Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, The Near and Middle East, Volume IX, Part 1

786.56/1–553

No. 538
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Officer in Charge of Palestine–Israel–Jordan Affairs (Waller)

confidential

[Washington,] January 5, 1953.

Subject:

• Arms Supplies for States of the Near East.

Participants:

• The Secretary
• Ambassador Abba Eban, Israel Embassy
• Mr. David Goitein, Minister, Israel Embassy
• Col. Chaim Herzog, Defense Attaché, Israel Embassy
• NE—Mr. Hart
• NE—Mr. Waller

Ambassador Eban, accompanied by Mr. Goitein and Colonel Herzog, called on the Secretary at 4:30 today to express the concern of the Israel Government at the prospect of arms being supplied to the Arab States, particularly Egypt.

The Ambassador’s statements were, in effect, a résumé of information furnished the Department during the past several weeks by members of the Israel Embassy and by the Israel Minister for Foreign Affairs to Ambassador Davis in Tel Aviv. Ambassador Eban left an Aide-Mémoire which covers the points made. These were:

1. The Arab States have been enabled to strengthen their armed forces beyond the scale of Israel’s increase in defensive strength. Egypt, which is within easy range of Israel, has already acquired many jet-propelled aircraft from the Western Powers, while Israel has not a single aircraft of equivalent speed or power. The Ambassador recalled that the invasion of Israel in 1948 began with bombing attacks by Egyptian aircraft on the undefended city of Tel Aviv.

2. The United Kingdom, in November 1952, announced its willingness to sell further jet-propelled aircraft to Egypt, and 14 such aircraft each to Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Israel. The results of this transaction were:

a. a further and sudden increase of the air strength of the Arab States in relation to Israel; and

b. the imposition on Israel of the necessity to keep pace with this Arab rearmament by diverting funds from economic development to arms purchases. Israel was given to understand that the United States had not supported, but had been unable to prevent this action by the United Kingdom.

Thus, a fair level of armament was no longer being observed between Israel and the States whose armies had invaded her in 1948; the Western Powers were sending arms to Arab States without tripartite coordination; and an arms race had begun, involving political tensions and financial strain.

3. On November 10, 1952 the Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom replied to a Note which the Israel Government had submitted on this question on September 30, 1952. These replies were deeply disappointing. They implied that the refusal of Arab States to negotiate a peace settlement with Israel had no effect on the fitness of those States to receive shipments of arms from the very Western Powers which strongly believed that a peace settlement should be negotiated.

4. On November 13, 1952, Foreign Minister Sharett asked Ambassador Davis for information on United States policy in the supply of arms to Arab States and suggested alternative methods whereby the United States might assist Israel to make the arms purchases necessitated by the unfortunate decision to supply jet planes to the Arab States.

5. On December 17, 1952, Israel’s disquiet was increased by a conversation between Acting Assistant Secretary of State Jernegan, Minister Goitein and Colonel Chaim Herzog of the Israel Embassy. From this statement it emerged that

a. The United States did not intend to oppose the supply of jet aircraft by the United Kingdom to Arab States, or to facilitate by financial aid the acquisition of jet planes by Israel.

b. On the other hand, the United States appeared to be contemplating a measure of special military aid to Egypt in order to strengthen the regime in power there.

In their conversation on December 26, 1952, Ambassador Davis was able to give Mr. Sharett no assurances which would indicate that the apprehensions of the Government of Israel were not well founded.

6. On December 30, 1952 the Government of the United Kingdom publicly announced its intention to continue selling jet aircraft to the States of the Near East. This statement was issued immediately after the Arab governments, meeting in Cairo, had reaffirmed their refusal to conclude a peace settlement with Israel, notwithstanding the express desire of the Western Powers that they negotiate such a settlement.

This disposition by the United States and the United Kingdom to increase the armament of Arab States, principally Egypt, has coincided with the following political developments in the Near East.

a. On September 14, 1952, at a time when a moderate atmosphere was beginning to prevail, six Arab States decided to raise a discussion of the “Palestine” question in the United Nations on the basis of vehement charges against Israel and extreme one-sided proposals. The General Assembly ignored or rejected all these charges and proposals, but only after the Arab States had provoked a fierce debate which increased regional tension.

b. In September 1952, under the initiative of General Naguib, the Arab States published a declaration that they were “at war” with Israel and threatened the Federal Republic of Germany with drastic reprisals if that Government did not repudiate its agreement obliging it to make material compensation for the plunder of European Jewry.

c. In the United Nations on November 12 and November 25, 1952, Egypt again announced its alleged state of belligerency with Israel as a reason for opposing the Israeli-German agreement. The Ambassador said he understood that it has not been usual for the United States to authorize the export of arms to States which proclaim belligerency and a “state of war” with other States in friendly relation with the United States.

d. During December 1952 the Arab States in the United Nations, together with Asian and Communist states, opposed a Resolution supported by the United States, the United Kingdom, France, many countries of Western Europe, the Commonwealth and Latin America, and later approved by the Special Political Committee of the General Assembly, calling for a negotiated peace between the Arab States and Israel. The United States spokesman had described this Resolution as “fair to all legitimate Arab interests.” Israel had accepted it and made a detailed peace proposal, including non-aggression undertakings, to which the Arab States had failed to respond.

e. Egypt has continued, and still continues, to refuse compliance with the Security Council’s Resolution of September 1, 1951 calling for an end of all blockade regulations and practices. While Egypt appears to have retreated, under the prospect of discussions in the United Nations, from particular extensions of the blockade recently initiated by General Naguib, the blockade regulations as they existed when the Security Council condemned them on September 1, 1951 are still in force without any modification. The Ambassador said he understood that it has not been usual, since the establishment of the United Nations, for the United States to authorize the export of arms to a government which was in violation of the security provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, as interpreted in a Security Council Resolution. Indeed, on August 4, 1949, according to statements made by Ambassador Warren Austin, the United States undertook to support the resumption of arms to Near Eastern states only on condition that no “acts of hostility” would be committed and by definition of the United States representative in the Security Council on August 16, 1951, blockade is certainly to be regarded as an “act of hostility”.

f. The Arab Governments, especially Egypt and Syria, have continued to dissociate themselves from all plans for defending democracy in the Near East against any aggression from outside. It will be recalled that in the Security Council on June 25, 1950, Egypt had declined to approve resistance to aggression in Korea, with the result that this resistance was almost deprived of the international sanction which constitutes one of its most important moral and material assets. Proposals for regional defence in the Near East have been frustrated by Egypt’s opposition in principle, which has still not been modified. As recently as December 23, 1952, Egypt and Syria aided a Communist propaganda manoeuvre by leading a group of Arab-Asian States in abstaining on a Resolution directing gross insult against United Nations forces, and especially American troops in Korea.

g. Democracy, which is the only sure moral foundation for a free world united against tyranny, has been increasingly set aside in Arab States in favor of dictatorships, at the very time when Parliamentary government has been stabilized and widened in Israel. To the Government of Israel it appears inconceivable that the Western Powers, in their arms policy, should discriminate in favor of those whose internal and international policies show no responsible awareness of the threats to world freedom.

The Ambassador summarized by saying the Arab Governments, principally Egypt, are in conflict with the policies of the free world, including Israel, on the following points: Refusal to negotiate an Arab-Israel peace settlement; maintenance of a doctrine of belligerency and war; active practices of blockade in pursuit of a theory of belligerency rejected by the Security Council; neutralism accompanied by a refusal to cooperate with Israel or with other powers in organizing the defence of the area for freedom; unwillingness to maintain or respect free institutions.

Each of these factors by itself might well justify the suspension of projects for increasing the armament of Arab States. In aggregate, they seem to constitute a remarkably impressive list of disqualifications for arms aid.

There are many methods, short of the perilous increase of military power, whereby the Western Powers, if they desire, can strengthen the economic stability of Near Eastern States in ways which would not affect Israel’s security. There are also opportunities whereby the influence of the Western Powers could be effectively used to promote peace and democracy in the area. But for the Western Powers to select this moment of renewed tension for sending arms to Egypt, or other Arab countries, would surely constitute a threat to the security of Israel; to the peace of the Near East; and to principles of equity, caution and restraint which the United States and the United Kingdom both agreed to observe in statements to the Security Council on August 4, 1949, and in the Tripartite Declaration which they made jointly with France on May 25, 1950.

The Secretary stated that he was impressed with the seriousness of the problems raised by the Ambassador. The Arab reaction to the Israel-German agreement came as a surprise to him, the Secretary said, as he had not anticipated such a strong reaction. He hoped a solution would soon be worked out.

The Secretary then referred to the question of arms for the Arab States and said that our participation in the Tripartite Declaration was, and continues to be, a serious undertaking. We do not have the slightest disposition to start an arms race.

The Secretary said we do want to strengthen General Naguib, although we find it difficult to determine how best to do so. The Secretary felt that General Naguib has moved a long way toward a solution of the Sudan problem, and appears willing to do something regarding the base. After these two problems have been resolved General Naguib should be able to move toward peace, including the Suez blockade and other problems which more directly concern Israel.

The United States has considered ways to extend economic help to General Naguib, but we have a surplus of what the Egyptians have available for sale. Long staple cotton is an example. General Naguib wants military equipment. Most of it is for internal security purposes, but some is not. Regarding the latter, the Secretary felt that the Israel Government was rightly concerned. However, we do not consider the amount contemplated involves any threat to Israel. Our purpose is to provide General Naguib with a foundation of military assistance—to encourage him and to get him into a position where he will be with us, and not out of control. We see no threat to Israel—or at most only a “paper” or theoretical threat, as General Naguib’s army is not very good and our military aid will be so modest it could not cause any upsetting of the balance in the Near East.

With regard to the British decision to supply jet aircraft to certain Near East states, the Secretary said that this came as a surprise to him. He understood the British motivation was purely commercial.

In conclusion the Secretary said that all he could say at the moment was that he was deeply appreciative of the seriousness of the problems raised by the Ambassador and that he would carefully reexamine them in the light of what the Ambassador had said. He emphasized, however, that we believe it is most important that two problems—Sudan and the base—be settled as soon as possible.

Ambassador Eban informed the Secretary that Israel’s Foreign Minister, Mr. Sharett, has gone to Rangoon to attend the Asian Socialist Conference. The Foreign Minister instructed Ambassador Eban to express to the Secretary Israel’s appreciation for the consideration which the Secretary has always shown and the help given in the solution of some of Israel’s problems.