Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, East Asia and the Pacific, Volume XII, Part 1

S/P–NSC files, lot 62 D 1

Draft of National Security Council Paper Prepared in the Department of State¹

top secret

[Washington,] November 12, 1954.

U.S. Policy Toward the Far East

problem

1. The primary problem of U.S. foreign policy in the Far East is to cope with the serious threat to U.S. security interests which has resulted from the spread of hostile Communist power on the continent of Asia over all of Mainland China, North Korea and, more recently, over the northern part of Viet Nam.

2. In its five years of power, the regime in Communist China has established and consolidated effective control over the territories it dominates, and maintained and developed close working relations with the Soviet Union. Inherently such regimes have elements of rigidity and instability which might produce crises or breakdown unexpectedly, but there is now no reason to anticipate an early collapse nor any basis for foreseeing when one might occur. While the ability of the regime to consolidate its position was in doubt, it was reasonable to hope that external pressures, such as harassing actions against the mainland and its commerce, might reinforce efforts of opponents within the country to block or delay that process. Under present conditions, that premise is no longer tenable. While it is not necessary to assume the permanency of the present regime, it seems most unlikely that external pressures or actions can bring about or hasten its downfall or materially weaken its ties with the Soviet Union. At the same time, we should be ready to exploit any opportunities which might occur as a result of inherent internal weaknesses.

3. The task of U.S. coping with this situation is further complicated by:

a. the vulnerability of the non-Communist countries in the area militarily, and in varying degrees, politically, economically, and psychologically, to further Communist expansionist efforts;

b. the deep-seated national antagonisms and differing assessments of national interest which divide these countries from each other and severely hamper efforts to combine their collective resources for their own defense and welfare;

c. the intense nationalistic feelings, fed by residual resentments against European colonialism coupled with a widespread feeling of weakness and inadequacy in the face of the worldwide power struggle, which inhibit many of these countries from cooperating closely with the United States; and

d. the divergencies on Far Eastern policy with our European allies, principally with respect to our posture toward China, which limit the extent of political and economic pressures which can be maintained against the Asian Communist regimes without divisive effects on the basic U.S.-led coalition.

objectives

4. Consistent with the basic policy of the U.S. to be clear and strong in its resolve to defend its vital interests but not provocative of war, the principal objectives of the U.S. in the Far East should be:

a. Preservation of the territorial and political integrity of the non-Communist countries in the area against further Communist expansion or subversion;

b. Progressive improvement of the relative power position of the non-Communist countries vis-à-vis that of the Asian Communist regimes.

5. In order to preserve the territorial and political integrity of the area, the United States should:

a. Maintain the security of the Pacific off-shore island chain (Japan, Ryukyus, Formosa, Philippines, Australia, and New Zealand) as an element essential to U.S. security; building such military strength in each area as conforms to its needs and capabilities and is consistent with domestic stability.

b. Conclude a Mutual Defense Treaty with the Republic of China, covering Formosa and the Pescadores, with appropriate safeguards against Chinese Nationalist offensive action. Such a treaty, when made and ratified, will replace the existing unilateral defense arrangement.

c. Encourage the conditions which will make possible formation of, and be prepared to participate in, a Western Pacific collective defense arrangement including the Philippines, Japan, the Republic of China and the Republic of Korea, eventually linked with the Manila Pact and ANZUS.

d. In the event of Communist overt armed attack against any country with which the U.S. does not have a security treaty, this evidence of a renewal of Communist aggressive purposes would constitute such a grave menace to the U.S. as to justify the President in requesting authority from Congress to take necessary action to deal with the situation, including the use of U.S. armed forces, if appropriate and feasible.

e. Assist where necessary and feasible non-Communist Governments and other elements in the Far East to counter Communist subversion.

6. In order to enhance the individual and collective strength of the non-Communist countries, the U.S. should:

a. Increase efforts to develop the basic stability and strength of non-Communist countries, especially Japan, and their capacity and will to resist Communist expansion.

b. Continue (1) to recognize the Government of the Republic of China and its right to represent China in the United Nations, and (2) to furnish direct support to its military establishment and its economy.

c. Encourage the prompt organization of an economic grouping by the maximum number of free Asian states, including Japan and as many of the Colombo Powers as possible, based on self-help and mutual aid, and the participation and support (including substantial financial assistance) of the U.S. and other appropriate Western countries, through which, by united action, those free Asian states will be enabled more effectively to achieve the economic and social strength needed to maintain their independence.

d. Take all feasible measures to increase the opportunities of free countries for trade with each other and with other free world countries.

e. Provide technical assistance to help develop political stability and economic health.

f. Develop and make more effective information, cultural, education and exchange programs for the countries concerned.

7. In order to retard the growth of the power and influence of the Asian Communist regimes, especially Communist China, the U.S. should:

a. Continue to refuse recognition of the Chinese Communist regime (as well as other Asian Communist regimes) but deal with it on a de facto basis when circumstances make this useful.

b. Continue to oppose its seating in the Security Council, the General Assembly, and other organs of the United Nations.

c. So long as the Chinese Communists are engaged in building up a war establishment and are motivated by hostility to the U.S. which appears more virulent than that of Soviet Russia, the U.S. should continue (1) to maintain stringent controls on strategic materials for China more severe than those on the Soviet bloc, and (2) to exert our influence on other free world countries to maintain the current level of trade restrictions, but be prepared to acquiesce in limiting such controls, if necessary to maintain the essentials, or to avoid serious friction with our allies, or to prevent nations needing Chinese trade—from accommodating with the Communist bloc.

d. Utilize U.S. information programs and covert means to create discontent and internal divisions within each of the Communist-dominated areas of the Far East, and to impair their relations with the Soviet Union and with each other, but refrain from assisting or encouraging offensive actions to harass Communist China or its commerce, and restrain the Chinese Nationalists from such actions.

1. This paper is marked “State Draft”. Indication has not been found in Department of State files whether or not the draft had been prepared in conjunction with or otherwise coordinated with the NSC Planning Board.