Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, The Near and Middle East, Volume IX, Part 1

684A.86/4–754

No. 785
Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Byroade) to the Secretary of State¹

secret

[Washington,] April 7, 1954.

Subject:

• Representation to Israel on Arab-Israel Border Incidents.

I believe the Arab-Israel border situation has deteriorated to a point where immediate action is necessary to forestall the real danger of an outbreak of general fighting. The UNTSO alone appears no longer capable of coping with the problem and it is too risky to await the outcome of prolonged debate in the Security Council, even if constructive results emerge in the fact of Soviet obstructionism.

Our reports indicate Israel has embarked on a deliberate policy of fomenting border disturbances (Tab A).² She appears to have reached the conclusion that the existing situation is intolerable, and appears prepared to risk open warfare. Her objectives apparently are to bring about, through the use of force, a revision of the armistice machinery and permanent arrangements with the Arab states.

The best way of arresting the present trend is to make abundantly clear to Israel our conviction that her policy of force will not pay, and that we will not condone it.

Recommendations:

1. That the Secretary call in Eban and discuss with him bluntly our concern over Israel’s present policies, making the following points:

(a) Our assessment is that Israel bears heavy responsibility for the deterioration of the border situation. As stated in the past we deplore particularly her policy of retaliation. Our information does not confirm Israel’s assertions that the Arab states are pursuing a deliberate aggressive policy.

(b) We are amazed at Israel’s attitude toward the UNTSO, upon which peace in the first instance depends. Her position is not justifed by the facts.

(c) We are forced to believe that Israel’s present policies, especially her deliberate use of force, will lead to increased disorders and may result in open warfare, which can only harm the best interests of the U.S. and Israel.

(d) We earnestly counsel Israel to undertake a general reevaluation of her present course and to cooperate in working out peacefully permanent arrangements.

(e) Persistence by Israel in her present policies will result in damage to Israel-US relations and may force us into a position of open opposition to Israel.

2. That the Secretary sign the attached telegram (Tab B)³ informing the British and the French that we intend to make representations to Israel and suggesting that the three powers immediately send parallel notes to Israel based on the Tripartite Declaration of May 25, 1950 warning her of their concern over the border situation and asking her to take all measures in her power to restore stability on the border.

[Attachment]

Memorandum Prepared in the Office of Near Eastern Affairs⁴

secret

[Washington, April 8, 1954.]

Evidence Of Israel’S Aggressive Policy

1. General Bennike’s October 27 report to the Security Council, his replies November 9 to questions from SC members, and his March 1 report to the SC indicate Israel has failed to live up to its declared desire for a peaceful border. In a letter March 29 to the UNSYG, Ambassador Eban strongly criticized Bennike’s March 1 report which stated, in part, “An increase in the number of [Israel] complaints does not . . . suffice to indicate a deterioration in the local situation on the border. It may indicate an intensification of the cold war between the central authorities. . . . There have been other periods of psychological warfare”.⁵ As Bennike has said: “respect for the armistice agreements must come from the parties themselves”.

2. Substantial guilt for the critical state of affairs is attributable to Israel, . . . (Enclosure 1).⁶ The British have received a report that the Israel Cabinet March 28 approved a policy of retaliatory action for border killings (Enclosure 2).⁷

3. When the Israel–Jordan MAC failed March 23 to condemn Jordan for the Negev bus ambush, the Israel delegation walked out, having unsuccessfully pressured MAC Chairman Hutchison with threats before the meeting. Israel failed to heed Hutchison’s subsequent request for cooperation in identifying the killers which you endorsed in your March 25 conversation with Eban. Prime Minister Sharett stated to parliament March 24 that the MAC “has failed to carry out its responsibilities and betrayed our confidence . . . has betrayed its primary duty”. (Enclosure 3)⁸ (We have information which should not be revealed to Eban that Bedouin brigands from Egyptian territory committed the bus murders.)

4. The Israel–Jordan MAC condemned Israel for an organized military attack March 29 on the Jordan village of Nahhalin. Sharett made statements justifying the attack and saying it was a “local affair”. (Enclosures 4⁹ and 5¹⁰)

5. The Israel–Egyptian MAC condemned Israel for two attacks April 2 by “military or para-military forces” in Egyptian controlled territory (Enclosure 6).¹¹

6. We have reports of two organized attacks by Israel forces April 6/7 on the Jordan village of Husan. Our Ambassador in Amman feels immediate action is desirable to cause Israel to desist from aggressive border actions and cooperate through the MAC and the local commanders’ agreement (Enclosure 7).¹²

7. Eban is now engaged in an active press campaign to convince the US public that the Arab states are embarked on an organized campaign of aggression against Israel. His contentions are not borne out by the facts. While the serious problem posed for Israel by Arab infiltration should not be minimized, we have no information from our representatives or the UN indicating that these activities are instigated by the Arab governments. On the contrary, Jordan has taken energetic measures to curb infiltration. In contrast, the Israel Government has deliberately directed—as a matter of policy—attacks by military units against the Arabs.

1. Sent through the Executive Secretariat. The source text does not bear Secretary Dulles’ initials in a space provided for his indication of approval or disapproval. An attached note from Scott of the Executive Secretariat to Under Secretary Smith, dated Apr. 8, reads: “For your consideration prior to submission to the Secretary.” The note was initialed by Smith. A notation in the handwriting of O’Connor reads: “1st person note OK.”
2. Below.
3. Draft telegram not printed.
4. Drafted by Burns.
5. Ellipses and brackets in paragraphs 2 and 3 are in the source text.
6. Enclosures 1–7 do not accompany the source text; they are identified here on the basis of a marginal notation. Enclosure 1 was telegram 153 from Jerusalem, Apr. 3, not printed. (684A.80/4–354)
7. Enclosure 2 was telegram 1016 from Tel Aviv, Apr. 2, not printed. (684A.85/4–254)
8. Enclosure 3 was apparently an extract from the Jerusalem Post.
9. Enclosure 4 was telegram 1001 from Tel Aviv, Mar. 30, not printed. (684A.85/3–3054)
10. Enclosure 5 was telegram 144 from Jerusalem, Mar. 30, not printed. (684A.85/3–3054)
11. Enclosure 6 was telegram 1024 from Tel Aviv, Apr. 5, not printed. (674.84A/4–554)
12. Enclosure 7 was telegram 411 from Amman, Apr. 7, not printed. (684A.85/4–754)