Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, The Near and Middle East, Volume IX, Part 1

IO files, lot 71 D 440

No. 526
Minutes of the Fifteenth Meeting of the United States Delegation to the Seventh Regular Session of the United Nations General Assembly, New York, November 28, 1952

secret
US/A/M(Chr)/252

New York, November 28, 1952

The Secretary opened the meeting and called upon Mr. Barco.

I. Palestine

Mr. Barco began his presentation with a short history of the Palestine case in the General Assembly. At the end of the 1948 Session, the Palestine Conciliation Commission (PCC) had been established to assist the parties to resolve their differences. The resolution called for an extension of the scope of the armistice negotiations to be undertaken either by the parties themselves, or with the help of the PCC. It urged that the refugees who wished to return to Palestine should be allowed to do so. Those not desiring to return were to be compensated. Responsibility for repatriating or compensating was given to the PCC. The third responsibility of the Commission was to draft a statute for the international regime in Jerusalem.

The theme of the activities of the PCC had been one of frustration. Many attempts had been made, and almost all were total failures. During the first year, the Commission tried to bring the parties together on the various issues referred to above. Its failure in this attempt was reported to the Assembly. Efforts were continued along these lines in 1950, with an emphasis on seeking to get the parties to negotiate directly.

In 1951, the Commission had sought to make proposals itself on matters of substance. In July of that year a conference of the parties with the PCC was called, in Paris, in accordance with the request by the Arab Delegations for the PCC to mediate. Proposals concerning repatriation, compensation, the discharge of war claims, and territorial readjustments were made by the Commission and rejected virtually out of hand by both parties. At the Sixth Session of the Assembly, in Paris, the United States had proposed that the Commission impress upon the parties the fact that primary responsibility rested upon them. A resolution was passed which kept the Commission available to the parties, but they had made no real attempt to use it. On a few limited questions the Commission had used its own initiative. The PCC had obtained the agreement of the Government of Israel to release the blocked accounts of the Arab refugees held in foreign banks in Israel. A first installment of one million pounds sterling had been released, and the Commission was trying to work out, with the Arabs, a scheme for disbursing this sum.

At the Seventh Session of the Assembly a new situation had arisen wherein two items on the political questions of Palestine had been proposed by the parties. There had been no PCC report to the Assembly in 1952, but only progress reports made to the membership of the UN. The first item was that proposed by the Arabs, and some Asian delegations, which would have the PCC carry out its work in the light of past resolutions of the Assembly. The second item, introduced by Israel, involved the “refusal” of the Arab States to assume the obligations of the Charter and of the resolutions of the Assembly to come to terms with Israel and settle their differences.

Regarding the first item, Mr. Barco said that the Arabs planned to introduce a resolution (US/A/AC.61/7)¹ which would state that the PCC had not been able to fulfill its mandate and so would change the membership from 3 to 7 members. It would contain very strict terms of reference in accordance with the 1948 resolution of the Assembly, and would have the Commission sit in Jerusalem. It was not, at that time, certain whether this resolution would be introduced. The Arabs had been told that we could not accept this draft, that it was not helpful to increase the membership, and that the terms of reference should relate to the possible, building on what little had been done in the past. We had asked them to give us something in writing, but up to that time they had not done so.

Six “neutral” delegations had introduced the resolution contained in document A/AC.61/L.23² concerning the second item. This resolution had been inspired by the Israeli Delegation and contained a clear call to the parties for direct negotiations and asked the PCC, as presently constituted, to remain available. In answer to questions as to the US attitude on this draft resolution, we had indicated that we were sympathetic to its objectives, but pointed out that we had no responsibility for drafting it, and were offering no amendments. We felt that the best way to obtain progress, in view of the frustrating history of this case, was to do whatever was possible on certain technical questions while hoping that one day the parties would agree to negotiate directly. At that point the only thing to do was to wait upon the Arab delegations to see how far they would go, and how near they might come to our views.

Mrs. Roosevelt asked whether the United States had ever told the Arabs that repatriation of the refugees to Israel was impossible. Mr. Barco answered that this had never been done officially or publicly, but that certain statements had implied this. He added that if this idea could be accepted, it would remove one very thorny obstacle to a final settlement. The fear was, however, that if it were publicly stated, it would most likely provoke the Arabs and prevent negotiations.

Mrs. Roosevelt noted that Baroodi (Saudi Arabia) had talked in very sentimental and nostalgic tones of the houses and the trees, and the land that awaited the return of the Arab refugees. However, during her trip through Israel the previous Spring, she had not found any of these unoccupied houses, to which Baroodi referred, in Haifa or elsewhere. In fact, the great influx of population had eliminated whatever excess land there had been. She recalled that she had been greeted by groups of both Arab children and adults, who spoke no English, but who arose spontaneously upon seeing her, and spoke in perfect English saying, we want to go home. It had been obvious to her that this was all a manufactured spontaneity. While, no doubt, originally these refugees had desired to return, that feeling would long since have died, but for the fact that it was being nurtured and kept alive by the Arabs for their own purposes. She thought that perhaps we could encourage the few realists and urge their acceptance of a “temporary resettlement”, which would have to be for a very long time.

Mrs. Roosevelt had been quite depressed at the things she had seen in the Arab refugee camps. There was a total lack of the necessary preservation of skills and crafts which should be handed down from the older to the younger generation, a lack which was due to an attempt to avoid anything which might become permanent. Conditions in these camps were “dreadful”. Arab officials and, perhaps, a few Communists, bore the responsibility for keeping these conditions alive. Mrs. Roosevelt realized that she could not say all this to them as plainly as she spoke to the Delegation, but if the Arabs “were going to wail for two thousand years”, like the Jews in waiting for a return to their homeland, it should be at a new place and something would have to be done for the intervening generations.

Mr. Plitt noted that he and Mr. Byroade and other members of the NEA Bureau, in their private talks with the Arabs, had always urged against the keeping alive of the idea of repatriation. A most recent example had been in a talk with Prince Faisal, of Saudi Arabia, but his reaction had been typical. This was simply not an issue on which the Arabs could back down. Ambassador Jessup agreed that the situation of the Arab refugees was deplorable, and acknowledged that the Arab States were responsible for keeping this matter stirred up. He noted, however, that the Arabs felt themselves in a bad bargaining position, and realized that the emotional appeal of the plight of the refugees was a valuable bargaining element. We must take this attitude of the Arabs into account. Furthermore, in the Assembly, with Arab leaders such as Jamali, of Iraq, making wild and extreme statements, no other Arab Delegate could publicly disagree although many did so in private.

It seemed to the Secretary, in his talk with the Syrian Foreign Minister, that there had been an indication that there might be a slight movement from dead-center. The Syrian had told him of their plans for “improvement in the conditions of living” of the Arab refugees. While they refused to call this resettlement, it seemed to amount to the same thing.

Mr. Ward Allen asked what the general climate was with regard to the two resolutions referred to above. Mr. Barco saw a widespread feeling for a more realistic approach to the overall problem. A certain amount of bargaining would have to be done, but at least the Assembly was trying to move this matter along. Mr. Stein pointed to a hopeful sign, in that some delegations had flatly stated, in their speeches, that large-scale repatriation to Israel was impossible.

Ambassador Jessup said that the complex history of this case in the Assembly indicated a certain pattern which would apply to these two resolutions. The six-power draft was generally known to have been inspired by the Israelis. The Arabs were, so far, feeling their way. The general tendency in the past had been to reach a common ground so that neither side violently opposed what the Assembly finally adopted. We could expect, therefore, an extreme Arab draft resolution from which they could move toward a compromise. Alternatively, the Arabs might introduce their extreme ideas as amendments to the six-power draft. It was generally felt, in the Assembly, that there was little use in passing something which one side or the other vehemently opposed.

[Here follows a short discussion of the situation in Korea.]

The Delegation meeting then adjourned.

Charles D. Cook

1. Not printed.

2. This joint draft resolution, originally submitted to the Ad Hoc Political Committee by Canada, Denmark, Ecuador, the Netherlands, Norway, and Uruguay, was also later sponsored by Cuba (A/AC.61/L.23/Rev.1) and by Panama (A/AC.61/L.23/Rev.2). Under this eight-power draft resolution (A/AC.61/L.23/Rev.2), the General Assembly would (1) call upon all parties to desist from any further acts of hostility; (2) reaffirm the principle that the governments concerned had the primary responsibility for reaching a settlement; (3) urge these governments to begin early direct negotiations for a settlement; and (4) request the Palestine Conciliation Commission to be available for that purpose, if so desired.

   In the course of the debate on the Palestine item in the Ad Hoc Political Committee between Nov. 25 and Dec. 11, two other draft resolutions were submitted: a joint draft resolution by Afghanistan, Indonesia, Iran, and Pakistan (A/AC.61/L.25); and a Syrian draft resolution (A/AC.61/L.33).