Office of the Historian

683.84A/9–2953

No. 677
Memorandum of Conversation, by Douglas Worcester of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs1

[Extract]

confidential
[Washington,] September 29, 1953.

Subject:

1.
The Israel-Syria Demilitarized Zone Dispute
2.
UN General Assembly Aspects of Tunisia and Morocco

Participants:

  • Ambassador Zeineddine—Syria
  • Dr. Zakkaria—Syrian Embassy Mr. Hart-NE
  • Ambassador Moose
  • Mr. Harlan Clark—Embassy Damascus
  • NEA-Dr. Howard
  • NE—Douglas Worcester

1. The Israel-Syria Demilitarized Zone Dispute

Ambassador Zeineddine began the discussion by recalling the earlier dispute over drainage of the Huleh marshes, a dispute which culminated in the May 18, 1951 Security Council resolution. He charged that Israel had never complied with the resolution but had continued drainage operations, thereby removing a natural military barrier between Israel and Syria. Moreover, the Israelis were in the habit of conducting operations as if the Demilitarized Zone (and the Jordan River) were Israeli territory instead of territory where sovereignty is in abeyance pending a final peace settlement.

The present dispute, he said, was a natural outgrowth of letting the Israelis get away with things 2½ years ago, but the Syrian Government is disturbed particularly by three aspects of the dam diversion/canal operation below Baanat Yacoub:

a.
Syrian information indicates the Israelis do not intend to return diverted water to Lake Tiberias via power installations, but instead will store it for use possibly on the coastal plain in line with the Hays-Lowdermilk plan.
b.
Diversion of Jordan waters will leave dry an important system of eight canals in Syrian territory; some of these canals feed the rich Buteiha farms.
c.
As a military barrier, the Jordan River will become adjustable to Israeli desires by means of opening or closing the dam spillways.

[Page 1332]

Over and above these considerations, however, the Syrian Government regards the fate of General Bennike’s September 23rd decision as the touchstone of: applicability of the Armistice Agreement; UN effectiveness in dealing with Israel; and of meaningfulness in the Tripartite Declaration. Therefore, Syria believes support of General Bennike to be vital and is anxious to know the position of the United States.

Mr. Hart explained that only yesterday morning Prime Minister Mardam Bey had received assurances from Chargé d’Affaires Geren in Damascus that the United States stands fully behind the decision of General Bennike. Moreover, on the previous Friday the Secretary had made our position known to the Israeli Ambassador. Ambassador Zeineddine was pleased to learn of our statements, but he wondered what the United States position would be if Bennike’s decision were placed before the Security Council. Would the United States still support it?

Mr. Hart replied that the United States is supporting Bennike and will continue to stick by the decision as it now stands. It is too early to tell what may develop, but meanwhile the U.S. hopes that both Israel and Syria will not increase the present tension. Moreover, the Israel Government has not yet categorically refused to comply with the decision, which may be a token for the better.

Ambassador Zeineddine expressed doubt that Israel would comply unless the United States made itself heard, or more importantly, placed some practical restraint upon Israel. Mr. Hart reiterated that the United States position had been put to Israel and had been put emphatically.

Ambassador Zeineddine may or may not have caught the drift; he simply replied that Syria does not want to seek Security Council review but may have to do so as a last resort.

2. UN General Assembly Aspects of Tunisia and Morocco

. . . . . . .

  1. Also drafted by Harry N. Howard.↩