should:
- a.
- Strengthen psychological activities in relation to the area to
foster increased alignment of the people with the free
world.
- b.
- Continue programs of economic and technical assistance
designed to strengthen the indigenous non-communist governments
of the area.
- c.
- Encourage the countries of Southeast Asia to restore and
expand their commerce with each other and with the rest of the
free world, and stimulate the flow of the raw material resources
of the area to the free world.
- d.
- Seek agreement with other nations, including at least France,
the UK, Australia and New
Zealand, for a joint warning to Communist China regarding the
grave consequences of Chinese aggression
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against Southeast Asia, the issuance of
such a warning to be contingent upon the prior agreement of
France and the UK to participate
in the courses of action set forth in paragraphs 6–d, 7–f, and
8–c in the event that such a warning is ignored.
- e.
- Continue to encourage and support closer cooperation among the
countries of Southeast Asia, and between those countries and the
United States, Great Britain, France, the Philippines,
Australia, New Zealand, South Asia and Japan.
- f.
- Strengthen covert operations designed to assist in the
achievement of U.S. objectives in Southeast Asia.
- g.
- Continue activities and operations designed to encourage the
overseas Chinese communities in Southeast Asia to organize and
activate anti-communist groups and activities within their own
communities, resist the effects of parallel pro-communist groups
and activities and, generally, increase their orientation toward
the free world.
- h.
- Take whatever measures may be practicable to promote the
coordinated defense of the area, and encourage and support the
spirit of resistance among the peoples of Southeast Asia to
Chinese Communist aggression and to the encroachments of local
communists.
- i.
- Make clear to the American people the importance of Southeast
Asia to the security of the United States so that the people may
be prepared for any of the courses of action proposed
herein.
Indochina
6. With respect to Indochina the United States should:
- a.
- Intensify support of constructive political, economic and
social measures.
- b.
- Continue to promote international support for the three
Associated States.
- c.
- In the absence of large-scale Chinese Communist intervention:
- (1)
- Continue to furnish aid for the French Union forces
without relieving French authorities of their basic
military responsibility for the defense of the
Associated States.
- (2)
- Provide military equipment and supplies on a high
priority basis in order to:
- (a)
- Assist the French Union forces to maintain
progress in the restoration of internal security
against the Viet Minh.
- (b)
- Assist the forces of France and the Associated
States to defend Indochina against Chinese
Communist aggression.
- (c)
- Assist in developing indigenous armed forces
which will eventually be capable of maintaining
internal security without assistance from French
units.
- (3)
- In view of the immediate urgency of the situation,
involving possible large-scale Chinese Communist
intervention, and in order that the United States may be
prepared to take whatever action may be appropriate in
such circumstances, make the plans necessary to carry
out the courses of action indicated in subparagraph d
below.
- (4)
- In the event that information and circumstances point
to the conclusion that France is no longer prepared to
carry the burden in Indochina, or if France presses for
a sharing of the responsibility for Indochina, whether
in the UN or directly
with the U.S. Government, oppose a French withdrawal and
consult with the French and British concerning further
measures to be taken to safeguard the area from
communist domination.
- d.
- In the event that it is determined, in consultation with
France, that Chinese Communist forces (including volunteers)
have overtly intervened in the conflict in Indochina, or are
covertly participating to such an extent as to jeopardize
retention of the Tonkin Delta area by French Union forces, take
the following measures to assist these forces in preventing the
loss of Indochina, to repel the aggression and to restore
international peace and security in Indochina:
- (1)
- Support a request by France or the Associated States
for immediate action by the United Nations which would
include a UN resolution
declaring that Communist China has committed an
aggression, recommending that member states take
whatever action may be necessary, without geographic
limitation, to assist France and the Associated States
in meeting the aggression.
- (2)
- Whether or not UN
action is immediately forthcoming, seek the maximum
possible international support for and participation in
any international collective action in support of France
and the Associated States.
- (3)
- Consistent with world-wide U.S. commitments take
appropriate military action against Communist China as
part of a UN collective
action or in conjunction with France and the United
Kingdom and any other friendly governments.
- (4)
- Intensify covert operations to aid anti-communist
guerrilla forces operating against Communist China and
to interfere with and disrupt Chinese Communist lines of
communications and military supply areas.
- (5)
- Employ as desirable and feasible anti-communist
Chinese forces, including Chinese Nationalist forces, in
military operations in Southeast Asia, Korea, or China
proper.
- e.
- If communist control of substantial additional portions of
Indochina becomes inevitable, support any elements capable of
continued resistance to communism in order to delay the
consolidation and exploitation of communist gains and to
minimize the psychological consequences of such a communist
victory.
Burma
7. With respect to Burma, the United States should:
- a.
- Encourage the Burmese Government to cooperate fully with the
anti-communist nations, and be prepared to furnish to Burma
military equipment, supplies and advice as appropriate.
- b.
- Arrange to conduct a full and frank exchange of views with the
British Government with the object of re-examining policy
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toward Burma and seeking
any joint or coordinated action which might contribute toward an
improvement in the situation in Burma. Urge the inclusion of
elements from other Commonwealth countries in the British
Services Mission, emphasizing participation by Asian nations,
especially India.
- c.
- Attempt to arouse the Burmese and Indian Governments to the
dangers of Chinese Communist expansion and to the need for
effective military defense against it, including coordinated
military action with other Southeast Asian countries.
- d.
- Develop united action and cooperation among indigenous,
anticommunist groups in Burma to resist communist encroachments.
Make preparations for the establishment of guerrilla forces
among suitable ethnic groups for possible use against the
communists. Unless the Burmese Government should cease to be
non-communist, however, the major consideration should be to
take no action that would involve serious risk of alienating the
Burmese Government.
- e.
- Conduct information and economic assistance programs in Burma
which will have a maximum short-term favorable impact upon the
Burmese people and government.
- f.
- In the event of overt Chinese Communist aggression against
Burma, take the following action:
- (1)
- Support an appeal to the UN by the Burmese Government.
- (2)
- Consistent with world-wide U.S. commitments take
appropriate military action against Communist China as
part of a UN collective
action or in conjunction with France and the United
Kingdom and any other friendly governments.
- (3)
- Employ as desirable and feasible anti-communist
Chinese forces, including Chinese Nationalist forces, in
military operations in Southeast Asia, Korea, or China
proper.
- g.
- In the event of a seizure of power at the seat of government
in Burma by local communists, activate to the extent practicable
the guerrilla forces referred to in paragraph 7d above.
- h.
- If, in spite of the preceding courses of action, communist
control of all or a substantial part of Burma becomes
inevitable, support any elements capable of continued resistance
to communism in order to delay the consolidation and
exploitation of communist gains, and to minimize the
psychological consequences of such a communist victory.
Thailand
8. With respect to Thailand, the United States should:
- a.
- Continue to assist the Government of Thailand in creating
conditions of internal security, in becoming a stabilizing force
in Southeast Asia, and in maintaining its alignment with the
free world.
- b.
- In the event of communist domination of either Indochina or
Burma:
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- (1)
- Immediately consider increasing the priority and
volume of military aid to Thailand.
- (2)
- Immediately put into effect whatever measures may be
determined as feasible to forestall an invasion of
Thailand or a seizure of power by local Thai
communists.
- c.
- In the event of Chinese Communist aggression against Thailand:
- (1)
- Support an appeal to the UN by the Thai Government.
- (2)
- Consistent with world-wide U.S. commitments take
appropriate military action against Communist China as
part of a UN collective
action or in conjunction with France and the United
Kingdom and any other friendly governments.
- (3)
- Employ as desirable and feasible anti-communist
Chinese forces, including Chinese Nationalist forces, in
military operations in Southeast Asia, Korea, or China
proper.
Malaya
9. With respect to Malaya, the United States should:
- a.
- Support the British in their measures to eradicate communist
guerrilla forces and restore order.
- b.
- In the event of Chinese Communist aggression against Malaya,
in addition to the appropriate military action contemplated
above against Communist China, the United States should assist
in the defense of Malaya as appropriate, as part of a UN collective action or in
conjunction with the United Kingdom and any other friendly
governments.
Indonesia
10. With respect to Indonesia, the United States should:
- a.
- Seek to strengthen the non-communist political orientation of
the government, promote the economic development of Indonesia,
and influence Indonesia toward greater participation in measures
which support the security of the area and Indonesian solidarity
with the free world.
- b.
- In the event of a seizure, or attempted seizure, of power by
internal communist action in Indonesia:
- (1)
- Seek maximum international response to a request by
the legal government for friendly nations to come to its
assistance against the insurgents.
- (2)
- Consistent with world-wide U.S. commitments, take
appropriate military and other action to wrest the area
from communist control.
- c.
- In the event of Chinese Communist aggression against
Indonesia, in addition to the appropriate military action
contemplated above against Communist China, take appropriate
military action to assist in the defense of Indonesia as part of
a UN collective action or in
conjunction with other friendly governments.
