888.2553/8–2851: Telegram
No. 78
The Special Assistant to the President
(Harriman) to
the Department of State1
1090. From Harriman for President and Secretary; no distribution except as directed by Secretary’s office. I met yesterday afternoon (Monday2) with Attlee and group consisting of Stokes, Shin-well, Addison, Ede, Lord Alexander, McNeil and Strang. Holmes and Rountree accompanied me.
In reviewing Iran situation I said Stokes’ mission had been of real value and had reduced to some extent Iran resistance to Brit and made progress in breaking down Iranian intransigence thus making any future negotiations considerably easier. I pointed out explosive situation exists which requires skillful handling and closest coordination US–UK policies. I emphasized importance working with Shah and of giving him proper encouragement to act when situation permits, while not forcing him to take measures which he considers wld be dangerous. I urged caution in next moves and suggested Brit let situation simmer for a time, pointing out that adverse economic conditions in Iran will weaken Mossadeq only if there is minimum indication that they are brought about by outside pressures but are understood to be the result of Mossadeq’s inept handling. This may take some time, particularly in view financial reprieve obtained by Mossadeq by virtue 14 million pounds made available from currency cover.
Stokes mentioned two encouraging developments, namely the strengthening of Iranian security forces at Abadan to prevent disorders, which apparently was the result of talks which we had had with Shah, and message received Monday from Shepherd saying [Page 151] Shah advised him that Mossadeq had agreed to establish managing board under NIOC with two British, two Iranian and two neutral directors and with British general manager. British said and I agreed, however, that there shld be clear evidence Iranians prepared to be realistic in financial aspects of settlement before sending mission with Minister back to Iran. We discussed desirability of Brit sending to Tehran a technical level officer conversant with previous negotiations and with knowledge all aspects of problem. He would be assigned to Ambassador’s staff for purpose keeping in touch with Iranians, being available assist them in understanding realities of situation, and encouraging them to come forward with proposals which would make it possible to resume negotiations. Although Prime Minister expressed some concern that this might be interpreted as being itself a resumption of negotiations, and would thus reduce pressure on Mossadeq, British seemed generally impressed with advantages and will give suggestion further consideration.
Prime Minister and others were concerned that inaction by British for protracted period is embarrassing politically in UK and indicates sign of weakness abroad. They are acutely aware of possible approaching elections. They pointed out that although payment local employees in fields stopped because no British there to pay them, continued payment of Iranian staff at Abadan imposes heavy financial burden which can not go on for long; also that continued provision of dollars under financial agreement with Iran and shipment of goods in very short supply here, such as steel and sugar, wld be most difficult to justify to British public while Iranians are “kicking Britain around.”… I emphasized danger of disastrous consequences of military action beyond that absolutely necessary in landing forces solely to evacuate British personnel, and found that there appeared to be general agreement on this. I said that I had assumed payments to Iranian personnel could not go on indefinitely, but emphasized dangerous effects of this and other economy measures. I urged that Shah be consulted in advance before any such steps are taken. I said that manner in which any economy measures having adverse effect upon Iran are taken is extremely important and that any such action shld be on the basis of availabilities without public statement; that if British pressure is overtly exercised in form of publicly announced sanctions, Mossadeq would not be weakened and public opposition to British would be further solidified. Stokes supported me in this, and others seemed to agree.
Stokes referred to press stories to effect that British Ambassador in Tehran, contrary to Stokes advice (and contrary to strong advice given British by me), had stated that further negotiations with [Page 152] Mossadeq impossible and that Mossadeq should be replaced. He also referred to press stories that US Ambassador would undertake discussions with Mossadeq as mediator in endeavor find solution. I, of course, stated that latter story could have no foundation in fact. Stokes mentioned this mainly to emphasize importance of US and UK coordinating their policies. Great difficulty is that Iranians are under the impression that there is substantial divergence of views between US and UK. We agreed upon importance continued advance consultation between two governments and of closest working relationship between Embassies in Tehran. Latter essential to arrive at agreed appreciation of situation to establish points of difference thereon, and to agree in light of such appreciation as to action which should be taken by each govt.
It was agreed as result of position I took, with strong support by Stokes, that in the interest of our common objectives each of us should take an independent though closely coordinated line on the situation as it develops.
Attlee said at end of meeting that he agreed British could delay for a time taking any special measures, but said he wanted us to know he cld not let situation drift indefinitely and hoped for US understanding and support if circumstances require specific actions which he did not define. He and his colleagues appeared to agree provocative statements or action would do more harm than good.
Talks were in private and in the tone of close associates dealing with a common problem. Britain seems most appreciative of efforts which have been made by US to help find solution. They did not even raise question of US giving categoric public support for their position or reply Attlee letter to President.3 My immediately following telegram suggests line of reply this letter.4