Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, The Near and Middle East, Volume IX, Part 1

120.230/10–1853: Telegram

No. 696
The Chargé in Jordan (Lynch) to the Department of State¹

secret
priority

Amman, October 18, 1953—2 p.m.

172. Department pass USUN priority. Paris for Johnston. I called on Prime Minister this morning to deliver advance copy President’s message regarding visit Eric Johnston.² I first expressed my deep sense of shock at outrage at Qibya village and my sympathy for government and people of Jordan at this time. I then told Prime Minister that I had not heard officially from my government as to steps which were to be taken but that I understood from radio news that tripartite powers were presenting case to UN Security Council. Prime Minister then showed me sheaf of telegrams which he said came to him from all over Jordan and rest of Arab world, practically all of which, he said, begged him not to protest to tripartite powers from whom in the future, as in the past, no hope could be expected. They demanded positive action.

I told the Prime Minister I felt reprisals would be most unfortunate and would place Jordan in same light as Israel. He replied that he did not wish to take reprisals, providing something was done to stop Jewish acts of aggression. He then enumerated long list of organized Israeli attacks on Jordan villages and pointed out that protests to Israel by US and others in past has been completely ineffective. He said no Jordan Government could remain in power if no action was taken. If the three powers or Security Council are not prepared to do it, the Jordan Government must. He suggested that at least aid to Israel should be stopped.

Prime Minister then said that he was aware that the US was anxious for peace and stability in Near East. He reminded me of hopes which had been aroused by visits first of Secretary and Mr. Stassen and subsequently of Eric Johnston and several Congressional Committees. Nothing had come of them to date. I then presented him with President’s message and said I had great hope for something concrete emerging as result of Mr. Johnston’s coming visit. He read President’s message with interest and said that his first reaction was that Jordan Government had always cooperated with American Government and its representatives, but, added again “up to now nothing has come of it”. It would be far better, he said, for Mr. Johnston’s visit to take place in the wake of some concrete evidence that US was prepared to take action against Israeli aggressions. If he comes now, he said, “all he can expect is abuse” He later tempered this remark by saying that the Jordan Government would welcome Mr. Johnston at any time but indicated visit would have little chance of success unless it followed some positive action by US to show its disapproval of Israeli behaviour. He reiterated that protests were not enough. He hoped that it would not be necessary for Jordan itself to take retaliatory measures.

Comment: Prime Minister’s remarks serve to emphasize importance of early Security Council action along lines recommended by American, British, French representatives in Jordan (outlined Embtel 171).³ Question arises whether action recommended, even if followed, will be strong enough to permit Jordan Government to withstand popular pressure for some kind of Jordanian retaliatory action. I do not know.

Lynch

1. Repeated to Paris, London, Baghdad, Beirut, Jerusalem, Damascus, Tel Aviv, Cairo, and Jidda.
2. Not printed, but see footnote 2, Document 693.
3. In telegram 171 from Amman, Oct. 18, Lynch reported on a résumé of joint views on the Arab-Israeli situation drafted by the British and French representatives in Amman and himself, in view of the tripartite approach to the Security Council. The résumé recommended, inter alia, that some positive step be urgently taken to reduce dangerous tension, in particular, that the Security Council condemn Israel for the Qibya incident, and for her attitude regarding the waters of the upper Jordan; and that the Security Council threaten Israel with sanctions unless her attitude changed. Failing such Security Council action, the résumé stated that the three Western powers should consider action based on the phrase in the Tripartite Declaration providing for action outside the United Nations. (120.280/10–1853)