Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 415
Background Paper Prepared by Mildred M. Yenchius of the Office of South Asian Affairs1
KV D–5
Ceylon and the Manila Pact
Ceylon was invited to attend the conference at Manila which resulted in the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty and the Pacific Charter. It declined to attend but the Ministry of External Affairs communiqué on the subject stated that Ceylon is “prepared to maintain an open mind on the subject”.2
The Prime Minister has told our Embassy in Colombo that he personally believes the future of Ceylon lies with the West and he supports the Manila Pact in principle. He stated, however, that the majority of the Cabinet, public opinion and press were very much against such a commitment. Later, however, on September 16 the Prime Minister informed our Embassy3 that the Cabinet had agreed with him not to make a final decision on participation in the Manila Pact until after his return from the United States.
At that time our Embassy at Colombo commented that Ceylon was primarily interested in such economic benefits as might be obtained from participation, and that Ceylon would probably not adhere to the Pact if it continued to be ineligible for American economic assistance under provisions of the Battle Act.4
Affecting Ceylon’s attitude toward the Manila Pact is its reluctance to give up its very profitable trade in strategic rubber with Communist China; Ceylon is concerned that its adherence to the Manila Pact might require it to stop that trade. Ceylon’s defense is already provided for under a defense agreement with the United Kingdom. Besides communications facilities, the Royal Navy has base rights at Trincomalee and the Royal Air Force maintains a base at Negombo. Apart from these bases which are already available to the British, Ceylon has no significant military strength to contribute in the event of further Communist aggression in Asia.
[Page 1019]We hope that Ceylon eventually will associate itself with the Manila Pact. We recognize, however, that public opinion in Ceylon presently does not favor adherence to the Pact. We would not wish Ceylon to adhere to the Pact if such action would lead to Sir John’s dismissal as Prime Minister.5
- Attached to a covering note of Dec. 1 by Richard D. Nethercut of the Reports and Operations Staff. This paper was prepared in conjunction with the visit of Prime Minister Kotelawala, who was in Washington, Dec. 6–8.↩
- See footnote 1, p. 902.↩
- The Prime Minister’s conversation with Ambassador Crowe on that date is summarized in telegram 100 from Colombo, Sept. 16, not printed. (396.1 MA/9–1654)↩
- For text of the Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act of 1951, approved Oct. 26, see 65 Stat. 644.↩
The Secretary and Sir John discussed the Manila Pact in a meeting held in the late afternoon of Dec. 7.
“The Secretary asked the Prime Minister his views on the Manila Pact. The Prime Minister expressed his appreciation of the action which he implied was a strengthening of the area for free nations and expressed his appreciation for the door being kept open to other nations in the area. He went on to note, however, the need for provision in the Pact for aggression other than Communist aggression. The Secretary observed that under the provisions of the Pact the United States stood ready to come to the assistance of those subject to communist aggression and armed attack (Article IV paragraph 1), and in the Understanding expressed our willingness to consult under the provisions of Article IV paragraph 2 as to the proper course of action in the event of other aggression or armed attack.
“The Prime Minister said that the Communist line of propaganda attack on the Manila Pact was that the Pact was designed only to serve the United States interest in opposing communism and was not designed to contain aggression as a matter of principle. The Secretary observed that the communists would of course follow this line and attempt to undercut the development of strength in the area for resistance to the primary danger of communist aggression. The Secretary went on to note the great problem of defining aggression, and observed that subversion was hard to identify and harder to combat. He posed the problem of defining a true revolution in terms which would permit a proper course of action. The Secretary added his belief that so far the best approach to the general problem had been made at the Tenth Inter-American Conference where it was agreed that should the international communist movement take control of the political institutions of any of the countries, this would constitute a threat to the area and would call for a Meeting of Consultation to consider the adoption of appropriate action.
“The Prime Minister agreed that this problem of the definition of subversion and aggression was a most difficult and pressing one. He said that it was compounded, as indicated by the Secretary, by acute nationalism. He said that he had met with some difficulty in the Colombo Prime Ministers’ conference in getting a resolution condemning the exportation of communism; his proposal was countered with a proposed amendment which would likewise condemn the exportation of anti-communism.” (Summary minute of meeting by J. Robert Fluker, Officer in Charge of Economic Affairs, Office of South Asian Affairs; drafted Dec. 13; attached to covering note dated Dec. 13 by Nethercut, not printed; Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 415, KV SM-1)
↩