788.00/10–953: Telegram

No. 374
The Ambassador in Iran (Henderson) to the Department of State1

secret

866. 1. During talk with Ala, Minister Court, evening October 6, he asked my latest thinking re Majlis and Senate. I explained why I thought it preferable Shah issue firman dissolving both bodies and calling for new elections. I said I failed understand why Shah appeared be unwilling do so. Ala said he agreed with me.… Early on morning October 7, Ala informed me he had talked with Shah who not only had expressed willingness sign necessary [Page 811] firmans if requested by Zahedi but also had asked Ala … urge Zahedi at earliest possible moment request Shah to issue these firmans.

2. I learned later on morning October 7 that Prime Minister Zahedi was to lunch with Shah and requested see former before his luncheon. During our conversation I gave Zahedi substance formal attitude UK re Majlis (see paragraph 2 Deptel 933, October 5, repeated London 1772).2 I also said it my impression both US and UK of opinion that from point view ratification agreements it would be preferable have full rather than rump Majlis. Questions might be raised later as to why seats in Majlis made vacant by resignations had not been filled, particularly seats Tehran deputies. It seemed to me personally his government would be in stronger position not only internally but before world if it could be supported by full duly-elected Majlis.

3. Zahedi said he hesitated incur hostility small group rabid nationalists who opposed dissolution. He thought it would be easier control them in framework Majlis consisting of 23 deputies who had not resigned plus those elected to fill vacancies which Mosadeq had not permitted be filled than it would be if he were to antagonize them by having Majlis dissolved. Furthermore, he needed Majlis for certain urgent legislation. Vacant seats sufficient make quorum could be filled by election with[in] few weeks. Holding of general elections would require several months. Furthermore, if Majlis should be dissolved and new one brought in as result general elections certain nationalistic elements would charge he had deliberately replaced nationalist Majlis with one subservient to British and Americans.

4. I said I realized force his arguments and did not wish to press him take action which, in his opinion, would be harmful Iran. It seemed to me, however, that experienced public relations officials could explain to Iranian public that (a) certain important laws must be enacted in near future; (b) all districts Iran should be represented in any Majlis considering these laws; (c) Mosadeq by preventing completion of elections and bringing about resignations of more than 50 deputies had succeeded in undermining effectiveness present Majlis; (d) in order that Iran might be provided at once with effective Majlis he was requesting Shah dissolve it and call for new elections; (e) since effectiveness of present Senate had also been weakened by Mosadeq he was also requesting Shah dissolve it [Page 812] and call for holding senatorial election simultaneously with those of Majlis. I said it difficult believe that if this matter presented to Shah latter would fail to see its merits and would be unwilling issue necessary firmans. I hoped he could take this matter up with Shah at lunch.… Prime Minister promised he would discuss matter with Shah at lunch.

5. While I still talking with Prime Minister member Embassy staff brought me Deptel 938 October 6 repeated London 1784,3 substance of which I communicated to him.

6. I told Zahedi that I would also be grateful if when talking with Shah he would again raise question establishment near future diplomatic relations with UK. I aware both he and Shah inclined believe it preferable diplomatic relations be resumed simultaneously with oil settlement. After giving this matter further thought I had become thoroughly convinced diplomatic relations should be resumed at earliest possible moment and that resumption should not be considered as linked with oil problem. In present delicate international situation it disadvantageous to Iran not to have diplomatic relations with great member free nations such as UK. Immediate resumption relations should strengthen Iran’s international position as well as internal position of present government. Present government could never hope have support of Tudeh and other anti-Western elements of country. It needed backing all pro-Western elements. Until it had established relations with UK many powerful groups in Iran friendly to West would not be likely give government their full confidence and support. I had reason believe UK was prepared establish diplomatic relations. Since Iran had broken relations it seemed to me it was appropriate it should take first steps to resume them. British Government and public friendly towards present Iranian Government. If, however, this new government would appear to be following Mosadeq’s policies re UK, sympathy of UK Government and public towards new Iranian Government must gradually disappear. Furthermore, there no logical reason for linking oil problem with that resumption relations.

7. Zahedi said he doubted that public opinion in Iran as yet prepared for resumption diplomatic relations with UK in absence of oil settlement or at least of concrete steps in direction oil settlement. He afraid that if British Embassy should be established in Tehran before settlement oil problem it would become target abuse extreme nationalists and relations between Iran and UK would [Page 813] suffer. Furthermore, Mosadeq has been successful in persuading Iranian people that problem oil settlement and that diplomatic relations with UK were linked. If new government should enter into relations with UK without oil settlement many Iranians, he feared, would begin to believe propaganda of elements hostile to government to effect new government merely puppet of British and Americans. I said I realized that it would be necessary prepare Iranian public for resumption relations. I did not believe, however, such preparations would be difficult or would require much time. Prime Minister promised discuss this matter with Shah.

8. I immediately informed Ala substance this conversation. I suggested he tell Shah before latter’s meeting with Zahedi. Ala said he knew Shah would welcome request to issue firman dissolving Majlis and Senate. He doubted, however, that Shah would consider it wise for Iranian and British relations to be resumed prior to oil settlement. Shah was still of opinion that government might be charged by Iranian nationalists as following weak policy re British if it should enter into diplomatic relations while oil situation existed as at present.

9. Ardeshir Zahedi told me afternoon October 8 Shah had told his father that in his opinion both Majlis and Senate should be dissolved at once and steps taken to hold general elections within next few months. Ardeshir said he did not as yet know what his father’s final decision in this matter would be. His father would discuss this problem, together with other problems, with me on evening October 10.4 Ardeshir also said he did not know what present attitude of Shah was re resumption diplomatic relations with UK. Ala confirmed to me evening October 8 that Shah pressing Zahedi for dissolution Majlis and Senate. He also disclaimed knowledge re Shah’s latest views re resumption diplomatic relations.

Henderson
  1. Transmitted in two sections; repeated to London.
  2. In telegram 933 the Department informed the Embassy in Tehran that the British felt that the United Kingdom could make no agreement with Iran unless it was concluded and ratified by the Majlis in a manner valid under Iranian law and consistent with the provisions of the Iranian Constitution. (788.21/10–553)
  3. Telegram 938 instructed Henderson to convey the substance of telegram 933 to Prime Minister Zahedi and also to inform him that although the U.S. Government was unwilling to make a judgment in this matter, it nonetheless expected that any agreement which was concluded would be ratified in a manner valid under Iranian law. (788.21/10–653)
  4. Ambassador Henderson reported on his conversation with Zahedi on Oct. 10. Zahedi informed him that he had spoken with the Shah about the future of the Majlis and Senate and told the Shah he was inclining toward the position that both should be dissolved and new elections be held. He also informed the Shah that he thought he would take the decision within the next 2 or 3 days. (Telegram 881, Oct. 12; 788.00/10–1253)