Historical Documents - Office of the Historian

S/P–NSC files, lot 62 D 1

Memorandum by Robert Cutler, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs1

top secret

[Washington,] May 19, 1954.

U.S. Objectives (Paragraph 10, NSC 5405):2

“To prevent the countries of Southeast Asia from passing into the communist orbit, to persuade them that their best interests lie in greater cooperation and stronger affiliations with the rest of the free world; and to assist them to develop toward stable free governments, with the will and ability to resist communism from within and without, and to contribute to the strengthening of the free world.”

U.S. Motives in Forming Regional Grouping

1.: its overriding concern is for the independence and welfare of the countries of the area;
2.: it is not seeking to draw them into any alignment that would compromise their independence;
3.: it scrupulously respects the rights of other nations to free and stable governments and institutions, secure from foreign domination, external aggression, and internal conspiracy instigated by a foreign power;
4.: it is prepared to join in a collective effort toward that end in order that the countries of the area may achieve their goals of independence, peace, and economic progress;
5.: in consultations on matters of common interest in the regional grouping, its purpose would be to receive advice no less than to give it;
6.: participation by the U.S. is not intended by the U.S. as a step in a war against Communist China.

[Page 491]

Regional Grouping No. 1 Purpose	Regional Grouping No. 2 Purpose	Regional Grouping No. 3 Purpose
Assuming no acceptable settlement and continuance of hostilities in Indochina: either	Assuming end of hostilities as result of negotiated settlement or Communist conquest of all or part of Indochina:	(May be formed either during hostilities or after their cessation.)
(1) to defeat the Vietminh by eliminating organized Vietminh forces; or	(1) to exchange information on meeting problems causing vulnerability to Communist expansion;	To foster cooperation on economic and social problems.
(2) to prevent the Vietminh from gaining control of Indochina.	(2) to create psychologically important common front against Communist expansion;
	(3) to give direct assistance to a participating Asian government, on its request, against Communist insurrection;
	(4) to defend a participating Asian government, on its request, against external Communist attack; with moral support of other Asian participants;
	(5) provision by Asian participants of facilities and, if possible, some forces in aid of (3) and (4) above.
Membership	Membership	Membership
1. US, France, Assoc. States, Thailand.	1. US, UK, Australia, New Zealand, Thailand, Philippines.	1. US, UK, Australia, New Zealand, Thailand, Philippines, Pakistan.
2. Philippines—probably.	2. To extent grouping is applicable to Indo-china—France, Associated States.	(2. France, Associated States?)
3. Australia, New Zealand—Possibly after Australian elections.	3. Pakistan—probably.	3. India, Burma, Indonesia, Ceylon, probably during early years if no prejudice to their nonalignment policy.
4. UK—No.	4. India, Burma, Indonesia, Ceylon—benevolent neutrality, would probably join in event of further Communist Chinese aggression.	(4. Japan? Republic of Korea? Chinese Nationalists?)
5. Pakistan—moral support.
6. India, Burma, Indonesia, Ceylon—neutral.

Basic Questions

1.: If the Tonkin Delta is lost, is it militarily feasible to prevent Communist control of the rest of Indochina and of Southeast Asia?
2.: Would the loss of Southeast Asia be so damaging to U.S. security and prestige that the U.S. should intervene now in Indochina, even at the risk of war with Communist China and possibly of general war?
3.: Can the Tonkin Delta be successfully held by U.S. intervention now in Indochina: (a) by U.S. air and naval forces alone?; (b) by [Page 492] U.S. air, naval and ground forces?; (c) only by direct U.S. attack on Communist China?
4.: Should the U.S. intervene now in Indochina as part of a limited regional grouping, if such action: (a) endangers the U.S.-UK alliance? (b) prejudices possibility of later forming a wider grouping to try to protect the balance of Southeast Asia, if all or part of Indochina is lost?
5.: Will the loss of all or part of Vietnam make easier or more difficult the formation of a regional grouping to defend the rest of Indochina?
6.: Is it essential for U.S. to decide, if it intervenes in Indochina, that it will tactically use new weapons as militarily desirable?
7.: Should the U.S. objective, in now intervening in Indochina, be (a) offensively, to defeat Vietminh forces, or (b) defensively, to prevent Communist control of Indochina?

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, East Asia and the Pacific, Volume XII, Part 1

Memorandum by Robert Cutler, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs1