674.84A/9–1053

No. 660
Memorandum of Conversation, by Theodore R. Frye of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs

secret

Subject:

  • Peace Feelers Between Israel and Egypt

Participants:

  • Dr. Ralph J. Bunche, Principal Director, Office of the Assistant Secretary General, Department of Trusteeship and Information from non-Governing Territories
  • NE-Mr. Hart
  • NE-Mr. Frye

Mr. Hart said that he had been informed that Dr. Bunche had obtained some information of interest to the Department during his visit to Cairo and Jerusalem in February. He was taking advantage of Dr. Bunche’s presence in Washington (to attend the meeting of the American Political Science Association, of which he is the President) to ask him about it.

Dr. Bunche said that on his return from India and Pakistan in February 1953, he stopped in Cairo where he was extremely well received by General Naguib and other Egyptian officials. (He had a warmer reception in Egypt than in Israel.) During a talk with Foreign Minister Fawzi, the latter indicated that there had been a number of peace feelers from Israel. (“There have been knocks on the door.”) Knowing that Dr. Bunche planned to go to Jerusalem from Cairo, Dr. Fawzi indicated that Egypt was interested in the possibility of talks with the Israelis. He said that “Egypt can accept one partition but not two,” meaning that Egypt can accept the existence of Israel but cannot accept being separated from other Arab States by Israel control of the Negev. He presumably meant that [Page 1305] Egypt wants some sort of corridor connecting with Jordan. Dr. Bunche asked whether he could inform the Israelis of Dr. Fawzi’s statements and the latter said that he could, provided he did not suggest to the Israelis that the Egyptians had asked him to do so.

In Jerusalem, Dr. Bunche talked with Mr. Ben Gurion but had no opportunity to inform him of Dr. Fawzi’s statements since the Israel Prime Minister was wholly preoccupied with the recent developments in Soviet policy on world Jewry. (The Soviet Legation in Tel Aviv was bombed just a few days after Dr. Bunche’s visit.) Dr. Bunche did inform Foreign Minister Sharett of Dr. Fawzi’s statements but got no immediate reaction. Subsequently, Mr. Sharett called Dr. Bunche away from a dinner to tell him that Israel wanted to talk with the Egyptians and were willing to go anywhere, even to Cairo, for the talks, which would be kept absolutely secret. The Israelis were willing to enter the discussions with no conditions and with an open agenda. Dr. Bunche asked Mr. Sharett whether he had noted Dr. Fawzi’s reference to the Negev and Mr. Sharett said that he had. Dr. Bunche told Mr. Hart that he had never seen Mr. Sharett in so humble a mood.

On his return to Cairo, Dr. Bunche informed Dr. Fawzi of the Israeli “response” and Fawzi seemed genuinely interested and said that he would inform General Naguib.

Subsequently, the New York Times published a story concerning the incident and the Egyptians immediately denied that such an approach had been made.

It is Dr. Bunche’s view that Mr. Sharett had not felt it necessary to consult Mr. Ben Gurion, and that if he had, the latter would not have been interested at that time since he was so preoccupied with the Soviet problem.

Dr. Bunche feels that if the two parties are to be brought together, it will require the assistance of a third party. In reply to Mr. Hart’s question, he said that he felt that the United States would be an appropriate third party. He agreed that if and when the Suez Base negotiations with the British are resolved satisfactorily, it would then be a propitious time to attempt to get the Israelis and Egyptians to discuss a peace settlement. Dr. Bunche feels that an effort should be made to arrange that Egypt should be the first country to conclude peace with Israel since the other Arab States would probably follow Egypt’s lead.

Following his return to New York, Dr. Bunche was visited by the Syrian and Lebanese United Nations delegates who inquired concerning his conversations with the Egyptians. He replied that the conversations were confidential and he could not discuss them.

General Naguib told Dr. Bunche that he thought the Israel War was “the best thing that could have happened to Egypt,” since it [Page 1306] had brought into the open the corruption of the Farouk regime and had led to a cleanup.