790.5/5–2154
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Bonbright)
Subject:
- Clarification of Remarks Attributed by the Press to the New Zealand Foreign Minister, Mr. Webb, with regard to United Action in South East Asia.
Participants:
- The New Zealand Ambassador, Mr. Munro
- Mr. Laking, New Zealand Embassy
- The Secretary of State
- J. C. H. Bonbright, EUR
The Ambassador began by conveying Mr. Webb’s regrets for not coming himself to see the Secretary. This was due to the fact that Mr. Webb was on the point of leaving Washington and furthermore, he felt that his personal presence might not be helpful since it would be noted by the press and require further comment.
According to the Ambassador, Mr. Webb considered that his remarks to reporters yesterday had been grossly misrepresented by the press. (He was reported by Chalmers Roberts of the Washington Post as having declared that “he could not conceive of a Southeast Asia alliance without Britain.”)1 Mr. Webb thought he had [Page 503] made it absolutely clear to the reporters that he considered they were asking him to comment on a situation which would not arise. All he was saying was that if there were a pact, the British must be in it. The Ambassador went on to say that this morning Mr. Webb had again made it clear to the press that under no circumstances was New Zealand trying to impede the negotiation of a pact or to impede the Secretary’s efforts in this direction. On the contrary, Mr. Munro added confidentially that his government would make every effort to persuade the United Kingdom to enter a pact for the defense of Southeast Asia. He then gave the Secretary a copy of Mr. Webb’s press statement this morning (Attached).
To sum up, Mr. Munro said that Mr. Webb was deeply concerned and very, very resentful of this misrepresentation and he, the Ambassador, felt the same way about it.
The Secretary replied that he too regretted the incident and said that when he had read the words attributed to Mr. Webb, he was sure he had been misrepresented. While he said that he understood what had happened, the Secretary did not conceal that he was in a difficult situation, particularly since he was going up to the Hill at two o’clock today to talk to members of Congress in order to make sure that if we get a pact we will have the funds to finance it. It was difficult for him when people were in a position to put the question: “Why should we help if we get slapped in the face every time we try to make a helpful move?”
The Secretary said that obviously we would not want in any way to put the New Zealand Government in the position of having to choose between the UK and the US. He had been careful not to do this or to raise hypothetical questions in his talks with Mr. Webb. Mr. Munro entirely agreed that the question had not been raised in this way.
In response to a question from his Ambassador, Mr. Laking said that Mr. Webb had one other point in mind which was to tell the Secretary that obviously he could not, as a member of the Commonwealth, say that New Zealand would enter a pact without the UK. This was the reason why Mr. Webb could not go back on what he said yesterday but put it in its proper context.
Mr. Munro then turned to the subject of the five-power military talks. He said that his government attached great importance to these talks, as evidenced by the high rank of the New Zealand officer who would take part in them. He understood that our view had been that purely military talks would be of little or no value unless [Page 504] accompanied by political conversations. He thought that at the very least there will continue to be informal and confidential exchanges of views on the political and diplomatic level. He would expect to carry on such conversations with us in order to show that New Zealand was in earnest about this whole matter and he assumed that there would be similar bilateral talks between the US and UK and others. The Secretary agreed that such talks should certainly continue and referred to the conversations between Great Britain and the Colombo powers. He thought that it would be helpful if the Colombo powers would come to realize more fully the dangers in the present situation and would be willing to participate in such measures as providing troops to patrol and protect an armistice agreement if one were worked out. In his view the more the Asians took over the better. As he had already told Mr. Munro we would like to avoid much involvement in the mainland of Asia and it was only because we had feared the appearance of a vacuum there that we had considered doing something to help fill it.
In leaving, the Ambassador again expressed how deeply he and Mr. Webb had been disturbed by the misrepresentations in the press. He was obviously entirely sincere in this.
- Roberts’ report reads in part: ‘Webb said he had not discussed with Dulles the question of New Zealand’s joining in the proposed ‘united front’ without Britain. But he told reporters with vigor, in reply to questions: ‘I don’t visualize the possibility of Britain not being in such an alliance. I can’t conceive of a satisfactory alliance being made that would not include Britain.’” (Washington Post and Times Herald, May 21, 1954)↩