Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, East Asia and the Pacific, Volume XII, Part 1

Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation, lot 64 D 199

United States Minutes of ANZUS Meeting

secret

Washington, October 11, 1954—11 a.m.–1 p.m.

Participants

• United States
  • The Secretary
  • The Under Secretary
  • Mr, MacArthur, C
  • Mr. Kenneth Young, PSA
  • Mr. Horsey, BNA
• Australia
  • Mr. R. G. Casey, Minister for External Affairs
  • Ambassador Spender
  • Mr. David W. McNicol
  • Mr. F. J. Blakeney, Minister, Australian Embassy
• New Zealand
  • Ambassador Munro
  • Mr. Foss Shanahan, Deputy Secretary of External Affairs, Wellington
  • Mr. R.H. Wade, First Secretary, New Zealand Embassy
  • Mr. H.P. Jaffery, Second Secretary, New Zealand Embassy

The Secretary welcomed the other delegations and noted that an ANZUS meeting was generally held about this time of year and that the Manila conference raised new problems which it might be useful to discuss in the first instance in this forum. He suggested that, since the meeting was being held on Australia’s initiative, Mr. Casey start off.

Mr. Casey said that the SEATO Treaty was not an end in itself and that there should be a suitable organization in both military and nonmilitary terms. He mentioned Australia’s plans for ratification of the Treaty. This would be started in a few weeks and the process of ratification would give Australia sufficient freedom of action on their obligations under the Treaty. The important thing now was to get on with military planning, economic planning and cold war planning.

On military planning, Mr. Casey said that Australia was prepared to pull its weight but could not do so without knowing U.S. views. He recognized the problem posed for us by the nature of the SEATO relationship, with seven partners of varying background and reliability as to security matters, but he hoped that between the ANZUS partners and the British there could be effective planning with the U.S. acting as coordinator. He suggested that, in this way, ANZUS serve as a cover for what would in effect be SEATO strategic planning—its true purpose not being publicly known—and that “make believe” planning be undertaken bilaterally by the U.S. with each of the other four countries. He said he had made these views known to a number of persons in Washington, including Admiral Radford. The end result of all this, so far as Australia was concerned, should be agreement on the forces which Australia should maintain for use in an emergency. Mr. Casey said he knew the U.S. view on not allocating specific forces to the area but, unless some real planning was done with Australia, the Treaty would lack a good deal of reality for them. Moreover, the Prime Minister had said publicly that the Treaty would result in Australia knowing her commitments in precise terms and that there would be considerable embarrassment to the Australian Government if this did not happen. (In a later conversation with Mr. MacArthur, Mr. Casey said that, unless Australia got the type of guidance they needed, the inevitable result would be a lesser defense effort.)

On economic planning, Mr. Casey said that at the meeting in Ottawa he had talked with representatives of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia to ascertain their principal needs. He found they did not have any clear idea of those needs and he had therefore suggested that canalizing economic aid into the Associated States was the most urgent problem of the Colombo Plan enterprise. He suggested breaking away from the bilateral aspect of the Colombo Plan and forming a group composed of representatives of the U.S., U.K., Australia, New Zealand, and Canada to decide what were the most urgent requirements. He thought that a small group of technicians from the American Embassy in Saigon could readily ascertain these and let this planning group know. He said that Australia was willing to contribute a quarter of a million pounds immediately.

On cold war planning or “anti-subversion”, as he called it, in Southeast Asia, Mr. Casey said that he had very incomplete knowledge as to what was being done now. It might be appropriate to establish a “security council” under the Manila Pact Council to canvas this field. There should perhaps be, he said, bilateral planning with each of the countries concerned on such subjects as police training and organization, police communications, et cetera.

On other problems of the area, Mr. Casey mentioned South Vietnam and said he had discouraging reports as to their ability to maintain a reasonable framework of government. He thought that if this area was lost, Laos and Cambodia would find great difficulty in maintaining their independence. This had led him to speculate on linking Laos and Cambodia more closely with Thailand, if not in a federal structure, perhaps at least in some closer relationship than now exists. He had discussed this with Prince Wan and said that Prince Wan at least did not object to the proposal.

On Western New Guinea, Mr. Casey said he would not review their entire position but he wished to emphasize the very bad effect which any trend toward a change in the sovereignty over the area would have on the Australian people. He recalled a conversation with the Indonesian Foreign Minister. He had suggested that, if Indonesia could not at this stage withdraw the issue from the General Assembly, they at least come to some sort of compromise with the Dutch. Mr. Casey said he thought we agreed with his estimate of the deteriorating situation in Indonesia and felt that it was completely unwise to move (in the GA) toward any result which would oblige the Dutch to cede sovereignty.

Mr. Casey said he would welcome any indication which the Secretary could give as to likely future developments on Communist China.

Ambassador Munro concurred with Mr. Casey’s presentation and said New Zealand too wished to pull its proper weight. He said that the continued vitality of ANZUS was fundamental, perhaps even more so after the Manila Pact. On the political side, he said there was no question of the value of discussion among the three ANZUS partners of the problems of the Pacific area. On military planning, he said that ANZUS planning had been interrupted by the work of the Five-Power Staff Agency and that the Military Representatives had not met for thirteen months. He felt this group was of particular value to New Zealand and could do actual military planning. It was also important as a channel through which the New Zealand Government could be apprised of our military thinking. It might also be used as a means of consulting with the U.K. on these questions. Referring to Sir Robert Scott’s presence at informal ANZUS meetings during the past summer, he said New Zealand would like to see everything possible done to bring the British into close association with the ANZUS group.

Ambassador Munro said that it was important that SEATO should not appear to the New Zealand public merely as a document and that it would be unfortunate if it had no content. He knew the U.S. thesis of maintaining a strategic reserve in the general area but New Zealand needed an indication of what we thought about strategic reserves being maintained by others. He said the effect of this on the Asians was particularly important. He agreed that insufficient attention was being given to the threat of subversion in the area and suggested that a small subcommittee might be set up, consisting of the U.S., the U.K., Australia and New Zealand. Ambassador Munro was not sure whether it was wise to set this up under the Manila Pact or ANZUS, as Mr. Casey had suggested.

Ambassador Munro referred briefly to economic questions and said that New Zealand too would like to do their part with respect to Indochina but that their help would be on the technical side. In conclusion, he said he would like to have our views on the future of Korea.

Sir Percy Spender said he felt it was important to bring ANZUS military planning up to date. On indirect aggression or subversion, he felt we were all ill-equipped to deal with the problem. He referred to the suggestions which he himself had made during the summer in the form of a draft treaty which he had submitted to us. He thought there was a good deal we could do to help the exposed countries meet their problems by coordinating intelligence and police work.

Sir Percy said he had discussed Western New Guinea recently with Ambassador Lodge, looking for a line of action by us which would be consistent with our anti-colonial policy. Sir Percy thought the GA discussion would be heavily clouded by the “false colonial issue”. Indonesia, he said, has refused to consider any solution which does not recognize their de jure sovereignty over the area. Their case rests on one document, which is now invalidated since it was conceived in the framework of a union with the Netherlands, which Indonesia has destroyed. Moreover, he thought it was inconceivable that two nations could dispose of an area of over a million inhabitants without consulting the wishes of the inhabitants. He suggested that, in the GA debates, the U.S. take a line which would show up the general ignorance on the issue and suggest the undesirability of any GA action which would affect the inchoate rights of the people to determine their own destiny, as inconsistent with the UN charter. The primary obligation of the UN was to the people of the area. Even a mild GA resolution suggesting that Indonesia and the Netherlands discuss the matter would adversely affect the rights of the people in the area, since it would concede implicitly that the Indonesians have some measure of claim to absorb them. Ambassador Spender hoped that, if the U.S. was unable to change its actual voting position, at least it could bring out these points in the debates.

Ambassador Spender asked for clarification in relation to Formosa, as to how the present tension between the Chinese Communists and the Chinese Nationalists over such places as Quemoy could be handled.

Mr. Casey, reverting to military planning, said that there had been discussion with the U.K. on the defense of Malaya which might come to a head soon. This emphasized the desirability that Australia know more of our broad plans for defense of the area of Southeast Asia before they committed themselves to the British on Malaya.

The Secretary appreciated the importance of the problems raised by the others and said we had been giving them all a great deal of study. This study had not yet, however, been brought to a conclusion within the U.S. Government as a whole. However, he thought he could throw some light on these questions.

The Secretary agreed on the importance of translating the Manila Pact into some measure of living reality. He said he attached importance to the pledge in the Treaty of action in the event of open armed attack. He believed that the pledge itself had an important deterrent effect and was a factor of not inconsiderable significance. He recalled that, in the North Atlantic Treaty ratification debate, it had been recognized that the primary value of NAT was in the warning that, if open armed aggression took place, the U.S. would be involved. It had been said that if our intentions had been clear in 1914 and 1939, there would have been no war. This time our intention was clear and the Manila Pact contains substantially the same warning. If backed by obvious resolution and capacity, it will of itself operate to deter open aggression. In the case of the NAT, we had moved on to create an organization and forces in being. However, conditions in the Manila Pact area were different. In Western Europe there was a considerable measure of unity, cohesion and military tradition on which to build and it may be possible to create there forces in being which will add substantially to the deterrent and retaliatory power. The forces were in any case particularly important on the psychological point of view. The Secretary noted Churchill’s concurrence with this thesis. With regard to the Manila Pact area, the Secretary repeated that we shared the desire to give the Treaty a living reality but repeated likewise that the value of the pledges in the Treaty should not be overlooked, especially when fortified by the resolution and the capabilities of all the countries concerned. With the world-wide responsibilities of the U.S., it was not wise for us to make an allocation of military strength to the area. We could contribute more by disposing our strength so that what protected one could as well protect many. He noted that both the Australian and New Zealand spokesmen had said that they understood our policies in this respect.

Mr. Shanahan in response to a question from the Secretary on the prospects for New Zealand ratification, said that although Parliamentary action was not constitutionally required, it was customary to have a debate prior to executive ratification. He noted the fact of the New Zealand elections in November and indicated that ratification would take place in due course thereafter.

On our own ratification plans, the Secretary mentioned a conversation with Senator Knowland on the desirability of moving ahead before the next regular session of Congress. Senator Knowland’s view, in which the Minority Leader¹ concurred, was that the Senate itself should not consider issues extraneous to the one on which they are being called. However, the Senator thought that the Foreign Relations Committee might consider the Treaty and make a report which, if favorable, would enable us to take preliminary action in the way of an interim meeting of the Council, without awaiting formal ratification. At the same time it might put the Senate in position to move more rapidly in January.

On military planning, the Secretary said we were reluctant to assume the responsibility of coordinating the planning of the other Manila Pact countries through a series of bilateral arrangements. We were not opposed to a measure of military planning under the Treaty, with all the parties being represented. We would probably not want anything in the nature of a Standing Group or even a group which would meet at frequent intervals. However, we would be willing to have Military Advisers who would meet from time to time to exchange views. This would also be important from the psychological point of view. The Secretary outlined briefly Defense views on military organization and planning. In addition, he thought it might be desirable to have more intimate talks which might take place within the framework of ANZUS, perhaps with the U.K. as an observer. He noted the reference to the Military Representatives under ANZUS not having met and thought that it might be well for them to do so. On the assumption that the Australians and New Zealanders thought this would be desirable, we would take up this suggestion with Defense. (Later in the meeting, the views of the Defense Department on military planning under the Manila Pact were set forth fully in the form in which they had been received for use in this meeting.)

On economic planning, the Secretary said we were studying this whole question but were not yet sure how to undertake it with the speed and efficiency which were obviously desirable. A long range plan might take a year to get under way. It was possible that we would send an economic mission to the entire area, from Japan through to India, to study the possibility of developing economic interrelationships. This was a long range project which could not meet the immediate problem in Indochina. Mr. MacArthur reviewed briefly the recent talks with the French and the conclusion of the French and ourselves that it was important to coordinate our resources and to get started immediately on worthwhile projects.² Mr. Young said that we should soon have from the Embassy at Saigon the results of an FOA survey of the three Associated States and that, when we had this, we ought to consult with the Australians. Ambassador Munro said that New Zealand would likewise wish to be kept in touch with these developments and noted that New Zealand had two men in Cambodia.

On the anti-subversive aspect of the Manila Pact, the Secretary said that this gives us great concern, particularly in view of the great effectiveness of the Communists in this field. He noted that the Manila Pact referred, possibly for the first time in a Treaty, to subversion and agreed that this part of the Treaty particularly should be given life. He said that in our Government we did not have clear responsibility in this field, but that we were endeavoring to set up a group within the Government to consider how best to organize for this type of activity. He said that when our studies had progressed a little further, we would get in touch with Australian representatives.

In response to questions at the start on particular situations in the area, the Secretary said that our estimate of the outlook for Laos and Cambodia was not quite as unfavorable as that of the Australians. He said we had not given thought to the possibility of federation between these two countries and Thailand. He noted the importance of conducting our programs so as to lessen the dependence of Laos and Cambodia on the port of Saigon.

On Western New Guinea, the Secretary said that we had given it a good deal of careful thought, but he said that he preferred not to discuss it at this meeting. He would, however, give careful thought to what the Australian representatives had said. He said he wished to reflect on the issues raised by them. Sir Percy Spender said that he would put the Australian views in writing and give them to Ambassador Lodge.

On Korea, the Secretary said that the problem of dealing with President Rhee was getting more and more difficult and that the people were being aroused into a more and more anti-American condition. This had more serious implications as Korean forces were deployed following the redeployment of U.S. forces. The Secretary did not think, however, that Rhee would open hostilities although Rhee was so erratic that we could not be sure. We were alert to the danger in the situation and were doing what we could to handle it.

Mr. Casey asked whether it would be possible to have a Council meeting of the “SEATO powers” this year before ratification by all concerned. Ambassador Munro noted that, in view of the New Zealand elections, January was the earliest date they could consider. The Secretary responded that, if we made sufficient progress in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee during the present session of Congress, a meeting might be possible. He thought it was important to hold such a meeting in the area and suggested that Bangkok would be a suitable place. Mr. Casey agreed.

Mr. Casey said he had developed excellent personal relations with Pakistan leaders and would be glad to discuss this question later. In response to the Secretary’s question, he said he thought Pakistan would ratify the Manila Pact.

As to the question on Formosa, the Secretary said that our information indicated a build-up of strength which was directed in the first instance at the off-shore islands but that this might be a stepping stone to an attempt to retake the Pescadores and Formosa itself. The degree of support which the U.S. would give the Chinese Nationalists with respect to the off-shore islands had not yet been finally determined. It was being dealt with on a day to day basis by the President and the National Security Council.

In conclusion it was agreed that comments to the press would be limited to general statements that the meeting had been for discussion of a broad range of problems of concern and interest to the three partners.

[Here follows a partial text of the position paper, page 936.]

1. Lyndon B. Johnson of Texas.
2. For documentation on the talks held in Washington, Sept. 27–29, between Acting Secretary Smith, and La Chambre, Edgar Faure, Minister of Finance, and Gen. Paul Ely, French Commissioner General in Indochina, see vol. xiii, Part 2, pp. 2061 ff.