IO files, lot 71 D 440
No. 700
Minutes of the Seventeenth Meeting of
the United States Delegation to the Eighth Regular Session of the
United Nations General Assembly, New York, October 21,
1953
US/A/M(Chr)/277
Ambassador Lodge opened the meeting and presented Secretary Dulles, who had been in New York to address the Herald Tribune Forum the previous evening. The Secretary, having recently returned from the Tripartite Foreign Ministers Conference in London, took the opportunity to speak about developments there concerning Trieste and Palestine. [Here follow brief remarks concerning Trieste.]
On the Israeli-Arab matter, it was necessary to bring the whole problem to a focus. It had been decided some weeks ago not to proceed with the allocation of FOA funds to Israel since those funds were designed primarily for water resource development. In view of General Bennike’s decision to suspend operations of the Banat Yacoub project, it has been deemed inadvisable to release the United States funds to Israel. It had been hoped that Israelis would heed the appeal and suspend their work. Instead, the work was greatly intensified. The Secretary wanted to make clear that the decision to delay the funds took place prior to the Kibya incident.
The Secretary briefly mentioned Suez and reported an agreement had almost been reached there. He felt the talks between the Egyptians and the British ought not to break down: there was slight possibilities at that point that that would happen.
The Secretary stated that he had been following the work of the Delegation with much interest and appreciated the fine way in which the Trieste and Palestine matters had been handled in the Security Council.
1. Palestine Refugees
Mr. Taylor said that the subject for discussion was the Palestine refugee item, which would be presented in two parts by Mr. Barco and Mr. Gardiner. The former would present a summary of the different elements of the Palestine problem as a whole: the latter would present the United States position.
Mr. Barco stated that the most tragic, most urgent and most difficult element in the Palestine question had been the plight of the refugees. Almost one million of them had left their homes as a result of the war and, after the fighting had ceased, had been [Page 1374] forced to live under extremely harsh economic conditions. At the close of the war, the United Nations had taken several important decisions. The General Assembly resolved in 1948 that those refugees who desired to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbors should be permitted to do so. Those who did not desire to return were to be compensated. In addition, at the General Assembly in 1948 the Palestine Conciliation Commission (PCC) had been set up to aid the Israelis and Arabs in the negotiation of their differences, and the Arab States and Israel were requested to negotiate either directly or through the Commission. The truce agreements had been expected to give way to peace settlements within six months.
None of the things the United Nations tried to do had been successful. In 1949 the PCC first attempted conciliation. Conferences had been held with the parties both that year and in 1950, and ended in failure. In 1951, at the initiation of the United States, the PCC, assuming the role of mediator, called the parties together and made its own proposals for partial repatriation of the refugees who could be integrated into Israel’s economy. Arrangements for the allocation of the Jordan River waters had also been suggested, as had the enlargement of the scope of the Armistice Agreements and compensation by Israel of those who did not want to return to their homes. Those efforts were rejected completely by the Israelis, largely on the ground that the PCC had no authority as mediators to make any proposals. The Arabs refused to consider them because they did not go far enough toward implementation of the General Assembly resolutions.
In 1951 a major effort had thus been made and had failed. Since that time, all efforts had been directed towards matters of lesser importance. During the past year, the PCC had obtained agreement by Israel to release the blocked accounts of the Arab refugees, which were held in banks in that country. The objective was to obtain the release of some five million pounds sterling. Partial success had been achieved through the initial release of one million pounds sterling. The Arabs had not received that effort with all the sympathy it deserved. Since then, however, a number of obstacles had been removed and negotiations were proceeding for the release of the remaining accounts.
Another difficulty not to be overlooked was the fact that the armistice lines were set up on a temporary basis, which fact had created serious problems resulting in continual incidents on the frontiers. The differences on the question of waterways had a definite connection with the armistice lines.
On the basis of a report from Gordon Clapp, the General Assembly established the United Nations Relief and Works Agency [Page 1375] (UNRWA) in 1949. UNRWA had been dealing with the refugee problem since that time. The United States also had given principal attention to refugee matters for the past five years. The fact of greatest political significance had been the underlying problem that neither party had been willing to take steps which would prejudice their political rights. The Arabs should not be condemned for their part in keeping the matter alive. They were very much afraid each stage of the effort would be the last and they could look at past United Nations efforts and find considerable justification for their fears.
Ambassador Lodge asked whether the Arabs wanted the destruction of the Israelis or whether it was felt they wanted to progress from that point. Mr. Barco expressed the opinion that the Arabs would be pleased to see the Israelis go down. The more rational leaders realized however, that Israel was here permanently and that we were going to continue to support that State. It was felt we should give them time and we should solve some of the specific problems.
The Syrian Ambassador had told Ambassador Lodge the Arabs wanted one thing taken up at a time in the Security Council. Mr. Barco agreed that one item at a time should be considered completely.
Mr. Richards asked about the conduct of the Israelis. The Secretary cited their intensification of work on the water diversion project and said they had added crews to work nights.
Upon the temporary absence of Ambassador Lodge and the Secretary, who were summoned from the room, Mrs. Bolton assumed the chair. She called upon Mr. Gardiner to present the second phase of the matter, the United States position.
Mr. Gardiner reported that the United Nations had been caring for more than 800,000 refugees the past year. Those people were existing on 1600 calories per day. That had cost rather less than $24 per refugee per day. That fact would put us in the vulnerable position of having treated the Arabs with less care than we treated prisoners-of-war. They had not been our enemies. It would be difficult to satisfy the Arab delegations that reasonable justice had been done.
That year for the first time the UNRWA Advisory Commission had reached agreement, concurred in by the Department of State, the French and United Kingdom Governments, on a draft resolution (US/A/3622) which provided a relief budget of $24.8 million for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1954. That would include a United States contribution amounting to one-half of the total amount. The previous year the United States contribution had been 70% of the total program. In addition, the resolution provided [Page 1376] a budget of $18 million for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1955, subject to review at the Ninth General Assembly.*
It was pointed out that the reported number of Arab refugees had been excessive and obviously, the figures were padded. On the other hand, the ruin of the Arabs which had been caused in part by the Israelis and partially by the alignment of boundaries had been recognized.
Mr. Gardiner reported that when the lands were divided the Arabs had been given poorer land. Their tourist trade had been interrupted. They had not been compensated for the better land from which they had been removed. No less than 300,000 refugees had been living in Arab territory within sight of the Israeli border. There would always be incursions to which the Israelis would retaliate. There would be no hope of settling the border difficulties unless a solution could be found for the problem of the displaced persons. In dealing with those matters heretofore, we had been too optimistic.
In the course of the previous twelve months substantial program agreements had been signed with three countries, Syria, Egypt and Jordan. There was no immediate cause for concern in Syria where there was no great tension. The 80,000 refugees there were assimilated to a great degree. Once a political settlement was reached with Syria, that country could handle its quota of refugees. The best opportunities for settlement existed on farms. UNRWA could not undertake to make the most of such opportunities at that time and the Syrian government was not prepared to take steps to persuade the refugees to move into more available farm land. Instead, Syria had offered the Agency second or third class land. Some resettlement had taken place, but it had not matched the birthrate.
With regard to Egypt, that Government had felt UNRWA would cease the relief program and leave 200,000 refugees stuck there. For that reason Egypt had come forward and made a public announcement of their cooperation. They wanted to maintain harmony on the matter so that there would be favorable consideration in connection with other important issues, such as the Suez Canal, etc. An agreement had been signed with them for the settlement of 100,000 on the Sinai peninsula. Consideration was being given to a project to siphon the waters of the Nile under the Suez to irrigate that land.
[Page 1377]In the valley of the Jordan River was the third and best possibility. Concerned with that possibility, the TVA Report had been prepared and issued. Its appearance had caused quite a stir in the press. Referring briefly to the background of the Jordan River problem, Mr. Gardiner stated that the original lines were drawn in 1922. The boundaries had been so set, under the original mandate agreement, as to give the mandatory authority, i.e. the United Kingdom substantial control of the Jordan waters. In view of the increasing problem of border rights, with the Israelis on one side and 470,000 Arab refugees on the other side, there was good reason to question whether it was not time for a new deal. The TVA Report was a plan that could not possibly work unless political adjustments were made to assure Arab states that they could control those waters to be stored in Lake Tiberias.
The Secretary commented that on the basis of his personal observations in the area last May, the feeling was that it was not possible to achieve an overall peace there now. One thing should be dealt with at a time. The most encouraging factor was that the settlement of the waterways situation would help solve the refugee problem. That would provide employment and new land for the Arabs. The birthrate was much in excess of the death rate in the Arab camps. The general living conditions in the Arab states were so bad that they were worse than those of the refugees.
Mrs. Bolton noted that Israel desired to divert waters into the Negev, which action would seemingly be in conflict with the TVA plan. It was pointed out that the TVA plan would be advantageous to Israel in that its provision of 100,000 acres of irrigated land in the area would buy them a section of peace.
Mr. Richards said it seemed that to realize implementation of the TVA plan would mean that Israel would have to give up something, and he doubted that Israel would do so.
The meeting adjourned at 10:12 A.M.
The negotiating Committee for Extra-Budgetary Funds was requested to seek contributions required to meet the needs of UNRWA, established at a total of $292.8 millions.
An increase of two additional members to the UNRWA Advisory Commission was also authorized in the draft resolution. [Footnote in the source text.]
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