Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, The Near and Middle East, Volume IX, Part 1

683A.85/5–2253: Telegram

No. 615
The Chargé in Israel (Russell) to the Department of State¹

secret
priority

Tel Aviv, May 22, 1953—7 p.m.

1783. Embassy suggests Foreign Minister’s statement (Embassy telegram 1782)² be evaluated in light of:

1. Israeli belief that Jordanese are permitting infiltration and border incidents as a deliberate tactic in effort to harass and weaken Israel.

2. More evidences Israel Government and public have been finding psychological pressure of enmity of Israel’s neighbors (Embassy telegram 1708)³ and increasing concrete manifestations of perilous economy hard to bear. Israel Government may have decided better bring situation to head, realizing risks involved but prepared to take those risks, and being more or less confident that with careful engineering Israel Government would emerge in stronger position.

3. Press statements: Hatzofeh: “Borders must be defended permanently and effectively”; Jerusalem Post: “Arab Governments will do nothing constructive unless compelled by pressure of external forces”; occasional statements in Right Wing extremist press referring to Israel’s ridiculous borders”; and statements by Israeli officials and other leaders in conversation that reprisals necessary.

4. Impossibility of telling what is cause and what effect recent incidents both sides of border. (Amman telegram 98 to Department.)³

5. Israel Government apprehension concerning United States policies which might emerge as result Secretary’s trip. Action foreshadowed by Sharett yesterday may be gambit Israel Government to assume initiative in forcing developments along lines its policies rather than waiting for policies emerge from Secretary’s discussions.

6. Statement of respected and responsible Israeli journalist recently replying to query from French representative as to why Israeli press so actively and unanimously stirring up public on border situation. “Must understand Israel dependent for its existence first on American Jewry who in time of crisis prepared give unlimited support but who, when things calm, tend to forget about Israel; and secondly, on USG which is adversely affected by crisis psychology. It is a hard dilemma.”

7. Temptation for Israel Government to use Bab El Wad incident: as laying groundwork for possible turndown of Secretary’s request to Prime Minister to reinstate local commanders’ agreements; to lend point to arguments which had been advanced in conversation with the Secretary concerning Israel’s problems with its neighbors; to dramatize need for high level discussions on border problems.

Embassy recommends Israel Government be informed:

1. We recognize that the Israel-Jordan border situation constitutes a most serious situation and we will support steps which we regard as making a contribution to the solution of the problem.

2. We feel Secretary’s trip this area offers opportunity for constructive approach to many interlocking problems of which border situation is one and that Israel Government action suggested by Foreign Minister would seriously lessen possibility success this approach.

3. United States would regard action of kind contemplated by Foreign Minister as aggression and tripartite powers would have to act accordingly.

4. United States economic and military aid policies would have to be reviewed in light of any such developments.

Russell

1. Repeated to Amman, London, Paris, and Jerusalem.
2. Supra.
3. Not printed.
3. Not printed.