357.AC/12–1952: Telegram
No. 534
The Ambassador in Lebanon (Minor) to the Department of State1
1206. I have refrained from expressing my opinions re our UN attitude on Palestine because I have not wished compromise my reporting usefulness by overemphasis, for fear of being marked down as unreasonably pro-Arab (which I am not) and to avoid reputation of being a crank (which I hope I am not). But dream world aura of Dept’s 671, Dec 15, 1952,2 causes prudence to give way to candor. Please, therefore, bear with me while I play this last (tragic) movement of Near Eastern sonata.
I have long plugged for an area-wide, unbiased, truly Amer Near Eastern policy, free from Zionist pressures or Arab emotional intransigencies. We simply must reassure Arabs, set at rest their overweening fears, and give evidence of objectivity. If this is not done, it is quite possible Arab world will drift into chaos and ultimately go way of China. It is even possible that Russian game of anti-Semitic footsie will give Russians high position in Arab world which is already full of neutralism. Perhaps we have deceived ourselves into thinking Arab world in last four years was out of the battle. Arabs have indeed been punch drunk, but they are very much back in the ring for another go and have plenty of new-found energy and friends to see them through.
I have long also stressed the view that mechanisms of power in NE are inadequate to remedy situation until human, psychological, political atmosphere is improved. I have consistently advised against pushing MEDO until the general political framework in NE is right. I have pointed out hopelessness improving our position through Point 4 under these negative circumstances. I now suggest that economic aid to NE is unrealistic until we have psychological setting in which such efforts could be made effective. Gailani in Iraq told Sen Gillette that 15 billion dollars of Amer money under these circumstances wld not win Arab world and had just as well be poured into Mediterranean. This is bravado and exaggeration, but it contains generous germ of truth.
Specifically, if our action on Palestine at UN was designed to put Arabs on defensive or show Arab world exactly where we stand, it was successful. If, however, our eye was on ultimate objective of reestablishing [Page 1083] an Amer leadership position in NE, it was misguided. Coming at time when Arab world is inflamed against us, when logic has given way to emotionalism, and when Arabs are beginning to turn screws on us in retaliation, such actions set us back violently and needlessly. True, the Arabs are acting in a childish fashion, the difficulty of dealing with them is more than apparent to us who face them daily. But if we are to make progress, we must endeavor see things through their eyes and understand the complexes which govern them.
I wish I were capable of painting a word picture to instill in the Dept the sense of urgency to our own national interest which we Americans of all kinds in the NE feel. Loss of this great land mass, coming on top of the loss of China, could truly be a national catastrophe. It can be avoided, in my opinion, if hard decisions are taken. The Arabs will and must be required to settle for less than the destruction of Israel. Once they are convinced that we are not solidly with Israel and against them, and once our leadership position is restored, we can follow a middle of the road course with courage and conviction.
It is a time of hard decision. Could we not seek out some reasonable action which would convince the Arab world of our objectivity. I suggest the internationalization of Jerusalem (although I know reaction in Wash will be that it is impossible and can be done only by force). Nevertheless, it is a just issue on which to stand, one already approved by the UN, and one which wld give dramatic evidence to the Arab world that we can say “no” to Zionism. In any event, I hope we will stop trying to force Arab world into peace with Israel for this can only frustrate its own objective and contribute to our further decline in the area.
- Sent by pouch to Amman, Baghdad, Cairo, Damascus, Jidda, and Tel Aviv.↩
- Reference is presumably to circular telegram 671 of Dec. 15; see footnote 2, Document 530.↩