Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, East Asia and the Pacific, Volume XII, Part 1

790.5/12–1554

United States Minutes of a United States-United Kingdom Meeting¹

secret

[Washington,] December 15, 1954—3 p.m.

Participants:

• United States
  • FE—Mr. Sebald
  • C—Mr. Galloway
  • PSA—Mr. Bell
  • CIA—Mr. Wisner
  • Defense—Mr. Sullivan
• United Kingdom
  • Sir Robert Scott
  • Mr. Michael Joy
  • Mr. L. H. Mitchell

Sir Robert Scott stated that he found a surprisingly large area of agreement in the U.S. draft paper submitted at the meeting of December 7 on activities that might be undertaken under the Manila Pact to combat Communist subversion.

Sir Robert Scott handed Mr. Sebald a copy of a British comment, (attached) that inter alia, suggested the first four proposals under Article III of the U.S. paper² might best be considered by a committee of security experts while the second four, being mainly political, should be examined and discussed by the Ministers or their political advisers. Mr. Wisner stated that he believed the first four points should be considered by the Ministers and possibly referred by them to technical experts. It was agreed that the eight-power working group should make specific recommendations to the Ministers either in an additional paragraph to the U.S. proposed draft or in a covering memo.

Sir Robert Scott mentioned the leak of information on the proposed meeting in Bangkok by the Philippine Government and said that while this in itself was not too serious a matter, he believed that any leak of the proposals with respect to combating subversion would be a serious matter. Under these circumstances he recommended that the chairman should, at the time this paper is tabled, place special emphasis on the need for utmost security consciousness. Mr. Sebald stated we were fully aware of the dangers involved and, in fact, the paper had been prepared with the danger of its becoming public in mind.

Sir Robert Scott suggested that the Australians might be informed of our proposals on security prior to discussion by the working group. Mr. Sebald stated that we had informed the Australians we would discuss our views on this subject with them prior to tabling at the eight-power working group. It was agreed that we would date our revised draft December 15³ and tell the Australians of our conversation today with the British. Mr. Mitchell asked that we inform them when we spoke to the Australians.⁴

There followed some discussion as to precisely what was meant by the British suggestion of a committee representing national security intelligence organizations. Sir Robert stated that in the British view, one of the primary tasks would be the development of adequate security organizations in those states where they do not presently exist. Mr. Galloway suggested that the British might have in mind something similar to the NATO special committee and Sir Robert Scott said that that was true.

The British do not see the necessity or the utility of a high level permanent committee meeting continuously, but rather contemplate a group that might meet periodically. Inasmuch as the British views were not too specific, Sir Robert said he would make inquiries of his government for more details on this subject. Mr. Sullivan questioned whether there really would be enough work to keep a high level group busy on a continuing basis. Mr. Joy questioned whether a permanent committee would be workable and suggested that a series of periodic meetings would be preferable. Mr. Wisner said that we would have trouble agreeing on any kind of a permanent organization. Mr. Galloway suggested that when this matter is discussed in the working group, we delay any discussion on the formation of a committee to avoid pressure seeking the establishment of some kind of security or intelligence committee as a part of a permanent organization.

Mr. Sebald stated that we would not bring this matter up before the working group until Mr. MacArthur returns.

Immediately after the meeting, it was decided to meet with representatives of Australia and New Zealand on the morning of December 16.

[Attachment]

Paper Received From the British Embassy

secret

[Washington,] undated.

Manila Treaty Article 2

Subversion is a greater threat in South East Asia than open aggression. An important function of the Manila Treaty should be to discuss the efforts of member states against this threat.

We do not want to disturb existing bi-lateral security liaison arrangements which both we and the Americans have with some of the other members of the Treaty. Increased Anglo-American cooperation with the association of the Australians would be very helpful.

However, these existing arrangements even if improved should be supplemented by measures within the Manila Treaty framework. There should be a Committee representing national security intelligence organizations to foster a sense of solidarity and stimulate, especially amongst the Asian members, the feeling that they are taking part in a collective effort. There are some questions of common concern in the Treaty areas which could be discussed profitably in such a forum. The Committee would not disturb existing bi-lateral arrangements.

The informal Working Paper prepared by the State Department is therefore very close to our own ideas. All the forms of mutual assistance listed in the third paragraph of the American paper could usefully be discussed by Treaty members under Article 2. We do not however think it would be appropriate to discuss them all in the same forum. The first four are mainly technical and could best be discussed by the Committee of security experts. The second four are mainly political and could be examined and discussed by Ministers or their political advisers.

1. Minutes drafted by Bell.
2. See MacArthur’s memorandum to the Secretary, Dec. 3, p. 1022.
3. Not found in Department of State files.
4. In telegram 2221 to Paris, Dec. 15, marked “For MacArthur from Sebald”, drafted by Galloway, this portion of the meeting is described as follows: “We told them we planned discuss question with Australians and New Zealanders before introducing paper into working group some time after your return next week. British welcomed this idea and promised not to let Australians and New Zealanders know about early US–UK discussion this question.” (790.5/12–1554) MacArthur had accompanied Dulles to the NAC meetings in Paris.