788.11/12–954
No. 504
Memorandum by the Acting Assistant Secretary
of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Jernegan) to the Secretary of State1
secret
Washington, December 9, 1954.
Subject:
- Visit of His Imperial Majesty Mohammad
Reza Pahlavi Shahinshah of Iran and Empress Soraya
The Shah will call upon the President on Monday, December 13 at 12:15 p.m.
for a talk. The President expects that you will attend together with Under
Secretary Hoover and Acting Assistant
Secretary Jernegan. Ambassador
Entezam will accompany the Shah.
It is also expected that Mrs. Dulles
together with Mrs. Hoover will assist
Mrs. Eisenhower in showing the
Empress around the White House during this period. You and Mrs. Dulles, along with the others, are also
invited to lunch.
The Shah’s main interest is to find out what role we expect Iran to play in
Middle East defense and to what extent we are prepared
[Page 1067]
to assist Iran to develop defensive delaying
capabilities. Although the Shah has been told he cannot expect any final
decisions during his visit, our response to his questions should take in the
following considerations: we wish to improve the ability of Iran’s armed
forces to provide resistance to external aggression and eventually to make a
realistic contribution to the defense of the area. We wish also to build up
the self-confidence and morale of the Shah and his government so that they
will continue to stand up to Soviet pressures and to have a sense of
direction. Former opportunities to build up Iran’s armed forces were not
fully exploited due to a less favorable political climate. We believe that
if the present opportunity is seized we can capitalize on the existing
favorable situation in Iran and make a significant advance toward bringing
Iran into closer cooperation with its neighbors in the free world and
changing it from a liability to a positive asset in the Middle Eastern
area.
At the outset of their talk the Shah will hand the President a memorandum
containing his views. We have an advance copy, a summary of which is
attached as Tab A. It is recommended that because of his personal knowledge
of the Iranian situation, you ask Mr. Hoover to brief the President regarding it.
Attached as Tab B for your approval is a memorandum for the President,
transmitting a paper which suggests the line he may wish to take in response
to questions which the Shah is likely to ask. This paper has been approved
by the Department of Defense and CIA.
Attached as Tab C2 is a summary status report on military aid to Iran.
Although the Secretary of Defense has not yet replied to your letter
recommending a substantial increase in aid,3
a decision has been taken that we help develop Iran’s
defensive delaying capabilities as fast as Iran demonstrates its ability
to effectively train its soldiers to use properly our military
aid.
Attached as Tab D is a background paper on the internal political situation
in Iran. You may wish to comment to the Shah on the resolute attitude and
determination shown by his government in combating communism in Iran.
Attached as Tab E is a background paper summarizing the current economic
situation and describing US economic aid to date. It is not expected that
the Shah will want to discuss the question of economic aid in any detail.
However, it is recommended that you compliment the Shah on his government’s
stated intention to press forward with economic and social reforms.
[Page 1068]
If the Shah should express the hope that Ambassador Henderson would not be withdrawn at this
time you may wish to take the line that the decision regarding his
transfer4 was based on long-term considerations and
important responsibilities for which he is singularly qualified.
[Tab A]
Ambassador Henderson’s Summary Of The Memorandum To Be Handed
To The President By The Shah At The Opening Of Their Talk At The
White House On December 13
During the last 15 months Iran has demonstrated a determination to remain
an independent nation and to utilize its resources to the advantage of
itself and other free nations. The oil agreement marks a psychological
turning point for Iran as well as a beginning of a new and promising
economic period. In abandoning a negative and sterile policy the Iran
Government and Parliament have made a conscious decision to turn their
backs on this form of isolationism and to join hands with leading
nations of the free world. Iran is grateful for US financial support
during its period of travail; also for encouragement and counsel from
the President and his advisers that have helped so much to bring Iran to
the present promising situation.
It is hoped that Iran eventually will receive the oil revenues needed for
a development program designed to strengthen its economy and improve
living conditions. Plans for the program will be carried out in a way
that natural and human resources will be utilized to the maximum, and I
intend to do all in my power to make sure funds will be used wisely in
executing the program according to carefully worked out priorities. It
will be several years, however, before Iran is in a position to meet
urgent development needs without financial and technical assistance from
its friends abroad. We are particularly appreciative of the support
which the US is continuing to give in connection with the economic and
technical advancement of our country.
The problem weighing most heavily upon my mind at present, however, is
that of the security of Iran. We have over 1,600 miles of border with
Russia. Although relations now with our northern neighbor are at least
formally correct, we have no reason to believe that international
communism has abandoned its long-range objectives of converting Iran
into a Communist corridor to the Persian
[Page 1069]
Gulf, the Middle East and South Asia. We are
compelled to keep constantly on guard to prevent or frustrate Communist
infiltration. Just recently we discovered that Communists had taken
advantage of a situation which existed in Iran between April 1951 and
August 1953 to penetrate our Armed Forces. The so-called “neutrality”
policy of the Iranian Government then in power was primarily responsible
for the decline in morale among certain elements in the Armed Forces.
This policy gave these forces the impression that if Iran should be
subjected to armed attack from the north they would not be expected to
defend the country and that therefore there would be no reason to be
prepared to do so. Fortunately during this period an overwhelming
majority of officers and men remained loyal and patriotic and we have
been able to identify and weed out those who failed to stand firm.
Nevertheless a degree of success which the Communists were able to
achieve emphasizes the importance that the armed forces understand that
their basic mission is defense of their country.
There are several ways by which international Communists may try to take
over Iran. I shall mention three: (1) by armed invasion with the idea of
stamping out all resistance before other nations of the free world have
the opportunity to intervene; (2) by simultaneous employment of tactics
of diplomatic pressure, threatening gestures, and internal and organized
infiltration. Pressures and threats would be used to keep Iran isolated
from other free countries whose support Iran needs, and infiltration
would be resorted to for the purpose of reducing the country to a
helpless state of economic and political chaos; (3) by convincing the
Iranian people that Iran, in its geographical position under the shadow
of a great Communist bloc and far distant from the centers of strength
in the free world, has no hope of surviving as a free nation and
therefore it would be better to surrender to international communism
without fight rather than to give in after a cruel, hopeless
struggle.
I am convinced that one of the essentials for preventing international
communism from realizing its ambitions with regard to Iran is for us
with the help of great free nations, particularly the US, to strengthen
our Armed Forces to the extent that would render them capable of putting
up an honorable defense if Iran is attacked. If our forces could possess
such a capability, morale would be much higher and they would be much
less vulnerable to penetration. The Iranian Government and the Iranian
people would be sure to stand up more firmly in the face of pressures,
threats and attempts at Communist infiltration if they had the feeling
Iran could resist if attacked, and that the free world were interested
in Iran being able to put up such resistance and were helping to that
end.
[Page 1070]
Furthermore if Iran should have an army with real defensive capabilities,
international Communism in my opinion would be more cautious in
launching an armed attack against it and would not be so hopeful of
achieving its ends by indirect means.
We are grateful for US military assistance which during recent years has
rendered it possible for Iran to maintain armed forces capable of
preserving law and order internally. Unfortunately, however, its forces
now have practically no defensive capabilities. Its organization, number
and distribution throughout country do not correspond to the present
needs of Iranian defense; its officers and men are not trained,
conditioned, equipped and armed to meet the requirements of modern
warfare. I fear that no matter how much money and effort are put into
strengthening Iran economically, our common objective of maintaining
Iran as an economically and politically stable independent country will
not be achieved unless the situation re its armed forces is
remedied.
Unfortunately at present our budget, even with present generous
assistance from US is so limited we do not see how we can spare the
additional funds to the military for training purposes. We are not able
to give the armed forces food and clothing of the kind which men
undergoing rigorous training should have; no goods with which to settle
some contingents in more strategic areas or to transfer military stores
to less vulnerable places. We are hoping that the US will find it
possible to give us help in this regard, to give us additional aid in
training, and also furnish us, as fast as we are prepared to make
effective use of them, all weapons required by a modern army—weapons
which in our case would be required not only for our own defense but
also for that of the region. I stress the importance of modern weapons
since it would not be good for the morale of our soldiers for them to
feel that we expect them to stand up to heavy tanks with our present
inadequate arms or to be subjected to aerial bombardment without any
aircraft, guns and fighter protection. In this connection, it should be
borne in mind that in view of Iran’s geographical position it might take
from three to six months to get military supplies to us in case we are
attacked. Need for advance planning in the matter of military depots
therefore seems urgent.
We realize that Iran, even with strong army would not be able by itself
over a prolonged period to halt international Communist aggression in
force. It seems clear that a regional security arrangement of some kind
which includes Iran might well serve as a deterrent to such aggression
and would be helpful in combatting aggression if it should be
undertaken. It does not seem to me fitting, however, that Iran should be
a party to such an arrangement until it is in a position—or until it has
at least reason to believe that it will
[Page 1071]
soon be in a position—to contribute its share to
the common defense of the area. No self-respecting nation can expect its
neighbors to fight for it unless it is willing and capable of fighting
for itself.
From the viewpoint of the security of the area as a whole, it seems to me
militarily, strategically and logically sound that there should be a
carefully calculated balance of military strength among Turkey, Iran and
Pakistan. Such a balance is now non-existent. Powerful forces are
concentrated in Turkey while Iran is almost defenseless. An
international Communist attack would certainly not be through Turkey
when it could easily outflank Turkey by seizing Iran. It could then turn
the Persian Gulf into a Communist sea, split the forces of Turkey and
Pakistan, occupy our oil fields, and be in a position to seize the major
oil fields of the Middle East. It is difficult therefore to escape the
conclusion that Iran at present is the key to the defense of the Middle
East.
We earnestly hope that the US will understand the difficult problem Iran
is facing re its future and will make such political and military
decisions as are necessary if the Iran people are to go about their
tasks of strengthening the economic and social basis of their country
with feelings of confidence, and if Iran is to play its proper role in
promoting the security of the Middle East and of the free world.5
[Tab B]
Visit of the Shah of Iran
secret
The Shah visited the United States in 1949. He believes that he was
rebuffed and that he did not succeed in making the United States realize
the strategic importance of Iran and the need for our support on the
Greek-Turkish pattern. He is visiting the United States again, with his
Empress, to obtain medical advice, rest and relaxation, and to talk to
American officials concerning military support and area defense
organization. He has been informed by Ambassador Henderson that no final decisions will
be reached during his visit.
You will find him sympathetic to our objectives by personal inclination
as well as statesmanlike realization of his country’s stake in
[Page 1072]
the free world’s struggle
against international communism. He appreciates, but is very sensitive
about, the extent of our assistance to him in 1953 when he took a
courageous stand against Dr. Mosadeq.
The oil settlement has led the Iranian public to
expect early, tangible benefits. Without economic and social
improvement, political stability in Iran and the oil settlement itself
will be seriously threatened.
United States economic aid, consisting of $5
million per month budgetary assistance from August 1953 through the end
of 1954, a technical assistance program and a loan through the
Export-Import Bank of $83 million, has been designed to support
political stability and early economic development.
United States military aid is designed to improve
the ability of the Iranian armed forces to maintain internal security
and provide some resistance to external aggression. Intensive training
is a major element in our proposed program for next year and United
States training teams down to brigade level are being added to the
advisory military missions we have had in Iran since the war.
The Shah’s primary interest will be in the question of the role which we
expect Iran to play in Middle East defense. The “northern tier” concept
of increasing strength in the Middle East requires Iran’s adherence to
regional security arrangements. The Shah wants to join, but wants to be
assured that we will help develop his armed forces to a point where they
can make a realistic contribution to such defense before his country
formally commits itself.
recommendation
It is suggested that you tell the Shah that we would welcome Iran’s
adherence to a regional defense arrangement of Turkey, Pakistan and Iraq
and are prepared to help develop in the Iranian armed forces defensive
delaying capabilities which would make a useful contribution to
defense.… We are convinced, however, that until intensive training has
improved his army’s ability to make effective use of modern weapons, it
will not be possible for us to evaluate the military role which Iranian
forces should play.
Following the settlement of the Suez Canal base problem between Britain
and Egypt, we are reassessing the Middle East defense picture and expect
to have firm views on what is required by late spring. However, high
United States military and civilian officers are interested in having
the Shah’s views on this and related subjects.
We do not want to develop a military establishment in Iran which would be
an undue burden on the national economy. While we are prepared to ask
Congress for some defense support funds for
[Page 1073]
Iran in FY 1956,
we need assurance that, as oil revenues increase, the Shah will see to
it there is enough set aside to make a major contribution toward
supporting the armed forces and thereby reduce reliance on foreign
aid.
It is recommended that you express condolences for the death of Prince Ali Reza, the Shah’s brother,
in a recent airplane crash.6
It is recommended you mention the messages which you exchanged with the
Shah during the recent crisis period in the sense of a partnership which
is still active. A reference along the following lines is suggested:
“I am very pleased at the close way in which we have been able to
work together on some very important undertakings in spite of
the fact that many thousands of miles have separated us. I want
you to know of the great personal interest I have taken in all
of this and the appreciation I feel for the courageous and
statesmanlike actions you have taken.”7
