Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Iran, 1951–1954, Volume X

888.2553/8–2251: Telegram

No. 75
The Special Assistant to the President (Harriman) to the Embassy in the United Kingdom¹

top secret
niact

Tehran, August 22, 1951—noon.

163. Eyes only Ambassador. Stokes negotiations with Mosadeq are approaching an impasse with imminent danger negotiations may be broken off. He appears to be fully resigned this possibility and has taken very firm line with Mosadeq.

Ultimatum which he handed Mosadeq yesterday to effect he must have indication by noon today (Wednesday²) that Iranian Govt prepared negotiate on realistic basis or else he will leave is reported to have created bad impression and is source of concern Ala and other moderate elements who feel ultimatum to Iranians are serious tactical error and sound too much like AIOC tactics. I believe Stokes attitude at least some extent influenced by messages from Brit Govt indicating perhaps he has gone too far in concessions. While there appears to be little chance that satisfactory arrangements can be worked out with Mosadeq it is in my judgment of very great importance that every effort be made to do so. The 3 principal points to be settled are (1) purchase of most of oil by Brit interests, (2) arrangements for operation within Iran which wld enable retention Brit staff and (3) financial arrangements. Mosadeq has already yielded on first point and present difficulty centers largely around second. If Mosadeq shld yield on this point only third major problem wld remain.

If break in negotiations is inevitable manner in which this occurs is of great importance. Stokes shld avoid attitudes and actions which wld permit Mosadeq to place onus of responsibility upon him. Moreover departure of mission from Tehran shld if possible be under circumstances that wld permit resumption of negotiations at some future time without necessity developing new formula or statement new conditions under which this cld be done. If a more reasonable govt shld evolve, it wld be much easier for a new PriMin to resume talks where Mosadeq left off under our formula which has real practical merit. A “suspension” of talks wld therefore be much better than an absolute break.

While substance this telegram obviously cannot be given to Brit Govt, I hope you will discuss matter with them … emphasizing importance of Stokes making every effort to keep talks going, if this shld be impossible, of leaving Tehran under best possible circumstances.

Ref to mytel August 19, which through inadvertence was not rptd to you until this morning (no. 162³), I have agreed with Stokes that you shld show it to Foreign Office in order that Brit Govt shld know the strong line I have been taking to Iranian Govt privately with assurance that Brit Govt wld not use substance for formal or informal public statements on their part.

Stokes tells me there there will be Brit Cabinet meeting this afternoon and hopes this will reach Foreign Office for use at meeting.⁴

[

Harriman

]

1. Repeated to the Department as 737 for President Truman and Secretary Acheson; the source text is the copy in Department of State files.
2. Aug. 22.
3. Presumably Harriman is referring to the statement in telegram 709, Document 73; however, there is no indication on that telegram to show that it was repeated to London as 162.
4. At 5 p.m. on Aug. 22, Holmes reported that he had delivered the text of Harriman’s statement to Strang who stated that he would place it before the Cabinet that afternoon. Strang seemed impressed by the idea of a suspension rather than a break in the talks. (Telegram 987 from London; 888.2553/8–2251)