Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, The Near and Middle East, Volume IX, Part 1

684A.86/10–853

No. 683
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs (Hart)¹

secret

[Washington,] October 8, 1953.

Subject:

• Arab-Israel Relations: A Basic Review by the Secretary.

Participants:

• Mr. Abba Eban, Ambassador of Israel
• Mr. Reuven Shiloah, Minister of Israel
• Mr. John Foster Dulles, Secretary of State
• Mr. Henry A. Byroade, Asst. Secretary, NEA
• Mr. Parker T. Hart, Director, NE

This meeting was continuation of an interview between the Secretary and Ambassador Eban on September 24, at which time the Ambassador raised questions concerning basic United States-Israel relations upon which the Secretary replied that he would have to defer comment until a later date since he was scheduled to attend another meeting.

Ambassador Eban opened the conversation by stating that Israel had made “progress” with Bennike on the Jordan diversion problem. A series of conversations had been held between Bennike and Foreign Minister Sharett and it was understood that the Israel Government was awaiting a reconsideration by Bennike of his decision. Israel had also undertaken to assure adequate water to Arab properties in the demilitarized zone and had given this assurance to Bennike and not to the Syrians since by Israel’s interpretation of the Israel-Syrian armistice agreement, Israel owed no responsibility to Syria on this matter. Assistant Secretary Byroade, asking for permission to respond on this point, stated that whatever may be the conflicting interpretations of the armistice agreement, Bennike’s position in the matter had been made clear. He had requested that the work stop.

The Secretary brought the conversation to the topic upon which he had understood that Ambassador Eban wished his reply, namely, an analysis of United States-Israel relations, what difficulties had arisen and how they could be improved. The Secretary reviewed the closeness of United States ties with Israel, which were not limited to the intimate relationship between American Jewry and that state, but which were felt throughout America as the result of the Judeo-Christian civilization which is America’s heritage. Throughout the United States, there was also widespread admiration for Israeli energy in tackling the many difficult problems of survival and state-building. Posing the question: “What is our policy for Israel and the rest of the Near East?” the Secretary defined it as centered primarily in the achievement of area peace, particularly peace between Israel and the Arab states. Peace would greatly improve Israel’s internal economic situation and reduce its need to divert manpower to military channels and improve its trade. How is peace to be obtained? Certainly not by supporting Israel whether she was right or wrong. There was conviction in the Arab states that America had supported Israel without qualification for some time and, as a result of this conviction, American influence in the Arab states had sharply declined. The Secretary recalled that he had spoken in May to Prime Minister Ben Gurion in this vein.² The Prime Minister, in statesmanlike fashion, had responded that it was greatly to Israel’s interest that the United States so conduct its affairs in the Near East as to regain its influence among the Arabs. The Secretary could readily understand that Israelis shared the sentiment of an early American patriot [Stephen Decatur],³ who said: “Our country! In her intercourse with foreign nations, may she always be in the right; but my country, right or wrong”. The United States Government, however, had to form its own judgment as to Israel’s conduct and, if it was to gain and hold the influence which it requires to promote peace in the area, it must adopt an attitude of reserve toward such Israeli conduct as does not conform to the best international standards. Specifically, the United States Government feels that Israel has been over-aggressive, over-insistent on what it wants and too eager to achieve immediate goals without regard to the impression which it makes on world opinion. The Secretary wished to suggest to Israel that the kind of policy the Unted States Government is pursuing today will also serve the best interest of Israel, as well as the entire area. The Secretary could not set himself up as a judge of Israel. However, United States policy had to be guided by some set of judgments. The fact that it had reached a certain judgment might suggest to Israel that she is over-aggressive and that a more temperate mood on her part would encourage greater moderation in the rest of the Near East and would assist the United States in this policy.

The Secretary pointed to a talking paper⁴ before him and remarked that he had a long list of complaints and incidents to which the Israel Government would, no doubt, in each instance offer what it genuinely considered to be an adequate justification. However, he would not review these at this time. He would simply ask the Israel Government to believe that the United States entertained the friendliest feelings for it but had arrived at the conclusion that what apparently was the inevitable impetuosity of a nation bursting into existence after thousands of years, had generated a momentum which had now carried it too far. However essential such momentum may have been to Israel’s creation, the future of Israel depended heavily on the impression its conduct would make on the international community. The current impression, he reiterated, was that of over-aggressiveness. This summarized what he had in mind.

Ambassador Eban expressed gratitude for the sympathetic viewpoint expressed by the Secretary and his relief to learn that nothing of a fundamental character divided Israel and the United States. He had found a deep and widespread sympathy for Israel throughout the United States; a sympathy not limited to American Jewry. If recently he had expressed in a speech in Canada his disquiet regarding American-Israel relations, it was over the impression gaining ground in the United States that friendship between Israel and this country was lessening and that America was turning away from Israel toward the Arabs. Israel did not regard United States friendship with the Arabs as inconsistent with friendship to herself; she heartily approved of economic aid programs to the Arab countries. The Arabs felt otherwise and considered any American friendship for Israel as showing lack of friendship for themselves. Israel hoped that the United States would not go along with this concept. With reference to the Secretary’s cited conversation with Ben Gurion, the Ambassador recalled that Ben Gurion had also mentioned to the Secretary that he hoped the United States would not seek Arab friendship through disassociation with Israel or by encouraging the extreme Arab demands on Israel which the United States Government must know could not be carried out and which the American people themselves would not support. Israel hoped the United States Government would make it clear to the Arabs that its friendship for Israel was indestructible. The Ambassador added that Israel was prepared to make some boundary adjustments in a peace settlement with its neighbors although it envisaged no radical changes from the armistice lines which had now constituted the framework of the state for five years. He referred to the recent Syria-Israel border talks and earlier boundary discussions which had come close to success but were always defeated by political unwillingness in the respective Arab capitals to sign anything in the nature of an agreement with Israel. He mentioned Israel’s willingness to offer port facilities at Haifa to Jordan so that it would serve the commerce of both countries, as well as Israel’s willingness to facilitate communications between Arab states across Israel territory. Israel had been seeking means of satisfying the concern of world religious interests in Jerusalem. As regards refugees, he would like to point out that refugees still remained refugees in the Arab countries but not in Israel. Israel was also ready to pay compensation and was studying this problem. However, would the Arabs agree to accept it?

Shifting to a new topic, Ambassador Eban referred to the list of incidents and criticisms of Israel to which the Secretary had made reference and stated that the United States Government has really but one criticism and that is of Israel’s security policy. It was very difficult, he said, for any country—especially the United States with its lack of experience of invasion and with its long undefended borders—to understand the immediate and acute sense of insecurity of a country where but a few miles separated homes from enemy guns. Israel’s losses in her war of 1948 had been severe and were remembered with emotion. They were comparable in Israel to what 600,000 American losses in Korea would have meant here. The Ambassador had noted how much the actual losses of America in Korea had moved the American people. Unfortunately, the Arabs did not simply have a policy of no peace with Israel, they were exerting pressure on every frontier. World opinion, therefore, was not the only consideration in the eyes of those whose responsibility it was to defend Israel’s homes. The Ambassador noted that he had informed the Department of State some time ago that Jordan had been found guilty of 150 violations of the border of Israel from July 1952 to July 1953. During the same period Israel had been found guilty of thirty violations. The Israel Government had asked the Department to take this matter up energetically with Jordan but the Department had declined. The Ambassador felt that the ratio of violations had not changed since.

Turning to Egypt the Ambassador mentioned that the Israel Government had made representations in London with respect to the current Anglo-Egyptian talks. The Israel Government hoped that these talks would succeed, but it had two interests in their outcome: (1) it feared that Egypt might inherit a huge base complex which would dangerously shift the balance of power; and (2) it wished to see preserved in any new Anglo-Egyptian agreement the principles of free transit of the Suez Canal which had been internationally accepted. As he understood that the United States was likely to be consulted regarding any Anglo-Egyptian agreement, the Ambassador was bringing these points to the Secretary’s attention.

The Secretary thanked the Ambassador. He wished to emphasize that there had not been the slightest change in the feeling of the American Government toward Israel; however, this Administration felt that it could be more effective for peace in the area. The Secretary’s policy would be to clean up obstacles which impeded the achievement of peace and he would be greatly disappointed if he did not make considerable progress in that direction in the next year or two. He asked the Ambassador to ask the Israel Government to be tolerant of American policies designed to reach this end since in the long run they would serve Israel’s interests, even though at times they were not altogether agreeable. The Ambassador interjected at this point that what he feared most was that the American public and the Israel public were not being made to feel that relations were as close as formerly. The Secretary continued that it would be necessary for the United States Government to generate a desire for peace among the Arabs. Ambassador Eban again interjected that tactically it seemed best at times for Israel not to constantly entreat the Arabs for peace. The Secretary agreed and Mr. Byroade remarked that the United States could be more effective than Israel in speaking to Arab nations on steps to relax tension. Ambassador Eban responded that Israel felt the United States Government could be most effective by urging the two parties to discuss peace with each other, leaving specifics to the negotiators. The Secretary disagreed and stated that such a line by the United States could not be taken at this time. He closed the interview by urging Israel to abide by General Bennike’s decision on the Jordan diversion matter and thereby to remove itself from the awkward positon of being in contempt of a United Nations body.

1. This memorandum was summarized in telegram 276 to Tel Aviv, Oct. 9. (611.84A/10–953)
2. See the memorandum of conversation, Document 13.
3. Brackets in the source text.
4. The talking paper, not printed, was sent to the Secretary by Byroade on Oct. 7. (611.84A/10–753)