Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, The Near and Middle East, Volume IX, Part 1

684A.86/5–1154: Telegram

No. 821
The Secretary of State to the Consulate General at Istanbul¹

secret
priority

Washington, May 11, 1954—3:54 p.m.

1018. For Byroade. Re measures improve Israel–Jordan border situation:

1. UK Embassy has informed Department Foreign Office has approved at highest level substance “measures” proposed Department CA–6175 April 28. Foreign Office proposes, in order facilitate early acceptance by Jordan of measures for reenforcing GAA and UNTSO, that US, UK and France informally approach Jordan Government near future without awaiting final Security Council action. Approach would take form discussion with Jordanians of “measures” 2–13 of reference airgram to elicit Jordanians’ support and seek their views.

2. We are informing British Embassy Department agrees their suggested approach to Jordanians but believes measures to improve border situation can best be developed, and coordinated in Security Council, under UK aegis; and that we therefore urge they agree that Dixon take rapporteur role (under our proposed Tripartite UN Resolution) at least during remainder his SC Presidency. We convinced importance this coordination since “measures” in our view likely to be substance of rapporteur’s efforts and report to SC. Our intention is not to hamper UN consideration border problem but rather facilitate constructive action by seeking Jordanian and thereafter Israel concurrence in measures which we anticipate will in due course be proposed by rapporteur. (We do not anticipate that rapporteur would propose such of the measures as would be most effective if carried out without publicity.)

3. In Department’s (and UK) view approach should be made to Jordan first because prior acceptance suggestions by Israel would probably cause Jordan refuse consideration, whereas reverse is not necessarily the case. Department also concurs UK view no indication should be given to Israelis, or UN, that Jordan being approached, since news leak might preclude Jordanian acceptance suggestions.

4. Since formal three Power approach might attract public notice, Department believes it best have UK Ambassador speak to Jordanians in name three Powers, with US and French Missions informally confirming that UK Ambassador is acting for them. Alternatively, dinner might be arranged with three Ambassadors present at which Prime Minister could be informed of three Power’s tentative proposals. Approach in either case would involve discussing with Jordanians “measures” 2–13 set forth CA–6175, and attempting elicit their views and support. UK may discuss feasibility these suggestions with Glubb before approaching Government.

5. Approach to Israelis should follow soon as possible after eliciting Jordanian views.

6. French have expressed reservations re advisability proposed direct approach. Department informing French Embassy we would prefer have them join us in proposed action but feel situation requires we go ahead with UK in any event.

7. Any conversations with UN on measures affecting assistance to UNTSO should await outcome talks with Jordan and Israel.

Dulles

1. Sent also to New York priority, Amman, and Tel Aviv; repeated to London and Paris.