Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, The Near and Middle East, Volume IX, Part 1

683.84A/12–852: Telegram

No. 529
The Ambassador in Syria (Moose) to the Department of State¹

secret

Damascus, December 8, 1952—3 p.m.

411. Tel Aviv Embtel 902, December 3. Limited quantity arms for Syr need not lessen chances Syro–Israeli agrmt. Strong regime in Damascus can more effectively carry out policy of conciliation. Only major Syr agrmts on sensitive issues since Pal war have been concluded by strong Govts: Tapline concession and Syro-Israel armistice by Zaim, and UNRWA agrmt by Shishikli. That supply of arms enhances Western influence in Syr demonstrated by French and more recently by UK (Embdes 314 November 20).²

Against advantages to West of promotion stable and friendly regime in Arab states, Israeli arguments against delivery UK jets would seem carry little weight. Israel reliance should surely not be placed on keeping surrounding states impotent and unsatisfied but rather on increasing coop among mutually self-respecting states in context tripartite declaration and eventual area defense arrangements.

ReEmbtel 400 December 1³ MAC chairman Taxis confirms he forwarded to Israel reps several weeks ago Syr message indicating GOS willingness resume discussions. If, as described Tel Aviv Embtel 665 October 23, Israel is interested “in making [peace] with neighbors and becoming integrated in region,” difficult see why Israel so slow in responding forthrightly to Syr initiative on zone discussion.

Moose

1. Repeated to Tel Aviv, Amman, Baghdad, Beirut, Cairo, London, and Paris.
2. Not printed.
3. Not printed, but see footnote 4, supra.