745A.00/6–2253

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs (Raynor)

confidential

Subject:

  • South African Problems

Participants:

  • Ambassador Jooste, South African Embassy
  • The Secretary
  • Mr. H. Raynor, Director, BNA

Ambassador Jooste opened the conversation by stating that he wished to elaborate somewhat on the background of the problems facing South Africa which came to the fore each year in the UN. He explained the fundamentals behind the development of the South African policy of apartheid. He said the European South Africans realized that something must be done for the natives, the natives must be given hope for a better life, they could not be kept in their present position forever, etc. He added that it was equally clear that his could not be done on an integrated basis as this would mean that the European population would be submerged and absorbed. Hence, the South [Page 1001] Africans were attempting to develop the concept of the development within the same country of separate societies.

He added that the discussion of this problem, condemnatory resolutions, etc., at the UN were having the effect of making the carrying out of this policy most difficult indeed. There was discussion at this point as to whether the UN was going further than it should go on matters of this type which were primarily questions of domestic jurisdiction.

The Secretary, after pointing out that he had not visited South Africa (the Ambassador had expressed regret that the Secretary on his several trips had not been able to get to South Africa) and that he had not gone into this question with his advisers, had the personal impression that the Europeans in South Africa were sitting on a keg of dynamite and that the present policies would lead to some kind of an explosion.

The Ambassador said that he fully realized that they were sitting on a keg of dynamite but he said that the Europeans were the ones who would be blown up when the keg exploded. Hence, there was full realization that the problem must be solved and that this was what they were trying to do but that UN intervention was making it most difficult indeed. He appealed for a sympathetic understanding of the South African problems in the UN. He pointed to the fact that he had failed by a matter of one vote to stop the establishment last fall of the Commission on apartheid and pointed out that the U.S. had abstained on the vote.1 He said this had resulted in the development of a certain antagonistic feeling in the Union towards the U.S. and he mentioned this fact not by way of recrimination but because he thought the Secretary should know of this feeling.

On leaving the Ambassador stated that he would like to continue these talks so that the Secretary would have a better background on the South African questions before the meeting of the General Assembly this fall.

  1. Apparently reference is to the Commission, established under resolution 616 A (VII) for the purpose of studying the racial situation in the Union of South Africa and reporting to the General Assembly. See editorial note, p. 976. This resolution, on which the United States abstained, was adopted in the General Assembly by a vote of 35 in favor, 1 opposed, with 23 abstentions. The vote on the first paragraph, which established the Commission, was 35 in favor, 17 opposed, with 7 abstentions (including the United States). Within the Ad Hoc Political Committee, votes on individual paragraphs ranged from 44 in favor, with 8 abstentions.