Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, The Near and Middle East, Volume IX, Part 1

683.84A322/9–2553

No. 673
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Politico-Economic Adviser in the Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Gardiner)

confidential

[Washington,] September 25, 1953.

Subject:

• Israel/U.S. Relations—Diversion of Jordan River

Participants:

• Mr. Eban, Israeli Ambassador
• Mr. Reuven Shiloah, Minister of Israeli Embassy
• The Secretary
• Mr. A. Z. Gardiner, NEA

Ambassador Eban stated he wished to take the opportunity at this appointment, which was made a week ago, to review Israel/US relations in general, but that he first of all wished to review an urgent subject, the situation which had arisen with the UNTSO and with Syria in connection with the proposed diversion of Jordan water below the Banat Yaacov bridge. The Department will receive Mr. Sharett’s detailed remarks to General Bennike on this subject.¹ The Ambassador stated that it was an electric power project, with no effect on the general topography of the region; that the new channel that is being cut does not empty the existing channel of the river and affects no land rights in the demilitarized zone; that the project had been instituted on September 2 with the knowledge and concurrence of Colonel Tillotson of the UNTSO, and work had continued on the project with his knowledge. Mr. Karrer, TCA Water Specialist, had been informed on the 5th or 7th of September. This was not a suddenly-undertaken enterprise and there was no doubt as to its legitimacy or value.

General Bennike, however, had ordered the work stopped; his action was based on misinterpretation of facts relating to land rights and flooding damage. There was no justification for suspending the work, and the Israeli government felt it could satisfy all points at issue on the technical level except for the point raised by General Bennike which concerned the military advantage of the project. A decision on a matter of this nature was necessary at a higher level, but the Ambassador did not think that development work of benefit to the region should be held up for military considerations. In any case his government was not the body carrying out the scheme, but it wished to preserve the rights of the Palestine Land Corporation, the concessionaire, as well as the rights of Syrian landowners in the Jordan Valley. The Ambassador thought that all these rights could be respected. It is Israel’s intention to appeal the case to the Security Council. He would like US assurance of a full opportunity to appeal the case through peaceful means.

Cutting across these issues had come Assistant Secretary Byroade’s advice on the subject of our withholding the allotment of aid to Israel under the Mutual Security Act. The Israeli government had never regarded MSA aid as tied to political action, and it was most unfortunate to make it a counter in this complex issue. The Ambassador thought that linking the release of aid funds to the issue would prevent Israel from pursuing an orderly appeal through SC channels. He recalled that the Israeli case was sustained in the Security Council three years ago when similar issues arose in connection with the Huleh development. He therefore requested the Secretary to keep separate the subject of US aid to Israel and the immediate problem of water development. If the case does come before the Security Council he hoped that the US Government representative will take the same attitude adopted three years ago, and permit economic development to continue in the demilitarized zone. He further hoped that in view of the Syrian threats to take military action that the US Government would insist on peaceful procedures.

The Secretary replied to Mr. Eban at this point along the following lines.

The Secretary was unable to pass on the merits of the project from a technical standpoint. However, it was very difficult for the US when Israel took action in apparent disregard of UN decisions and created de facto situations which Israel could not later abandon. The Israeli Foreign Minister had said “What we have, we hold.” This makes for a feeling here that it is Israeli government policy to create situations and then say “Here I am, unless thrown out by force.” It would be much easier if Israel had more regard for UN action and legal processes.

At this point Mr. Eban stated that Israel’s territory was fixed by armistice agreements which set the limits of Israel’s existence. Israel however was willing to discuss territorial revisions. Mr. Eban pointed out that Israel was a small country of only 8,000 square miles, where there were 2,000,000 square miles of territory in Arab lands.

The Secretary asked whether this was a new position of the Israeli government, and the Ambassador replied that Israel had always been prepared to discuss territorial adjustments at a peace conference and that they were quite prepared to bargain with the Arabs for territory.

The Secretary observed that many people felt that Israel had received too many immigrants. He further stated that it would make a good impression in the United States and be of help to the United States if Israel agreed to comply with the UNTSO decision unless and until such a decision was reversed on appeal. He pointed out that we were trying to adopt a fair, even-handed policy in the Near East. This was difficult to accomplish if the Israeli government appeared to be disrespectful of United Nations decisions while we continued to furnish aid which from our point of view was discretionary. The incident of the diversion of the Jordan waters had closely followed the move of the Foreign Office to Jerusalem which had caused strong protest in Congressional circles. Both these situations will make matters very difficult for us if there appeared to be defiance of the UNTSO decision by Israel.

At this point Mr. Eban stated that work at Banat Yaacov had begun with UN acquiescence and that Israel would be prejudiced if the work was now stopped.

The Secretary then asked what Israel intended to do if the decision were against Israel, and the Ambassador stated that Israel hoped to be able to continue the work and to satisfy the controversial issues.

The Secretary stated that the whole question of the Jordan waters appeared controversial and that both sides were suspicious that the other side would steal water which rightfully belonged to it.

Mr. Eban affirmed that Israel would like to engage in discussion of regional water problems but their neighbors would not agree to do so. The Secretary pointed out that their neighbors in the present instance were sustained by a decision of Bennike and while the Secretary was not familiar with the merits of the case, the fact that General Bennike came to the scene as an unbiased person, and had reached a presumably unbiased decision, was an important consideration. Under these circumstances, he did not see how the Israeli government could say it was not going to pay attention to his decision.

Ambassador Eban pointed out that we had previously taken no action in matters of this kind until the matter reached the Security Council. He also pointed out that all Security Council decisions had been honored except by Egypt in the case of Suez Canal transit.

The Secretary again referred to Israel’s right to appeal to the Security Council but said that if Israel took action to continue construction while an appeal was pending a situation might be created which could not be undone.

Ambassador Eban responded that no water would be actually diverted until sometime in 1954.

The Secretary then asked if the Israeli government felt it prudent to invest funds in a project which might not be sustained by the Security Council and Ambassador Eban stated that only two or three million Israeli LS were involved.

The Secretary then stated that an effort might be made to secure an opinion from Bennike to permit certain work to continue while the appeal was pending, assuming that the facts as to individual rights would be found as stated by Ambassador Eban.

The Ambassador then requested the opportunity to consider the more general subjects of American/Israeli relations. It would not be prudent on his part to conceal the fact that a cloud had fallen over these relationships. While no one issue was paramount, the cumulative effect of many minor issues had caused growing concern on Israeli public opinion. He referred first to the reluctance of US officials to reassert in public the firm friendship which existed between the two countries. The absence of such protestation was noticeable now because so many had been made in past years. US leaders are now eloquent on the subject of Arab friendship, and appeared to have lost their balance. He referred to a recent Presidential message to a Zionist group which lacked any reference to the friendship existing between the US and Israel. In the second place, as far as Jerusalem was concerned there were two aspects to the conflict of opinions. The first related to the move of the Foreign Ministry and the second to the general question of Jerusalem and its internationalization. Whereas the two governments appeared to be in agreement on the subject of internationalization, the US public seemed aware only of the conflict on the move of the Foreign Ministry. A recent statement by Catholic interests favoring regional internationalization had failed to take into account the change in the US Government view.

A third topic related to the agitation of the Israeli public because of United States proposals to supply arms to the Arab nations. The Ambassador referred to the passionate feeling in Israel on this subject. The situation on Israel’s borders is tense, and Arab leaders are not talking or thinking peace. It was incomprehensible to the Israeli public that the US should furnish arms to such dictators as Naguib and Shishakli. Such action was not in the US tradition. The Ambassador thought in this case that we should err on the side of caution and abandon proposals to provide the Arabs with military assistance.

Other issues seemed minor in comparison. The Ambassador hoped that we would not continue to be so rigid in our restrictions of contacts with the Foreign Ministry in Jerusalem and would follow the action of other countries in this regard. He referred again to the unfortunate linking of release of Mutual Security funds with political issues between Israel and the Arab states, and pointed out that both countries were in the long run governed not by individuals but by public opinion. In conclusion he felt that the relations between Israel and the United States were basically on a sound foundation of public understanding.

The Secretary regretted that time did not permit his making a response to this statement of Ambassador Eban’s since another engagement was pressing on his time. He said he hoped to see Mr. Eban next week for a further talk and he would make a full reply at that time. He observed that the Arabs with whom he had discussed general subjects at the United Nations had told him that they hoped for better relations with the new Administration but that it appeared that the United States was continuing to favor Israel. Mr. Eban replied that this was proof of the failure of our policy of friendship with the Arab world.

As Mr. Eban took his departure, the Secretary restated his opinion that we should withhold release of MSA funds until the issue of the Jordan waters had been further clarified.²

1. In a decision of Sept. 23, Major General Bennike, as Chariman of the Israel–Syria Mixed Armistice Commission, requested the Israeli Government to cease its operations in the demilitarized zone so long as an agreement was not arranged. (U.N. doc. S/3122, Annex I) Foreign Minister Sharett replied on Sept. 24 with a series of reservations on the part of Israel. (U.N. doc. S/3122, Annex II) In a letter of Oct. 12, the Syrian Representative at the United Nations complained to the Secretary-General that Israel had violated the Israel-Syria General Armistice Agreement of July 20, 1949 (U.N. doc. S/3106); and in a letter of Oct. 16 to the President of the Security Council requested a meeting of the Council to consider the complaint. (U.N. doc. S/3108/Rev. 1) On Oct. 23, Bennike submitted a report to the Security Council on his decision of Sept. 23 (U.N. doc. S/3122). The Security Council considered the Banat Yaacov question at its 629th to 656th meetings, between Oct. 27, 1953 and Jan. 22, 1954. (U.N. docs. S/PV. 629–656) The text of Council Resolution 100 (1953), adopted on Oct. 27, is printed as Document 710.
2. This conversation was summarized in telegram 238 to Tel Aviv, Sept. 25, 7:33 p.m., repeated to Damascus, Jerusalem, London, and Paris, and sent by air pouch to Cairo, Amman, Beirut, Baghdad, Ankara, Rome, and Jidda. (683.84A322/9–2553)