771.00/2–1754: Circular airgram
The Acting Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic Offices1
Subject:
CA–4408. The Department has read with interest Paris telegram 2893 of February 8 reporting the views of Resident General Guillaume regarding the desirability of the general political orientation of North Africa toward Europe rather than toward the Near East. This is another expression of the long-standing French concept of maintaining North Africa, as the southern fringe of the Mediterranean Basin, as an integral part of the western system. While the United States has obviously never been called upon to take any position on this geopolitical concept, nevertheless our recognition of this situation might be considered to lie in our having made Morocco a part of our western defense system through the establishment of air bases in that country.
In this connection, the Department would answer in the negative the question raised in Tangier’s telegram 211 of February 10 regarding Spanish fears on this score. While the policy objectives of France and Spain in Morocco are obviously at variance in the present situation we believe firmly that the ultimate viewpoint of Spain on this problem also envisages the western and European orientation of North Africa, [Page 638] with especial reference of course to Morocco. Therefore, what the Spanish fear with regard to French North African policy is not, in the Department’s view, the integration of the area more closely with Europe as the French are trying to do. Indeed, any contrary tendency would deal Spain out as effectively as France.
Rather it is the Department’s opinion that Spain’s desire with regard to North Africa is to improve her own position in Morocco at the expense of France, within the framework of having the entire area facing northward rather than eastward. The recent caid’s demonstrations in Tetuan, organized by the Spanish, and Spanish demands regarding Tangier fit into this pattern. Furthermore Spanish territorial aspirations to extend her zone as far south as the Sebou would not seem consonant with a wish to have Morocco become a part of the Near East.
The basic Spanish policy in Morocco would seem to be one of self-interest, like that of the French. The policy of rapprochement followed by Spain with regard to the Arab world would seem to be entirely consistent with the retention of her present position in Morocco and even its expansion, in Spanish eyes. We have repeated indications that, in the last analysis, the Spanish realize French loss of control over North Africa would inevitably be followed by the expulsion of the Spaniards. While this might be somewhat more gentle in view of the more conciliatory line taken with the nationalists by Spain, there is no doubt that the former Sultan, who was the most influential Moroccan leader of the postwar period, felt the Sherifian Empire should be reunited under his effective rule, and had no feeling that Spain should have any different position from France in Morocco. There was some question at one time he might consider a different status for the International Zone, at least temporarily, but even this was open to question.
Furthermore, the pro-Arab policy of General Franco had other bases than the Moroccan situation alone, and was involved with the isolated position of Spain from 1946 to 1953. While the Spanish Government doubtless hoped to preserve a favored position in Morocco should anything happen to the French, this was at best a forlorn hope they generally realized.
Therefore, while the Spanish, for a variety of reasons, may desire to annoy the French to the utmost over the Moroccan question, it is hardly conceivable that Spain seriously believes it could form part of an eastern-oriented Arab bloc. Morocco of course occupies an important role in Spanish eyes, both from strategic and for prestige and patriotic reasons, and Spain would doubtless sacrifice her pro-Arab policy to the necessity of remaining in Morocco by force should the situation develop to a point where that choice were necessary. While under present conditions cooperation with the French in such an endeavor would be distasteful, and the Spanish seem to be enjoying present [Page 639] French discomfiture as a result of the terrorist campaign in the French Zone, we are inclined to believe that any general anti-European outbreaks throughout the Sherifian Empire would find Spanish and French military authorities working together to put them down.
Thus, while the views of General Guillaume in Paris telegram 2893 may be oversimplified, and are unpleasant to the Arab world, they are hardly news to the Spaniards or to the Arabs, North African and otherwise. Incidentally, it is believed that Guillaume and the many other French who hold the thesis that North Africa should look to Europe rather than eastward, are talking in political-economic-strategic terms, and certainly not in terms of religion, culture, etc. In this connection, while Spain undoubtedly has a strong cultural and historical tie with Morocco, which France does not, it also might be pointed out that present French religious policies toward Moslems are just as liberal as those of Spain. Neither France nor Spain has made any effort to subvert the Mohammedan religion in Morocco, since both realize that this would be a disastrously unsuccessful venture.
It is concluded that while France and Spain are unquestionably having serious squabbles over the Moroccan question at this time, the Spanish recognize a fundamental community of European interest and would agree with the conclusion of General Guillaume that North Africa should be tied to Europe—otherwise Spain would lose her hold in the Moslem part of the African continent entirely.