888.2553/9–2651: Telegram
No. 91
The Chargé in the United Kingdom
(Holmes) to
the Department of State1
niact
1527. For the Secretary. Makins, who is acting head FonOff, asked me in today to bring me up to date on latest developments in Iran crisis. He showed me: (1) PriMin’s msg ex [to] President;2 (2) instr to Shepherd to see Shah and to urge on him in firm but friendly terms absolute necessity his taking forthright action to stop order for expulsion of remaining technicians in Abadan; and (3) further instr to Shepherd to see Fatemi and protest expulsion order in strongest terms. Presumably all three docs have already been shown Dept by Brit Emb Wash.
Makins, who was present at last night’s Cabinet comite mtg when decisions reflected in foregoing docs were taken, told me he did not know, however, whether opposition leaders had been consulted. In response to my question, he also said no decision has yet been taken re course of action HMG will pursue in event appeal to Shah is unsuccessful, but observed that Cabinet will have face matter squarely and that decision will probably lie in one of two alternatives: (1) voluntary withdrawal remaining technicians before Irans can forcibly expel them; or (2) use of force to maintain them in Abadan.
It is extremely difficult for Emb to predict at this point which Cabinet wld feel compelled to take. As msg to Pres makes clear, govt is faced with very far-reaching dilemma, which, we wish emphasize, is made even more difficult by imminence of genl election.3 Expulsion order is alarming new factor which govt must confront squarely and urgently. Iranians have now forced showdown and hardcore Abadan, whatever its practical usefulness, has acquired tremendous symbolic significance. As Dept knows, Labor [Page 172] Govt has in recent months been more vulnerable from attack on ME than on any other phase of its foreign policy and it is not to be expected that conservatives will neglect any opportunity to drive home to electorate the already familiar allegation that Labor’s hesitancy and weakness have been instrumental in decline of Brit influence, prestige and material stake in this critical area. It is our estimate furthermore, that this will strike responsible note among electorate. Today’s press contains ample confirmation that genl tenor of feeling here is that UK can not supinely stand by in face this latest provocation. Moreover there are govt’s recorded statements, which while carefully worded to preserve maximum freedom of action, are nevertheless widely interpreted as intention to hold Abadan by force if necessary. For example, Attlee during FonOff’s debate July 30, while admitting there might have be withdrawal from “some part of Abadan”, went on to say “our intention is not to evacuate entirely”. Lord Henderson in Lords following day termed this as announcement “that we shld stay in Abadan” and added “in saying that, we accept all the implications that flow from that decision”. While it is likely that Attlee and Henderson merely intended the foregoing as an expression of the govt’s intention in the situation then prevailing, their statements have nevertheless been widely interpreted as a continuing commitment.
Under circumstances, we can see only two ways in which Labor Govt can resolve dilemma, either: (1) by endeavoring secure opposition agreement to voluntary evacuation of Abadan personnel (which wld undoubtedly have been accompanied by strongest protest and retaliatory measures); or (2) by holding on to Abadan by force and thereby obviating by deed Cons charge Labor Govt showed weakness. We do not believe that alternative (1) is practicable as we cannot see Conservatives, particularly in view their own most uncompromising stand on importance holding refinery, associating themselves with a policy which wld generally be interpreted here as virtually complete capitulation. It is our belief therefore that Labor in face latest Iran action, will find itself under strong compulsion to use force to maintain present nucleus of technicians in Abadan unless appeal to Shah successful and expulsion order rescinded. In final analysis, however, decision re use force will probably be largely influenced by US attitude.
There can be little doubt, however, that Labor Govt wld welcome way out present dilemma if it cld be accomplished without national and, incidentally, party consequences it fears. Appeal to Shah along lines Attlee’s msg is only hope they feel they have. In view of far-reaching implications of voluntary withdrawal or use of force, I hope President will find it possible comply with PriMin’s request to extent of doing everything possible at this critical juncture in [Page 173] making clear to Shah, Iran Govt and Iran people that we condemn expulsion order and that we strongly urge it be rescinded.
I wld like to add a final note of caution. There is a strong feeling in govt circles at the present time that the issue in Iran has been finally joined and, under these circumstances, that their friendliest and staunchest ally shld show its hand firmly and unequivocally in support of them. I fear very much that if the feeling becomes prevalent in Labor circles that we have failed them in their hour of need, some Laborites will, in order to explain their own failure, feel compelled to place blame on US. To my mind it wld be most unfortunate if any US–UK divergency on this issue were publicly aired in this pre-election period. I am not citing this as the principal reason why I feel we shld support the UK at this time, but I think it has an important bearing on the situation and should be kept constantly in mind.
- Repeated to Tehran; received in the Department at 1:50 a.m. Sept. 27.↩
- Transmitted in Document 89.↩
- Oct. 25.↩