789.5 MSP/9–1554
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Officer in Charge of Pakistan—Afghanistan Affairs (Thacher)1
Subject:
- Review of Afghan Problems
Participants:
- Mr. M. K. Ludin, Ambassador of Afghanistan
- NEA—Mr. Byroade
- SOA—Mr. Thacher
The discussion with Ambassador Ludin centered on two problems: Afghanistan’s need for small arms, because of the deterioration in equipment of its army and security forces, and the need for a settlement of the Pushtunistan problem.
With regard to the first problem the Ambassador said that Afghanistan has made no purchases of foreign ammunition since 1947 or 1948, and it has now insufficient amounts for suppression of internal disturbance. The Ambassador said that the Afghan military is deeply worried about obsolescence of its equipment, and would like to purchase some small arms wherever it could, but because of the country’s economic condition, some outside economic assistance would be needed before [Page 1415] such purchases could be made. He wondered whether the United States could consider some short-term economic aid to Afghanistan to help it buy small arms in Europe. The Soviets would know that no non-satellite European country would sell Afghanistan arms without U.S. approval but Afghanistan would have to take the risk of the probable adverse Soviet reaction. He was aware also that any such possible aid by the United States to Afghanistan might present difficulties for us in the context of the “Pakistan—United States alliance.”
In discussing Pushtunistan the Ambassador said concern with this question in Kabul had increased sharply of late because of accelerated integration of the Pushtu tribal areas with the settled areas in Pakistan. The Ambassador said that the Afghans view this Pakistan policy simply as a continuation of the old British policies whereby British domain was extended through alternate pursuit of a “forward” policy of forceful absorption or peaceful penetration by subsidy and bribe. Ludin wondered whether in the light of Pakistan’s participation in the Manila treaty2 it might try to claim that the Pushtunistan movement should be considered as a form of subversion within the terms of the treaty. Still the Government of Afghanistan is sharply aware that little progress can be made in deciding whether Afghanistan is to remain in a position of neutrality or whether it should come into closer association with other nations of the free world as long as the Pushtunistan problem remains unsettled. If half of the Pushtu-speaking peoples are absorbed into Pakistan, the Pushtoons of Afghanistan become simply another small, insecure minority, and the Pushtoon people may be in danger of extinction.
Mr. Byroade said that Pushtunistan, like a number of other international disputes, was one in whose substance we did not have a direct interest and in which our chief desire was to see a settlement. He said that from his personal observation he had not been able to understand either the logic or justice of the Afghan view. We have continued to hope that there might sometime be a change in Afghan attitudes which would permit a settlement. He asked what was the status of negotiations at present and whether through some kind of union of Afghanistan and Pakistan the road might be opened for settlement.
The Ambassador said negotiations were continuing. They had discussed with Pakistan two proposals: a settlement of the Pushtunistan question which in turn might open the way for closer economic and political ties or some kind of merger between the two countries. However, there was a question in Afghan minds as to the sincerity of Pakistan’s intentions. The Afghans had been disturbed by a leak last spring of these highly confidential discussions to the New York Times [Page 1416] correspondent in Karachi. The Times story3 reflected that its reporter had been told only of the proposals for merger but not of the precondition of a Pushtunistan settlement.
Ludin asked about the possibility of U.S. support of Afghanistan’s desire for a seat on ECOSOC. He was informed that it did not seem probable that we would be able to support Afghanistan’s candidacy.
Ludin said that he had asked Prince Naim, Foreign Minister of Afghanistan, who was arriving in New York next week to head the Afghan UN delegation, to come to this country to discuss these matters with the U.S. Government. He hoped that Prince Naim might be able to call on the President and the Secretary. Mr. Byroade pointed out that the President would be out of Washington for some time yet but that he would draw to the Secretary’s attention the desire of Ambassador Ludin and Prince Naim to meet with him in New York.
- Initialed by Byroade, indicating his approval.↩
- The Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, signed in Manila on Sept. 8, 1954 (6 UST 85). For documentation on the participation of Pakistan in this Treaty, see volume XII.↩
- On Apr. 11, 1954, the New York Times published an article by John P. Callahan which reported that Pakistan and Afghanistan were planning a merger.↩