Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, The Near and Middle East, Volume IX, Part 1

Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 156

No. 41
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State¹

secret
ST D–8/2

New Delhi, May 22, 1953—1 p.m.

Subject:

• India

Participants:

• Prime Minister Nehru
• Secretary Dulles

1. We discussed Egyptian situation. I gave a detailed report of the situation as I found it and the lines of possible solution. Mr. Nehru expressed great concern over the possibility that undeclared war might break out with a possible British reoccupation of Cairo and Alexandria. He said, of course, the British can do this, but what will they do next: “bayonets are no good to sit on.” He inquired as to the relationship of the proposed Egypt base agreement to a collective security organization. I indicated the importance of assuring the creation of such a collective security organization with at least some form of UK and US associate membership so that before the British technicians were out of the base it would assume an international status with availability to the US and UK. I emphasized that this was the only real power area in the whole region and that it served far more than the Suez Canal.

2. Mr. Nehru brought up the subject of the Korean armistice, referring particularly to my statement of the preceding day, that if there was no armistice hostilities might become more intense. He said that if this happened it would be difficult to know what the end might be. He urged withdrawal of our armistice proposals inconsistent with the Indian resolutions, notably the provision regarding Korean POWs and unanimity. He agreed that there should be some provision for ultimate freeing of the POWs not desiring to be repatriated, stating that it would be an “impossible Situation,” for them to rot away with no end to their incarceration. I said that our formula was designed to meet that situation plus the likelihood that the communists would not accept the Indian resolution that future of POWs be referred finally to UN Assembly. Nehru agreed that this would probably be inacceptable because of communist China’s absence from the UN. He made no alternate proposal. He brought up again my reference to intensified operations, but I made no comment and allowed the topic to drop.

3. Nehru brought up the problem of Africa, stating that unless Colonial powers adopted a more liberal policy he believed the whole continent would be lost through violent revolution. He described in some detail the Mau Mau situation, and said that this was typical of what might become a rather general situation. We then went on to discuss generally the colonial problem. I said that the US was faithful to its traditions in these matters and would like nothing better than to work openly for political liberty, but that we did not feel that we could afford an open break with the British and French in this matter. He agreed that an open break should be avoided but hoped that our influence would continue to be exerted, in favor of nationalism, saying that if communism had monopoly of that issue they would surely win in Africa and Asia. We discussed the Laos situation which Nehru considered to be a local rebellion but which I said, according to our information, was pure aggression from without. Mr. Nehru raised in this connection the role of a nephew of the Prime Minister of Laos, who he said was leading the invasion. I said we apparently had conflicting intelligence.

4. I brought up the problem of Kashmir,² and I said I was glad to know that Nehru intended to deal with this directly with the Prime Minister of Pakistan. I suggested that partition might be a better solution than a plebiscite. Nehru indicated agreement and recalled that at some earlier time he had proposed to Pakistan a settlement on the basis of the status quo. He indicated he might renew this proposal in London.

5. I referred to reported Indian concern over Pakistan as a member of MEDO. I said it seemed to me unlikely that MEDO as originally projected would come into being at an early date and that the US had no present plans that would bring it into a military relationship with Pakistan which could reasonably be looked upon as unneutral as regards India. Mr. Nehru expressed satisfaction at this declaration.

6. I reported to Nehru in some detail the conflict between King Ibn Said and the British regarding the area of British protectorate particularly around Buraimi. I suggested that this might come up at their Commonwealth meeting and that I would like him to be informed of the King’s attitude and of his effort to bring us into the situation, adversely to the UK.

Note: The entire conversation was extremely cordial and frank.

1. This conversation took place at the residence of the Prime Minister.
2. For documentation, see vol. xi, Part 2, pp. 1162 ff.