611.80/5–953
No. 606
Department of State Position
Paper1
confidential
STA D–4
[Washington, May 5, 1953.]
Jordan
Summary Paper2
- 1.
- Relations with Israel—Extremely bad because
of (a) the state of affairs along the artificial Israel-Jordan
armistice line and (b) the hundreds of thousands of Palestine Arab
refugees living in Jordan. Sporadic fighting along the armistice
line and pressure from other Arab states as well as from Jordan’s
discontented population has effectively blocked any progress in
solving the Palestine issue as it affects Jordan. Only a handful of
Jordanians are even
[Page 1200]
willing to consider a permanent settlement with Israel. The United
States has urged Jordan to follow a policy of patience and restraint
and to rely on the United Nations in approaching its problems with
Israel.
- 2.
- Refugees—About 450,000 or one half of the
Palestine Arab refugees live in Jordan. They are a great burden on
Jordan’s weak economy and exert considerable influence on the Jordan
Government, especially by their deep hatred of Israel and the
Western powers. They manage a bare subsistence through the United
Nations Relief and Works Agency, to which the United States
contributes about 70% budgetwise.
- 3.
- Economic Development—United States
Aid—Jordan is not economically viable and has always had to be
supported by British subsidies and loans. The country’s basic
economic need is the reintegration of the Palestine refugees (see
above) within its borders, together with such development as can be
achieved of its meager resources. Jordan wants foreign economic
assistance. The TCA program in
Jordan for FY 1953 was approximately
$3,000,000. There are plans to expand this assistance.
- 4.
- Fertile Crescent Idea—The Kings of… Jordan
and oil-rich Iraq are of the same family. Syria opposes Jordan-Iraq
union, since Syria would be placed at a disadvantage. Syria would
prefer a Syria-Jordan union, which would be to Iraq’s disadvantage.
There have been no recent indications of Jordan–Iraq, Jordan-Syria,
or Jordan–Iraq–Syria union, and recent Jordan governments have not
promoted a union. The United States would not oppose Arab union if
it were achieved in accordance with the wishes of the peoples
concerned. A union would have economic advantages for the area and
possible political disadvantages for the West, since a larger, more
powerful state might be more difficult to deal with.
[Tab 1]
Relations With Israel
Background
The Jordan–Israel Armistice Agreement was signed on April 3, 1949 and
established an armistice line which, although subject to change in a
final peace settlement, is the official boundary between the two
countries. By this Agreement Jordan’s frontier was extended westward
to include a large portion of what was Palestine and which today is
known as West Jordan or Arab Palestine. The Jordan–Israel boundary
has been the scene of thousands of incidents during the past five
years (see topic paper entitled “Border
[Page 1201]
Problems” in Israel section). Incidents
arising along the border have been a major cause of tension between
the two countries. One recent series of incidents was described as
the “bloodiest since the Armistice Agreement”.
In an effort to normalize relations, Jordan’s Arab Legion was
withdrawn from the border areas and responsibility for the
maintenance of order in those areas was given the Jordan National
Guard. The National Guard has not been effective in preventing
Jordan nationals crossing into Israel or in apprehending Jordan
nationals returning from Israel with stolen goods or, in many
instances, after they have perpetrated crimes on Jews in border
communities. The Jordan Government has endeavored to plug the gap
but, because of the mountainous nature of many parts of the border,
has not been able to control the situation.
Prospects for peace with Israel are not bright. Jordan opinion
extends all the way from the belief that the only way to have peace
is to drive the Jews into the sea to the very small moderate
minority which considers the settlement on Arab terms of problems
relating to refugees, compensation and blocked accounts as a prelude
to peace with Israel.
Jordan’s Position
Jordan’s position vis-à-vis peace with Israel has been most
difficult. Pressure by other Arab states has been an important
deterrent. Even more important has been the political situation
within Jordan. In July 1951 King Abdullah was assassinated. He was succeeded by his
oldest son, Talal, who was
deposed in August 1952 because of a “mental illness”. Next in line
was Talal’s son, Husein, who assumed his royal
prerogatives as King on May 2, 1953, his 18th birthday. During this
period of uncertain leadership the Prime Minister found it necessary
to “be more Arab than the Arabs” and to tread a narrow line which
formed the balance between East Jordan and West Jordan. The latter
consists largely of refugees who have no cause to love Israel.
There are minor evidences that it may be possible for Jordan to
endeavor to reach a better understanding with Israel.
United States Position
We have urged Jordan to follow a policy of patience and restraint in
connection with the numerous border incidents and to use and
cooperate with the United Nations machinery for investigating the
incidents. It has not been possible during the past year or so to
take any important initiative in suggesting to the Jordan Government
that it resolve its difficulties with Israel. The time appears to be
imminent however when we can take more positive steps to that
end.
[Page 1202]
[Tab 2]
Refugees
Background
At the conclusion of the Israel–Arab armed conflict, about half of
the Arab refugees found themselves in Jordan. They are still there
today, and number approximately 450,000 out of a total Jordan
population of around 1,300,000. They are now treated as Jordanian
citizens. Comprising a third of the population, they exercise
considerable political influence in the Jordan Government. Their
animosity toward Israel has been an important contributing factor in
keeping public opinion in Jordan and the rest of the Arab world
alive against Israel.
(See the regional paper on refugees for more general discussion of
the refugee problem.3)
[Tab 3]
Economic Development—United
States
Background
Jordan is not economically viable and has always had to be supported
by British subsidies and loans. Although its economy is basically
agricultural and pastoral, only a small percentage of the land is
productive. Industry is trivial and there are few natural resources
of actual or potential commercial value. Over-all trade is seriously
out of balance and trade with the United States is negligible as is
the opportunity for private investment.
Although Jordan still has the smallest population of any Arab State,
the number of its inhabitants has more than doubled in the past five
years with the addition of East Palestine (now West Jordan) and the
influx of the refugees. The country’s basic economic need is
consequently the reintegration of the United Nations supported
refugees together with such development as can be brought about from
its poor endowment of land and natural resources.
Jordan Position
The Jordanian Government needs and wants foreign assistance for
economic development and has been more cooperative on this score
than most other Near Eastern countries. Its agreements with
[Page 1203]
TCA are the only ones in the area
which provide for the creation of special “cooperative departments”
within the ministries—analogous to the “servicios” in Latin America.
Jordan has received development loans, as well as subsidies from the
British and was the first Arab country to sign an agreement with the
United Nations Relief and Works Agency for the improvement of the
refugee living standards. Recently it joined the International Bank
and Fund.
United States Position
The United States contribution to Jordanian economic development
involves:
- 1.
- A TCA program currently
involving 42 American technicians and a total program
contribution for fiscal 1953 of approximately $3,000,000.
Among the TCA projects are
engineering surveys of Jordan–Yarmuk Valley development, a
2,000 acre water-spreading project on desert land which has
been made to yield forage at an unusually high rate and the
cleaning and repair on a demonstration basis of the
country’s numerous but unused Roman cisterns. The latter
project has since been copied in seven villages.
- 2.
- Plans for grant aid from the regional “special economic
aid” package for fiscal 1954. Capital assistance funds for
Jordan—Yarmuk Valley development may come from this source
as well as from the United Nations Relief and Works Agency
to reflect interest in indigenous inhabitants as well as in
the refugees.
- 3.
- Seventy per cent financial interest in the United Nations
refugee relief and reintegration operations.
[Tab 4]
The Fertile Crescent Idea
Background
. . . ; Iraq is rich from oil revenues; other states such as Syria
fall between the two extremes in viability. Individually they are
weak; united they could be fairly strong militarily and
economically.
Jordan and Iraq are bound by family ties of their respective kings
(cousins—members of the Hashemite family). Syria would not like to
see Iraq and Jordan united as the combination would put Syria at a
disadvantage. Syria would prefer a Syria-Jordan union which would
ease Syria’s fears of Iraqi aggression.
There have been no recent indications of progress in the development
of the idea of Jordan-Iraq or Jordan-Syria or Jordan-Syria–Iraq
union, and recent Jordan governments have not favored such
union.
[Page 1204]
United States Position
A firm position has not recently been taken on this subject since the
issue is dormant. It is realized, however, that the present Arab
states are, in general, artificial entities created by the British
and French some thirty years ago to divide the Arab world into small
states so that they could be more effectively controlled. In view of
the paucity of resources in the individual states, and in view of
the changed political situation, there would be important
advantages, as well as disadvantages, for the United States in a
union of two or more Arab states. The advantages would include 1) it
would be simpler to deal with one state, rather than several, in
MEDO, Point Four and other
programs, 2) the new entity would presumably be more viable and
hence require less foreign aid and 3) would be more attractive for
private United States investment. Disadvantages would include 1) the
possibility of the larger more self-sufficient entity being more
intransigent and hence more difficult to deal with, 2) more of a
danger to us if the larger state would oppose United States
policies.
